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The problem of creation has a long history in Greek
and Christian thought, and in Islam the Mutakallimun and
Palasifa have equally been preoccupied with it. The
doctrine of creation in al-Ghazall and Averroes, besides
being of historical importance, is also of basic interest
in philosophy and theology. Metaphysics presented a
formidable challenge to Muslim theology, especially in such
vital questions, as the creation ex-nihilo. the eternity of
matter, the One and many or the unity and multiplicity.
The fundamental notions concerning God are unity, His act
of creation, and the dependence of all creation on Him for
its sustenance. These are stated in the Qur'an in a
manner which is neither philosophical nor dialectical.
The philosophers of Islam tried to interpret and reconcile
these with the philosophical ideas. In Islam, philosophy
found its first field of development in speculative theology,
the obvious aim of which was to state the dogmas of the
religion so as to bring them into agreement with the demands
of contemporary knowledge. With the translations of the
Greek or Syriac texts into Arabic, Muslim thinkers became
acquainted with the One of Neoplatonic theology, Aristotle's
highest Good or the Prime unmoved Mover through fhe Theology
of Aristotle - which has now been recognized as consisting
2
of extracts from the JNeoplatonic philosopher Motdums.
Writings like these, together with Aristotle's he Anima,
Physics, and especially his Metaphysics. embodied rational
concepts of God, and the universe, which were at vai'iance
with the description of the nature and attributes of God in
the Qur'an. The Falasifa became the recipients and
transmitters of that philosophy. They saw the problem of
revelation and reason as a contrast between the divinely
revealed law and the human law devised by reason. Thus the
harmony of the Faith and reason became the goal of Muslim
philosophers from al-Xindl (d. circ.260/873) onwards. The
Muslim philosophers began with the position that the Qur'an
is truth and philosophy too is truth; but truth can only be
one; therefore, the Qur'an (revelation) and philosophy
(reason) must agree. This seems essentially a response to
the challenge that reached the Muslim world from Greek
thought. It is to be noted that this Greek philosophy
was accepted by Muslim^ as it had been previously accepted
by Greek and Latin Christians, as providing a "natural
theology". It was affected by the heoplatonic followers.
In this connection the Greek philosophers of the latter
period - that is Alexandrian Syriac thought - have their
bearing on Muslim thought.
3
The two Tahafuts, with al-Ghazall's al-Maqasid, which
is a compendium of the thought of Muslim Keoplatoniets -
al-is'arabl and Avicenna - taken together epitomise the essential
problems for Muslim thinkers arising from the impact of
classical philosophy on the teachings of Muslim philosophy
and theology during the fifth and sixth centuries A.B.
(eleventh and twelfth centuries A.J.) as well as summarizing
the views of the earlier centuries of Muslim thought#
home of these ideas say seem to be of mere historical value
today but are nevertheless of vital importance from the
point of view of both philosophy and theology. The Muslim
belief in a personal God involves the implication of His
relation with the world and it® dependence upon Him. This is
the main reason why al-Ghazall discussed these problems
at length and particularly gave the prise place, at the
heed of the of the twenty discussions in the Tahafut. to the
problem of the eternity of matter and the doctrine of
creation. He criticized the views of the earlier Muslim
thinker® (expounded in al-nacasld al-faiasifa) in his
Tahafut al-falasifa because of their over-stressed rational¬
istic approach and adopted a theological approach to
reality.
Averroes, on the other hand, criticized al-Ghazall
in his fahifut at-tahafut. His intellectual effort was
4-
essentially a reaction against the theological pragmatism of
al-Qhazali; a return to what one might call Aristotelian
positivism, as much as this could be reconciled with Muslim
theology.
The main reason which made me select this robleia
for discussion is its major importance in Muslim theology.
CHAPTER I
The Concept of Creation in the Qur'an
5
OHAfTSri I
The Concept of Creation in the Our'an
Introduction
The Qur'an includes views on the subject of creation,
but this is not confined to the philosophical or metaphysical
interpretation of the fundamental character of creation,
ir'alasifa and theologians derived their inspiration from the
Qur'an and interpreted the verses in a manner favourable to
their doctrine. But what is, from the objective point of
view, the Qur'anic view on the subject? The whole Qur'an
is impregnated with the thought of creation and a feeling of
profound admiration for it, and though there is not much in
the Qur'an which specifically deals with the whole process of
original creation, yet it abounds in allusions to God's
creative activity as the manifestation of His omnipotence
and omniscience. There are two types of references to
creation in the Qur'an:
firstly, the creation of the heavens and the earth
and all that is in themj
Secondly, the creation of man.
In order to try to interpret the treatment of the
concept of creation by the Qur'an, it is proper to discuss
the etymology of the terms used for creation in the Qur'an,
6
The Qur'an uses a number of verbs for the creation of the
e
heavens and the earth, and of man, such as : bada ; khalaqa;
bara'a; sawwara; ,jaCala; fatara. At first sight these
terms may appear to be synonymous but on consideration one
finds that they are not so, and in fact they signify different
aspects of creation.
The Meanings of the various Terms used for creation
1. Badlc or Badac
,c 1
The Qur'an mentions: badi as-samawat wa-1 ard.
The term badlc occurs twice in the Qur'an and only in
connection with the creation of the heavens and the earth.
*r»C C
lVow what is the meaning® of badi » or of its verbal form, bada ?
Bada . means to innovate, make, produce, invent; or to bring
something into existence which has not existed before, and not
2
after the similitude of anything pre-existing. it may mean
to make something for the first time which had no previous
existence, or the production of a thing unknown before.
Bada may mean to begin or originate a thing for the first
time, not after the example of anything preceeding. It may
3
also mean creating that which has no example or similitude.
It signifies novelty, strangeness or the wonder of something
^Qur. 2:117; 6:101.
p 0
Lisan... art. Badi % ix,pp.351-53*
3Lane's Lexi...I,i,pp.166-67.
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unknown before. According to these meanings, badac goes
back to the very primal beginning as far as one can conceive
it. Tetoda'i with ham aa., aai—wa huwa lladhi ./abdu.' tt—a±-
CT A
-kihialc.a thunmn yu iduhu, that is, "it ic no who begins the
prooooo of creation, thon ropoato it", implies the bogiiming
of creation. Ihus, according to the commentators, like
at-Tabari and az-Zamakhshari, badlc as-samawat wa-1 ard means
• • ' 5"
he who invented the heavens and the earth with no pre-existing
2
~c
model. Al-Badi as the attribute of God, means the origi-
:nator of the creation. It means the Creator and the
Inventor who creates and invents without a model. Al-Badic
is the one who brings what has no precedent in terms of an
act similar to it, but there is no reference to* creation out
of nothingness. Ahio is made olocror in tho up*an-:
■sXlarTnl ahcon a kullf ^Ttay' -ii-dpnaliu v;a bada khalna !■ insan
3
mi a tin, wharo tho beginning of 'uhc creation of .jrictlnc
mjri from olay io aontionodt Jo, badic means one who
originates the things; brings them into existence; makes
them or produces them for the.first time, but not out of
nothingness.
According to the philosophers' interpretation,like
that of Averroes, the word badac must be understood in the
^Qur. 30:27; & also 30:11.
2 t — c —
Az-Jamakhshari, Al-kashshaf an Haqa'iq at-Tanzil. i,181; ii,53;
(Beirut,19;+7); At-Tabari, Jarni0 al-bayan can fa'wil al-Qur'an.




sense 'to create out of something', as they refer it to the
Qur'an where it is stated: wa «jaCalna min al- ma' kulla shay'
- _ _ 1
hayy ; or thumma- stawa ila-s-sama' wa hiy dukhan. In this
way they argue that matter is pre-existing and eternal.
The commentators might point out that where it is said:
badiC as samawat wa-1 ard, the Qur'an also mentions: khalaqar» 2
kulla shay' and khaliqu kulli shay'. Thus, if one postulates
such a primal matter, it owes its origin itself to God, who is
the original basis of all existence. 'God creates all things'
signifies that He does not merely fashion but also creates
everything. There is no doubt that by stating God as
khaliqu kulli shay', the Qur'an has enlarged the scope of the
attributes of the Creator, so as to include the creation of
everything. But this verse does not give us any information
about the initial creation of the heavens and the earth.
The lexicographical and exegetical works belong to a comparatively
late period, and reflect the views of a more sophisticated
age. As a result the Muslim scholars arrived at a different
conclusion of the Qur'anic idea of creation. Most of them
think that the Qur'an teaches the idea of creation out of
rc
nothingness. The commentators insist on giving badi the
meaning of 'innovator' or bada 'to innovate out of nothingness'.
But close observation of the verses in which the Qur'an
used this word shows that these commentators are exceedingly
%anahi ,j. .» p . 205: ffasl. . .p.4-2; cf. Our. 21:50 & 4-1:11
2Qur. 6:101-2.
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far from the proper meaning of the usage of the word, as in
badlc as-samawat wa-1 ard, the word badTc is to be understood
# —————
in the sense of the one who creates out of something, because
in another place in the Qur'an it is clearly stated that the
1
'heavens were created out of smoke'.
In fact, the Qur'an does not indulge in any philosophical
discussion of the concept of creation. There is no indication
of the notion of creation ex-nihilo in the Qur'an.
2. Khalaqa
Another word of note in connection with the process of
creation is khalaqa. It is the term applied in the Qur'an
to God's creativity and it occurs frequently in the context
of the creation of man, the creation of the heavens and the
earth, and of everything. The word appears in the very
c c 2
first revealed sura al- alaq as: khalaqa 1-insan min alaq,
where it is used for the creation of man out of a 'blood-clot'.
Here creation is out of something already existing, but as a
gradual process of development. Later, the word khalaqa
is used in connection with the creation of the heavens and
the earth in six days: inna rabbakumu-l-lahu alladhi khalaqa
- 3
-s-samawat wa-1 arda fi sittati ayyam1. In sura Hud,
—-
A
cf. tur. 41:11; and see also for this the comment&ry of





there appears for the first time the idea of the throne upon
waters wa huwa alladhx khalaqa-s-samawat wa-1 arda fl sittati
ayyam wa kana carshuhu cala-l-ma'. that to say that all life
evolved out of the waters and this statement occurs in a
different way in the Qur'an in sura al-anbiya' as: awa lam
yara lladhlna kafaru inna-s-samawat wa-1 arda kanata ratqan
fafataqnahuma wa ,1acalna min-l-ma' kulla shay* hayy. 2
In sura iiissilat, there appears the doctrine that the origin
„
3
of heaven was smoke.
In the above mentioned passages, the creation of the
heavens and the earth, the evolution of life on our globe are
mentioned first; and the making of the sky into the seven
firmaments is mentioned last. It is stated that when the
sky was made into the seven firmaments, it had existed
previously as smoke, vapour, or steam. It does not refer
to the original creation of the heavens or of other living
things. No precise information is given to us on the subject.
Before establishing any definite view, it is proper
to determine the meaning of the term khalaqa. Linguistically,
the word khalaqa is used in the sense 'to measure and to cut
out', for example when the blacksmith makes horse shoes,
this operation can only take place if something is already





determining the measure or proportion of a thing, or the making
of a thing by measure, or according to the measure of another
1
thing, or proportioning a thing to another thing. It also
signifies the bringing of a thing into existence according to
2
a certain measure or to the requirement of wisdom. It means
that God brings into existence the creation or the created
beings or mankind according to the predetermination required
5
by wisdom.
Ihus, when one consults the Qur'an, one finds that the
woixi khalaqa is used as a term for creation in the sense to
form something out of something, as xx the khalq of man from
4
clay or of blood-clot; or to create in a general sense, as
5
the khalq of the heavens and the earth. It is also used
when the creation of things in accordance with the requirement
of wisdom is involved. It also suggests creation as a
gradual process of development. The Qur'an says:
We created man of an extraction of clay,
then we set him, a drop, in a receptacle secure,
(the early condition of the embryo in the womb)
then We created of the drop a clot
then We created of the clot a tissue
then We created of the tissue bones
wane's hexi...I,i,pp.799-300.
2cf. wur. 30:8.
^Az-Zaia., al-Kash...ii« 323; cf. Qur. 10:3.
4Qur. 32:7; 96:2.
3Ibid. 25:39} 10:3; 32:4.
6cf. Companion to the Qur'an. 23:13
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then We garmented the bones in flesh;
thereafter "We produced him as another creature.
80 blessed be God, the fairst of creators!
The following passage of the -^ur'an conveys the general
meaning of the term frhalaga:
He created the heavens and the earth in truth ...
He created man of a sperm-drop...And the cattle -
He created them for you...and He creates what you know not
It is He who sends down to you out of heaven water
of which you have to drink,
and of which trees, for you to pasture your herds,
and thereby He brings forth
for you crops, and olives, and palms, and vines,
and all manner of fruit...
And He subjected to you the night and day, and
the sun and moon; and the stars are subjected
by His command...
Is He who creates (yakhluou) as
P
he who does not create?
hhalaqa in these verses indicates the gradual process of
development. This is the original meaning of the term.
Hut later on it has been given various meanings and the
meaning varies with the philosophy of the outlook of the
commentate!1. The method and terminology of philosophy
had become part of the language of the thinker and for this
1
,ur. 23i12-14j cf. also 22«5l 32:7-9; 35:11} & 4-0:67.
flbid. 16:3-17.
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reason, his ideas and solutions to religious problems -
such as the eternity of matter - came in fact to be
fundamentally philosophical in his method.
According to the protagonist of the view of creatio
ex-nihilo, the verb khalaqa means 'to initiate what had no
previous existence'. In other words, when one says that
God created the world, one means that He brought it from
non-existence into existence. This view is the most
widely accepted one among the commentators. Whereas in
the earliest commentaries, such as the commentary of
c - 1
ibn Abbas (d.68 A.H.) the terminology is very simple
and cannot be compared with that of the later commentaries. In
fact the earlier commentaries do not speak of any philosophical
^Cf, Ibn 0Abbas: Tafsir. Al-HashimI Press,1280. There is
also an Urdu trans., Tafsir-cAbbasi.Tr.c>Abdul Qadir,Delhi,
undated. But Muhammad Husain al-Dhahabi points out that
• •
"fchis fafsir is not authentic. Of. his at-Tafsir wa-1
Muffassirun. Cairo,l961.i»P»82; cf. also as-Suyuti:
al-Itqan. Cairo,1278. ii,222ff; & cf. also for the value
of ibn cAbbas as a commentator and his Tafsir see
Goldziher,I.:die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung.
Leiden, (^g20g 5|*f^o??§r Tafsir of Muqatil b. Sulayqtan
(d.150 A.H.) in the British Museum, No. Or,6333# But
it deals with the interpretation of verses concerning
legal problems only.
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implications of the terms. These tai£rs lack much of the
theoretical information from the natural sciences, philosophy
and theology. Most of the commentators, however, are
of a comparatively late date, and show later influences.
Their terminology becomes more and more complicated as time
goes on, until a commentary such as that of ar-Hazi is
saturated with natural science and philosophy, in addition
to legal and religious matters. Many of the present day
comiaentaries^practically digests of the modern sciences.
These considerations make the study of the commentaries a
matter' of wider significance than the interpretation of the
pir'an alone. These interpretations are in fact a reflection
of the development of doctrine and its impregnation with
elements of external origin. The task of the commentator
— 1
was to develop and reinterpret the sense of the Qur'an.
Thus, the commentators, as well as the theologians and
philosophers, are as far removed as they could be from the
literal interpretation when dealing with the fundamental
questions of theology, such as the creation of the world
and the existence of God. Their interpretations are only
an expression of views which they derived from many sources
included the Qur'an. This problem involves the whole of
Islamic thought, and is known as the problem of reconciliation




of revelation and reason. It is generally accepted that
the harmonization of the Qur'an and external thought was one
of the outstanding features of Islamic thought.
On the question of creation, the Qur'&n does not
speak of how created or how uncreated the world was in the
philosophical sense. It merely states that God created
the woxtLd, and the sense of the word khalaqa in this context
is undefined. It was long after the first two centuries
of Islam that the Muslim thinkers assign to the word khalaqa
a definite meaning; this resulted from the internal
development which had to meet the challenge of foreign
thought. The Qur'an was used to justify the new ideas by
an interpretative reading of the text, even to the point of
metaphorical interprecation.
flhat conclusion can be reached if one disregards
later interpretations and considers only the tur'an itself?
There are verses which support the idea of creation from
something pre-existing. They are:
And it is Be who created
the heavens and the earth in six days,
2
and Kxs .Throne was upon the waters -
1 _ _
~ee for this h.Y. Musa: Islam, part I, Ba.yn ad-;in wa-3. falsafa.
Ch.3; cf. Ave. Faslt and also Arberry, ea. :cv. pp„7,16ff.
The two Tahafuta have a special significance here.
2Qur. 11:7-9; 21:30; 41:9-12.
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These verses indicate creation out of general matter, and
recall the primordial matter of ancient coamology. These
verses also teach that God created heavens and the earth
out of water. He created the heavens from smoke. The
heavens and earth were a solid mass (rataq); then God
divided Cfataqa) this solid mass into the heavens and the
earth. How did God create this primordial matter, or the
water, no information is given to us. Those who hold the
view that the creation was out of nothingness insist that
God created the water too and that He created out of nothing.
The majority of the theologians, philologists and commentators
agree that linguistically the word khalaqa is used in the
sense*to measure and cut out', and this operation can only
take place with something already existing. Nevertheless,
some of the commentators insist that in the ikr'an the word
1
khalaqa means *to bring something out of non-existence*.
They made this distinction because they accepted the idea
of creation ex-nihiio. Subsequently, it became necessary
for them to transfer the word from its linguistic sense to
another meaning, which supports the idea of creation out
of nothingness. The adherent of this view quote the
1See al-Kash. . . i. 2131 ii,3 & 328.
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verses: khalaqa kulla shay's and wa qad khalaqtuka min
1
qablu wa-lam taku shay'a, in support of their argument.
But the text 'He created all things', does not help us in
understanding the definite meaning of the word khalaqa;
and therefore, those who believe in the eternity of matter
interpret it in the sense 'to form' or 'to order'.
The text of the second vorse, also does not give khalaqa
the meaning 'to bring all things into existence out of
nothingness'. The verse 'I created thee aforetime, when
thou wast nothing', occurs twice in the ^ur'an. The
meaning of the first verse is: 'I created thee (ZakarTya)
aforetime, when thou wast nothing'. The second verse
gives the same meaning, but this time man is addressed.
It is, therefore, logical to conclude that the
meaning of creation out of nothingness when given to the
word kh&laqa by commentators and philologists, is alien to
the linguistic and the ^ur'anic interpretation. For that
reason it must be an outcome of the internal and external
development of Islamic thought.
^Qur. 6:101; & 19:9.
2lbid. 19:9 & 19:67.
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Creation by saying "Hun"
The Qxar'an says that God brings the creation into
existence by ilis command 'Be'. It says: wa idha gad;
a.,** fa inDama wul lahu fcu. fa^ or
li-shay1 idha aradnahu an naqul lahu fayakun. Here God' s
'word* or fiat is itself the deed. There is no inter¬
position of time or condition between His will and its
consequences, for He is the Ultimate Geality. Ee is
independent of the proximate or material causes, for He
Himself creates them and establishes their laws as He pleases.
His creation is not dependent on instruments or means, or
any condition whatsoever. Existence waits on His will,
or plan or intention. The moment He wills a thing, it
becomes His word or command, and the thing forthwith conies
into existence. His will or command is sufficient to
bring all into existence and to determine everything.
But from this arise two difficulties:-
.Firstly, was the command addressed to something
absolutely non-existent? If so the command was absurd,
or was it addressed to something 'which had already existed?
If so, God's act was not creation.
1Ibid. 2:117; 36:82; 40:68.
"Ibid. 16:40.
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Secondly, if one says that something was non-existent
and then case into being, does thi3 not indicate that God's
knowledge must have changed when the object came into being?
To these objections, the answer is that while in
the life of created things there is 'proportion' and
'measure', and a lag of time or distance; in God's command,
the word, the execution, and the consequences are but a
single act. For example, by way of contrast one can take
an illustration like that of a man writing a book. He must
form the design in hi3 mind; he must prepare himself by
research, collection of knowledge, or of personal experience;
he must use or acquire the art of writing; he must collect
St
the material for writing, namely, paper, ink, pen etc.,
and this will connect with a chain of manufacturing processes
in which he is dependent upon other people's work and
experience. Then his work may have to be printed, and
depends upon other people's skill; and the lag of time,
space and circumstances will occur at numerous stapes.
In God's command, the word kun includes everything, without
the intervention of or dependence upon any other being
or thing whatever. Further, God knows the thing which
will come into being before it came into existence. Thus,
the non-existence is as much an object of God's knowledge
as that which exists. And the coming into being of an
object does not change God's knowledge. Again, the Qur'an
20
states i wa ma amnana ilia wahidatun kalamhin bil-basar.'1
»■ ' ■ ■■■ % Tg
The anr or command, direction or design is a single thing
unrelated to time, "like the twinkling of an eye".
Creatures are subject to time, but the Creator is not,
2
He has power to do all that He wills. He, being perfect,
determines only that which is perfect in its proper order,
3, Bara'a
Another word used for creation is bara'a. It means
creation free from defect. The primary meaning of
bara'a in Arabic is to denote a thing becoming clear or
free from another thing, either by being released or by
production, Bara'a is creation implying liberation from
pre-existing matter or circumstances, for example man's
4 . _ 5
body from clay. The Qur'an says: rain qabli an nabra'a-ha.
Jeffery says that the Hebrew equivalent to this
verb is bara'a, signifying "he created out of pre-existing
matter" or "he fashioned". In the sense of create, he
6
further says that it is borrowed from the older religions.
1wur. 34:30.
^Ibid. 2:109| et passim.
^Lane's hexi..,I.i.p.178,
^Baydawl, Anwar-ut-lanzll. ii,51.
^ur. 37 J 22
6 —
The foreign Vocabulary of the ur'an.p,76.
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In this connection, it can he pointed out that the
Qur'an has been revealed in the plain Arabic language of
the time. "We have made it an Arabic Qur'an; haply you
"j —
will understand". If the Qur'an uses this word bara'a
in the sense to make or to create, which in Hebrew means
to shape or create, one can say that the Our'an makes use
of words prevalent in Arabic as it is stated: "We have
2
made it easy by thy tongue". Thus, if the pur'an retains
the word bara'a. used in the older religions, it appears
as if it was necessary to make it intelligible to the people
among whom it was promulgated.
3o, bara1a means to create out of pre-existing matter,
or to fashion and bari' means one who forms or fashions;
and hence the distinction from khaliq. The latter means
one who brings something into existence according to a
proper plan and measure; whereas the former signifies one
who fashions a thing into its proper shape. Generally
speaking, however, bari' is used somewhat synonymously with
khaliq. But technically, the word khalaqa is a term
applied to creation in accordance with some predetermined
plan, and the author of all creation is Al-khaliq.
1Qur. 45:3; and also 12:2 & 42:7.
'"Ibid. 44:58.
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Bara'a implies a process of evolving from previously created
matter or state, and the author of this process is Al-Bari'.
Al-Bari' applied to God means one who creates all things
free from any incongruity, or fault, and distinguishes one
1
from another by various forms,
4, Sawwara
Again, the word sawwara implies giving definite
shape, form, figure or colour, so as to make a thing exactly
suited to a given end or object, Sawwar means he formed,
fashioned, figured, shaped, sculptured, or pictured him or
2
it, Al-husawwir as an epithet of God means the Maker, or
kashioner of all existing things, who has established them
in their variety and multitude, and given to every one of
them a special form and a particular manner of being,
whereby it is distinguished.
According to al-Iji and al-Jur,1ani. "Al-khaliq
and Al-Bari' have a single sense: the producer, Creator of
things; Al-Musawwir, the Organizer, who ordains and composes
the forms (.suwar) of things, ihese last Names depend on
3
attx'ibures of act". But az«*Zamakhshan says that these
words have distinct meanings. According to him, "Al-khaliq




5 ?-uEI. art, 'Al-Asma' al-Husna ', Gardet,l. ,p.715»
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implies one who distinguishes one figure from another; and
Al-huaawwir is the one who fashions things in different
•
1
forms". All three connote the passage from non-existence
to existence; the first towards determination, in accor-
sdance with the divine decree (qadar); the second towards
existence properly so-called wu.jud; the third towards the
co-ordination of ideal forms. All these refer to the
completion of the visible stage of creation.
5. Jacala
The word ,jaCala implies making new shapes and forms,
2
or new dis£jositions. It means he made a thing of or from
M Q mm mm
a thing, as in the Qur'an: wa jaala —z-zulumat wa-n-nur;
M 0 mm ' 3
wa-1 lahu ja ala lakum ssin anfusixum azwa.ian. Or further,
lie made a thing to be in a particular state or condition,
as in the Qur' an: alfacihl .iaCala lakum-1 ard firasha; or
c c — — — .4.
wa ,1a ala lakum as-sam wa-1 absara wa-1 af'lda.
c
Ja ala. thus, signifies the making of a thing to become
in a particular state or condition, or constituting or
appointing it for a definite purpose. The Qur'sn says:
^Al-kash...iv,pp.309-10•
2Lane's Lexi...I.ii.pp.430-31.
^Qur. 6:1; & 16:72.
4Ibid. 2:22; & 16:?S.
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Blessed be He
who has set in heaven constellations, and has set
among them a lamp and
an illuminating moon. ^
And it is He who made the night and day a succession.
6. Fatara
—s
Again, fatara signifies some other aspect of
"I
creation. It means to produce or to bring into existence,
or to begin. Fatara implies the creation of primal matter
to which further processes are to be applied, as when on©
prepares dough but leaves it until it should become mature
2 e «.
to be fashioned later. Ibn Abbas says that he did not
know what is the meaning of fatir -as-samawat wa-1 ard.
until two Arabs of the desrt came to him, disputing
together respecting a well, ana one of them said*
— z _
'ana fatartu, meaning I originated, or began it. ffatir
means the one who extracts something by breaking the
shell. The attribute Al-ffatir, therefore, indicates
that God has created matter with the inherent faculties
of development and due season He breaks open the shell
or the covering which confines these faculties and brings
"Lur. 25*61-62$ cf. also 78*6,9-13-
2
wane's ^exi...l.iv.pp.2415-16.
^Lisan, art. * Fatir •,vi,pp.361-65.
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them into operation# For instance, a seed possesses the
faculty of growing into a plant or a tree hut this faculty
comes into operation only at a certain season and under
certain conditions# When those conditions arise and the
season arrives, the seed begins to develop itB faculty of
growth# 2his attribute, thus, indicates that the universe
continues developing in accordance with its set inhex-ent
laws that God has laid down# All the time the universe
goe3 on traversing preparatory stages and its inherent
faculties come into play at certain seasons and new forms
of life become perceptible#
7# Ax:aha'a
Another word used in connection with the creation
is anaha'a# as in the Qur'an: wa huwa-I-ladhl ansha'akum
1 ~~ *
min nafsin wahida# It means to make individuals to grow,
increase, develop, or reach maturity# It is one of the
wonders of God's creation that from one person we have
grown to be so many, and each individual has so many facul¬





From the above discussion it is clear that God is
the Ultimate cause of all creation. Everything in the
universe owes its existence to God. Everything goes by
law, porportion and measure, and all things are created by
gradual processes. Everything depends upon His will and
command, God's knowledge is absolute and is not conditioned
by time and apace. His activity still goes on. He
creates what He wishes, increasing creation as He wills.
He is powerful over everything. He is the absolute
Creator, who is unlike all creation. The Qur'aii further
affirms that there is no god but He, the Creator of all
things, the self-subsisting and all-sustaining. He to
whoa belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth.
But the Qur'an did not deal with the problem of
creation, going into the metaphysical implications of it.
It introduces ideas which are simple and does not give any
philosophical explanation. It, in fact, follows the
experiences^* with which one is familial-. There is no
explanation in the Qur'an or at least there is no clear
statement which affirms the idea of creation ex-nihilo.
though one might interpret it so as the commentators did.
What is clear from the Qur'an is that God is the Agent of
the creation, knowing all its details, and that He regulates
it. This conception is contrary to the view that God
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does not know anything apart from Himself, except as a final
cause, and that takes no care for things lov/er than Him,
for it derogates His perfection, if He were to think about
anything except that which is perfect, that is Himself#
KiUc God is not the mover but the Creator of all that exists.
The ^ur'an says* wa laqad khalaqnakum thuroma sawwarnakum.
Moreover, He guides and controls all affairs# Everything
depends upon His will# When He intends a thing, He says
to it 'Be* and it cornea into existence. Thus, the Qur'anic
view is that God is not only the Creator, but also the
Agent whose acts manifest His providence for all that He
has created.
Conclusion
The concept of creation as defined in the Qur'an
involves essentially two elements: one, an act of God,
which is complete in all respects} and secondly, a relation
of total dependence of the created things upon their Creator.





CosmoloKical Views of the Muslim :
as expressed in al-Maqasid
28
CHAPTER II
The Cosmoiogic&l Views of the Muslim Neoulatonists
as expressed in al-Maqasid
Introduction
Little is known about the ideas of the creation as
held by Muslims in the first century of Islam, or indeed in
the first half of the second century. The Qur'anic
conception, as shown in the preceding chapter, i3 general.
Ro doubt the xur'an invites consideration •of the nature of
the world, the creation of the heavens and the earth in six
periods, as proof for the existence of God; but not as a
philosophical enquiry for the concept of creation. It
seems that the idea of creation ex-nihilo. with its meta-
:physical implications must be late. It is only after
the middle of the second century that the Islamic thought
advanced some solutions to the problem of the creation.
But from the beginning of the third century, there began to
be two distinct trends of thought
(a) One philosophical, influenced above all by the
ancient Greek thought, represented by al-Kindl (d.260/873);
(b) and the other theological, with its own approach
to the problem despite its frequent use of the same termi-
:nology, represented by Abu-'l Hudhayl and an-Nazzam
# *
1Walzer,8„, Greek into Arabic. Ch.I
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(d. 830,841 or later). Both of them reach the conclusion
that the world was created ex-nihilo, and had a beginning
in time before which there was no world. In this period
one finds no other trend, such as the idea of the eternity
of the world. let what one knows of this period is
that the Muslims were already aware of the ideas concerning
the doctrine of creation current in other religions -
1
Manichaean and Zoroastrian doctrines of the creation; the
ideas of the various groups of Dahriyya, who believed in
the eternity of the world, in the sense of the eternity of
its matter or form, or in the eternity of the primeval
matter; or a number of various Christian and Greek ideas.
Such influences must have made themselves felt both through
personal contacts and through the works of translation,
which include many of the works of Aristotle, Plato, and
2
Plotinus. Keoplatonism was the system ^ust coming to
the fore-front when the Christians of Alexandria came in
contact with philosophy and it is from them that it was
introduced to the Islamic world. The Greek philosophy
was accepted by the Muslims, as it had been previously
accepted by the Greek and Latin Christians, as providing a
"natural theology". The Muslim scholars - al-Parabl and
Iqbal,fl., The Development of Metaphysics in ersia. Ch.I.
2
"Islamic Philosophy and Theology, p.45.
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Avicenna - had to adjust themselves to these ideas in one way
or the other. And the most important work in the fuller
development of their outlook was the so-called Theology of
Aristotle, which appeared in the Islamic world about 226 A.fi,
and was regarded at that period as a genuine work of
Aristotle.
The form in which the metaphysical tradition reached
the Islamic world, at the time of al-Farabl (d.950) and
Avicenna (d.1037)» is mainly leoplatonic. Al-Farabl and
Avicenna adopted in general the Neoplatonic line of thought
concerning their cosmological doctrines. According to
them, God is one, the 'necessarily existent' (wa.jib al-wujud)
from whom emanated the first intelligence, which is the
matrix of all multiplicity. They probably felt that there
no fundamental opposition between the Greek philosophical
learning and Islamic thought. In their philosophy they
seem to have thought of themselves as supporting and
elucidating what they considered to be the central doctrine
of Islam, removing all philosophical conflict, and therefore
tried to reconcile philosophy and religion in their own way.
Metaphysics presented a formidable challenge to Muslim
theology especially in such questions ass
How many could arise from the une; or how
the temporal proceeds from the asternal} and how
the temporal is related to the Sternal?
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Islamic philosophy and theology owes much of its richness
and complexity to such questions and the dispute about the
creation. Before giving an exposition of the Muslim
philosophers* views, as in al-Maqasid. it is proper to have
a glance at the Neoplatonists' views of emanation.
The Neoplatonists Views
The Neoplatonists expressed the doctrine of one God
- eternal, unchanging, and far removed above the phenomenal
world - as the first cause of all that exists (a philoso¬
phical monotheism, which is to be fitted with the Islamic
concept). The doctrine of an Absolute Keality, as the
necessary cause of all that is variable, was one to which
all philosophy and especially the heoplatonic school, v/as
tending. As causation to some extent implies change,
this First Cause could not he regarded a3 directly creating
the world, but only as the eternal source of eternally
proceeding emanation by means of which the power of the
First Cause is projected so as to produce the world and
all its contents. The essential features of this teaching
are: the absolute unity of the First Cause, its absolute
reality, its eternity and its invariability, (all of which
necessarily remove it above the plane of things knowable
to man) and the operative emanation ceaselessly issuing
forth, eternal like its source, yet acting in time and
space.
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In the teaching of Plotinus, God is the absolute,
the first Potency, beyond the sphere of existence. As
absolute God implies a compelling necessity so that all
which proceeds from Him is not enforced but is necessarily
so in the sense that nothing else is possible. let
Plotinus would never allow one to say that God "wills"
anything, for will implies a desire for what is not possessed
or not yet present; will operates in time and space, but
necessity ever proceeds from the eternal One who does not
act in time. Nor can one conceive of God as knowing,
conscious or thinking, all terms which describe the mental
activities in the world of variable phenomena. Ke is all
knowing by immediate apprehension which in no way resembles
the operation of thought, but is super-conscious, a condition
which Plotinus describes as "wakefulness", a perpetual being
1
aware without the need of obtaining information.
From the true God, the eternal absolute, proceeds
the Nous - a term which has been variously rendered as
2
He&son; Intellect; Intelligence; or Spirit. An eternal
emanation is necessitated in order that the First Cause may
remain unchanged, which would not be the case if it had once
^The Enneads. 5*3.12.
2
Cf. Inge, The Philosophy of xlotinus. ii,p.38.
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not been a source and then had become the source of emanation;
there can be no "becoming" in the First Cause. The
emanation is of the same nature as its cause, but is
projected into the world of phenomena. From the Nous
proceeds the Psyche» the principle of life and motion,
the world soul which is the universe and which is shared by
every living creature.
Reality, for ilotinus, is an ordered heirarchical
whole, comprising two movements:*
(i) One of the descent; and (ii) the other of the
ascent.
(i) The first is an automatic emanation by which
the higher generates the lower.
(ii) While the second is a movement of return, by
which the soul attains reabsorption in the divine source.
The first movement is from unity to multiplicity;
the second is a reverse movement, that is to say, from
multiplicity to unity. At the head of this system stands
a transcendent First irinciple, the One, which is ineffable
and incomprehensible to the discursive as well as to the
intuitive reason. Below the One, lie the two hypostases
which are the universal correlatives of the whole range of
human life, physical and intellectual. These are I-ipus:
Aristotle's active intellect and world soul, whose function
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is to contemplate as well as to direct the material world.
The hypostases are united with each other and the One,
firstly by emanation, which is the radiation of the lower
from the higher; and by return the contemplation of the
higher by the lower.
The One cannot be said to have a being, for this
way of thinking introduces a duality between subject and
object and there can be no duality in iure unity. In the
absolute, in its first and highest hypostasis, the One is
neither existence nor thought; neither moved nor movable;
it is simple unity. This is in brief the ontology and
cosmology which the Muslim thinkers- al-Farabl and Avicenna -
tried to mould in their own way to solve the problem of
One and many and the nature of the relation of the world
to its source.
Preliminary Discussion on al-Maqasid
When al-liaqasid was introduced in literary cirles,
' "* •'
through its Latin translation, the whole of the Western
world took it that here was al-G-hazall speaking for himself
and drew up lists of his philosophical errors. The style
of the book was such a faithful exposition of the Aristo-
stelianism that it was taken to be the work of a genuine
Aristotelian. But this misunderstanding arose simply
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because the translator through sheer chance omitted al-
Ghazali's preface and colophon. It is possible that
he might have worked from incomplete manuscript; whereas
the title of the book Maqasid al-falasifa in itself is
self-explanatory. Maqsad is, what is intended or meant.—
# 1
Al-Maqasid is most emphatically not al-Ghazal!'s philosophy,
but is an objective statement by him of what the Muslim
Neoplatonists - al-Farabl and Avicenna - meant in their
books. It is one of the best summaries of the Muslim
philosophers* views. Al-Ghazalx clearly realized that to
refute a system before getting thoroughly immersed in its
very depth was to act blindly. He says:
A man cannot grasp what is defective in any of the
sciences unless he has so complete a grasp of the science
in question that he equals its most learned exponents
in the appreciation of its fundamental principles, and
goes beyond and surpasses them, probing into some of
tangles and profundities which the very professors of
2
the science have neglected.
In all intellectual honesty al-Ghazali refrained
from saying anything against the philosophers till he had
completely mastered their system. Following a regular
1
Gf. Introduction to the History of Science. II,i,p.171•
^The Faith & Practice.p.29.
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convention in the writing of didactic treatises, al-Ghazall
begins with an address to a supposed disciple who has asked
for instruction* He says:
You have desired from me a doubt-removing discourse,
uncovering the inconsistencies of the philosophers and
the mutual contradictions in their views and how they
hide their suppressions and their deceits* But to
help you thus is not at all desirable except after
teaching you first their position (madhhab) and making
you know their dogmatic structure* For it is absurd
to consider the falsity of positions before under¬
standing their sources; it is indeed shooting an
arrow blindly and at a venture* 3o I am of the
opinion that I should prefix to an exposition of how
this structure falls to pieces, a concise discourse
containing a reproduction (hikayfa) of their meaning
(maqasid) as to the sciences which they cultivates
logical; physical; and theological; without distin-
:guishing between the sound and the false in them
(haqq wa-1 batil)t that is, I intend only to make
intelligible the ultimate purpose (ghiyia) of their
doctrine without making any addition to what they
mean. I shall state it by way of accurate relation
of facts and reproduction, joined with what they held
to be proofs* She object of this book is to
reproduce the meanings of the philosophers (i^Mlaqasid
al-falaolfa) and that is its title*^
]i-t|aqasid al-falasifa* (ed* Cairo, 1912) pp*2~3*
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Al-Ghazall further states:
We should understand that what we are now stating by way
of reproduction unconsidered, unrestricted without
investigation as to the sound and the false. When we
finish with that we will begin again seriously and with
a purpose in a separate book which we shall call, if it
be the will of Allah, the Takafut al-falasifa.^
i?he reiteration here shows how deeply al-Ghazall
feared that his purpose would be misunderstood, or raisre-
:presented, or that the opinions in the book would be
ascribed to hi®. In al-Hunqidh he repeats the similar
statement:
I might be suspected of neglecting the essential
basis of their proof, or of having hoard it and
failed to understand it, I repeated it in my book.^
ffhe Cosmological Views of the Philosophers as in al«Maaasid
She main problem facing the Muslim philosophers was
how to reconcile the absolute unity and perfection of God
with the creation of a multiple universe full of imperfections;
the problem of the One and many; and the relation of the
mutable to the immutable. If God's will was responsible
for the creation of the world, then one is confronted with
1Ibid. pp.5-4.
2
The Aarth and - ractice. p.45.
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the problem of the duality of God and Hi© will* How could
the postulate of the unity of God be preseved in view of
the fact that there is multiplicity in the world? By
introducing the theory of emanation (£SZ$)» the Muslim
philosophers relieved God of all the responsibility of the
existence of multiplicity#
To understand the cosmological doctrine of the
Muslim leoplatonists, it is necessary to discuss their
ontology and its implications#
The Problem of Existence and its nature
According to the Muslim philosophers the ultimate
and universal concept is that of existence# Al-GhasalX
states that they believei
Existence may be divided into substance (.lawhar) and
accident (carad)\ and the nature of this division is
of the form, as a thing is divided into diffex*entia
and species# In principle, first of all it is
required that •existence* should be defined and then
its implications be explained. But the concept of
existence is so self-evident and a priori that it
cannot be defined or described. 'This division is
based on the fact that one can understand existence
by means of one's intelligence alone without requiring




In other words the philosophers assert that
'existence* cannot be explained because it is a fundamental
principle (taabda') for every explanation. It has no
explanation, rather its form subsists in the mind without
the mediation of anything else# All existing beings can
be seen in a manner of division into substance and accident#
Nothing is more evident and manifest for its proper charac¬
terization than the existence of a thing# Again, if it
is said:
Existence is that which is characterized by the qualities
of origination and eternity; this would be a false
definition, for the originated thing consists of exis¬
tence after non-existence and the eternal thing consists
of existence not preceded by non-existence; but
existence is that which had no beginning.
When it is known that the definition of existence
is not possible and it is also known that it is divisible
into substance and accident the question is: what is
substance and accident? Existences of things may be
listed under two categries: (a) One which depends upon a
locus for its subsistence and is called accident; and (b)
the other which is not so dependent and is called substance#
%aqa...p#80; cf# Na,j.##p«218.
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The first category is divisible into two groupsj (i) The
first occurs in a locus which subsists in itself. (ii)
The second occurs in a place in such a way that the essence
of the place is constituted by it and that essence is subject
1
to change owing to this occurrence. So an accident is that
which occurs in a subject. It i3 incapable of subsisting
in itself and as such depends upon a subject for its
subsistence. Subject in reality subsists by itself.
Whenever a place cannot be independent of subsistence, it
is not called a subject, rather it is called matter (hayula).
On the other hand, a thing may exist in a place and be a
substance along with it. If the proximate place where it
exists becomes subsistence with the substance, it does not
subsist with its essence; thereupon it ha3 a cause of
subsistence which is called form. So, according to the
philosophers, form is the quality or quiddity by which a
body is what it is, whereas matter is that which supports
the quality or form. Matter can only exist by the form
imparted to it by the Intellect; without form it would be
pure receptivity deprived of being. That is why prime
matter cannot be found by itself. As regards man - that
which pursues the course of humanity is called form and its
place is termed matter. Wood, for instance, is a subject
for the form of chair and matter for the form of ashes.
'Maca.•.pp.80-81.
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For it remains wood when it assumes the form of chair, but
loses its being with the form of ashes. Al-Ghazall further
states that form is called substance, because substance
consists of every existent which is not in a subject, while
1
form is not in a subject.
Classification of dubstancea
Thus substances are divided into four groups:
(a) Matter (hayula):
(b) Form (sura);
(c) Body (jiam); 2
(d) Separated intelligence (caql»mufaraq).mmmmm ^ "
Separated intelligence exists by itself and in
every body the first three of the above substances exist,
as fir example, water is a body composed of the form of a
3
liquid thing, and matter is a support to it.
Thus, the philosophers believe that existents can
be divided into what exists in a substratum, like accidents
and forms, and what does not exist in a substratum. The
latter can be divided again into what serves as & substratum
for other things, for example bodies, and what does not
exist in a substratum, for example substances which subsist
by themselves. These latter again are divided into those
which exert influence not on bodies but on souls, and^which
1fhis argument is logically false, but al-Ghazali simply states





are called abstract intelligences, ixistents which inhere
in a substratum, like accidents, are temporal and have
temporal causes which terminate in a principle, in one way
temporal, in another way everlasting, namely, circular
movement, do those principles which exist by themselves
and do not inhere in a substratum, are of three kinds:
1, Bodies, which sore the lowest type;
2, Separated or abstract intelligences, which are not
attached to bodies, either by way of action or by
being impressed upon them, which are the highest
type; and
3, Souls, which are the intermediate agencies, attached
to the bodies in a certain way, namely, through
their influence and their action upon them, and which
stand midway in dignity; they undergo an influence
from the intelligences and exert an influence upon
the bodies.
Besides this division of existents into substances
which comprise the various domains of the cosmos, the
philosophers make another division of existents into possible
and necessary.
Division of Jxistents into . ossible end accessary
Saving discussed the essence and existence, the
philosophers, as al-Ghazall states in al-Maoasid move on to
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another fundamental division of existence into possible
•» i
(raumkin) and necessary (wa;iib). The possible existence
is that which is dependent upon another for its existence.
The necessary is the one which is not so dependent; rather
it forms an absolute which requires nothing for the completion
of its nature and is necessary by its essence alone, She
letter kind, belongs to the oooenoo of tho Hooosaary Being
in whom liio oxictonoo and oaoanoo ooinoidca with that of-
unity, truth, and goodness, God is alone a necessary
being which has no connection with anything else. He is
a transcendental being in essence as well as in all other
2
respects. The existence of God wholly concurs with His
essence, necessary Being is an unbending unity which
involves no multiplicity in its essence. The existence
of God is not different from His quiddity. Generally,
the concept of identity is distinct from that of quiddity
and its existence is accidental to quiddity. But while
considering the Essence of God, both identity and quiddity
3
form the unity of His being. Every accidental thing is
caused. For if it were existea®* by its essence, it would
A
1Ibid.pp.151-33«
^Cf. Fara.I'x.pp.25-24; see also Avi.«disa. °Arsh. tr.pp.25-37j
and also Afnan, Avicenna. p.169.
laga... p. 159.
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not be accidental to something else. Wherever it is
accidental to some other thing, it is dependent upon it,
since it cannot be except along with it. The cause of
its existence must be one of the following two things.
Either it is the quiddity or something else. But if it
is something else, the existence would then be accidental
and caused. On the other hand, quiddity by itself is
incapable of becoming a cause for its existence, because
non-existence cannot be the cause of existence, and quiddity
has no existence prior to this existence. How would it
be a cause? If it had an existence before this existence,
it would be independent of the second existence. But then
the same series of questions would follow, that is, whether
this existence is accidental or not. However, His quiddity
and identity form the unity of His Being which does not
resemble anything else. For whatever can be enumerated,
is simply a contingent thing which derives its being from
1
Necessary Being. Further, Necessary Being is not related
to anything as that thing is related to Him in such a way
that each of them is the cause of the other. For instance,
B is the cause of 0 and 0 is the cause of B. Here B in
view of its being a cause is prior to C; and G in view of
its being a cause, on the other hand, is prior to B.
1Ibid
4-5
Thus one is prior to the other which precedes it and this
is an absurd statement. For in respect of its being a
cause each of them occurs before its associate and in
respect of its being effect it follows the other. Conse¬
quently , each of the phenomena appears to be the cause of
1
the other and this is absurd. Thus their views consist
of two aspects: (a) One deals with the principle that God
is not (causally) related to anything else as that thing
is (causally) related to Him. (b) The other that every-
:thing in the world is contingent. It requires another
for its existence and that thing is in need of something
else for its coming into being. The process of one
contingent thing's coming into being pursues an upward
trend till it reaches Kecessary Being. Thus the thing,
according to the philosophers, cannot be a cause for itself.
Similarly, its quiddity is incapable of being a cause of
its existence. Furthermore, one quiddity cannot have
two existences, one deriving something and the other having
something derived. On this basis there cannot be two
things, each of them being the cause of the other.
Again, God cannot be related to any other thing as
that other thing is related to Him; not only in respect of
causality but also in respect of reciprocity such as between
two brothers. For, if the non-existence of the one does
1Ibid.p.140{ cf. Ghifal.p.37*
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not follow from that of the other, no relation can be
established# On the other hand, existence which is different
from necessary existence can have a relation with Becessary
1
Being. But it is to be noted that this form of relation
is similar to that of the effect to its cause, where effect
is related to cause, but cause say not be so related. In
other words, if the non-existence of one follows from the
non-existence of the other, it can simply be contingent and
not necessary. Moreover, whatever depends upon another
thing can be merely contingent. For there are two alter¬
ed
;natives; either that other thing would be suffibnt in its
existencei or it would require another thing. However,
either of these |ases would be contrary to the nature of
necessary Being.
Thus, the philosophers are of the opinion that
neither can anything ever be causally related to God, nor
can any reciprocal relation be attributed to Him, indicating
thereby that all finite categories fall short of actual
characterization of the nature of God. And also there
should not be two things equally necessary.
Further, al-Gfaazall states on behalf of the philo¬




His essence. Because if He subsists with that attribute,
He is connected with it and is composed of different parts.
But it may be noted that all that is composed of things is
caused. If its non-existence does not follow from the
implication of the non-existence of that attribute, it may
be treated as an accidental phenomenon, (as in the case of
knowledge in man). However, this is inconceivable, since
every accidental phenomenon is caused. But if its cause
is the essence of God, then the essence would imply two
aspects, one being active and the other being receptive;
but His being active is different from His being receptive.
As a result multiplicity would occur in the essence of God;
which is absolutely inconceivable because He is One in
1
every respect. It is further stated that the nature of
God cannot be subject to change. All categories of change
consist of the creation of a quality which did not exist
before. It becomes a new reference. However, everything
which is created necessarily requires a cause and in no
way can it be possible without it and be its essence. In
other words, every quality follows from the essence and
exists with it, but it never comes after it. This leads
%aqa...pp. 141-42; cf. ffara.fx.p.22; Avi. flisa °Arsh.rr.p.51.
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one to believe that the essence of God is the absolute
criterion of truth which is unconditional, invariable, and
eternal principle transcending all finite relations and
references. Moreover, God is not receptive, nothing can
be added to His essence; for the act of doing and that of
receiving imply two distinct phenomena; as such it causes
1
a duality in His essence which is impossible.
The philosophers believe that nothing can emanate
unmedi&ted from God except one thing. Then various things
come out of it mediately and successively. Thus He is
One without any multiplicity whatsoever. According to
them, multiplicity of things may be of two kinds: (a) It
consists of different parts of things, as is the multiplicity
of a composite body; (b) or, it consists of the multiplicity
of a concept where the thing is divided into groups which
cannot be independent of one or the other; such as, form
and matter, or being and quiddity. The philosophers
exclude all types of multiplicity and reject it as a
constituent part of His essence. * The hecessary Being
is one, and nothing can proceed from it except one. Thus,
they believe that the Necessary existent is one and free
from imperfections. It is the principle of things and
things proceed from it in proper succession. Speaking of
%aqa...p.145i Fara.Tx.p.38; Avi. Hisi♦cArsh.Tr. pp.35-37»
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Avicenna, Watt says:
In the centre of his metaphysics, is the First Being
or absolute One, which was understood, to be identical
with God as proclaimed in Islamic doctrine. From
him emanated all other existent things in hierarchical
order.^
- - -r 2
This idea is equally true in the case of al-Farabl.
Thus, in the opinion of the philosophers, the
Necessary Being is one in number, and its being should
always have one essence, otherwise multiplicity would result.
It is pure being different from the contingent ones. The
latter requires necessarily another for its coming into
being. In other words, the world and all things in it
are possible beings and contingent upon the Necessary Being.
The possible beings are themselves of two kinds:
(a) Those which though possible in themselves, are
made necessary by the Necessary Being; and
(b) those that are simply possible without any kind of
necessity attached to them.
The first class consists of the pure and simple
intellectual substances; which are the eternal effects of
Islamic Philosophy and Theology. p.55»
2Cf. Fara.fx. pp.23-24.
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God in the sense that they are made necessary by Him*
The second comprises the creatures of the world of generation
and corruption, which already contain the principle of
non-eternity within themselves, and are bound to wither
and die away* God is the agent of all things in the sense
that He is the existent from whom every distinct existence
emanates* But there is no compound element in his essence,
and Ke is free from all sorts of causes* With regard to
His relation with other existents, all of thera emanate
from Him according to known order and media. "All that
is other than the Hecesaary Being emanates from him in
successive order* In other words, the existence of all
other things is derived from Him"* In order to demonstrate
this view it is further stated: "that the Hecess&ry Being
is one in number. What is subject to enumeration cannot
be necessary; rather it must simply be a contingent thing
which requires the Necessary Being for its coming into
1
existence."
Thus, there are various kinds of existents which
successively emanate from God* An existent may be necessary
and contingent, while the latter requires the Necessary Being
A mm mm —
haqa...p.146$ cf* ffara.Tx.p.AOi Shifa'*p*4-7.
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for coming into being, God is one and pure Being; as such
there is no compound element in His essence and He is free
from causes and imperfection, Things other than Him
derive their existence from Him in proper succession,
The Theory of Emanation
After giving an exposition of their ontological
views, al-Ghazall proceeds to state the Muslim philosophers*
cosmological beliefs. In their ontology, as shown above,
they emphasized the transcendence of the Necessary Being
above all possible beings. To preserve that notion, they
accepted the Neoplatonic principle, ex uno non fit nisi unure,
and on its basis they developed their theory of emanation
Cfayd), The world in this perspective is compared to the
rays of the Bun, and the Necessary Being or the First irinci-
:ple to the Bun itself. The rays of the Bun are not the
2
Bun but they are nothing other than the Sun. The Neopla¬
tonic cosmology which the Muslim philosophers follow in a
similar manner derive the hierarachy of creatures from the
Ture Being itself without in any way destroying the absolute






In the opinion of the Muslim philosophers, the
principles according to which the manifestation of the
world takes place are as follows:
(1) Division of existence into necessary and possible.
(2) From unity or one only one can proceed (al-awwal
1
saciara rainhu shay1 wahid).
(3) Intellection of the heceseary Being is the cause of
2
existence.
I'hey conceive that from the hecessary Being or the First
Principle, which is a pure unity, it is inconceivable that
anything should proceed except that which is itself a unity
and that takes place through intellection. The first
emanation from the existence of the First 1rinciple is
numerically one.
\iaqa...p.218.
^Cf. Avi. kisa. dar haqiqat wa kayfivyitCTehran.1952). p.8|
(The authenticity of the kisala dar haqiqat wa kefrlyyat...A
has been doubted by sorae authorities, but the views on
Being and emanation are more or less the same as found in
Avicenna's other works).
i
cf. also Gardet, i..a ge n see religieuse d'Avicenna. p.48.
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The Emanation of One from the First and further Procession
According to the philosophers, al-Ghazall states,
1
out of the one only one can proceed. Now the First
Principle is one in every respect and the world is composed
out of different constituents. How does it proceed from
one? If it proceeds from a compound in which there is
multiplicity, where does it come from? Eventually, it
is necessary to connect multiplicity with the One, which
is absurd. From the existence of the First Principle
there emanates the first intelligence - an existent whicfc
subsists by itself, immaterial, not impressed on body,
conscious of its principle. And this becomes the source
2
of the coming about of multiplicity. This first intelli¬
gence is possible in essence, and necessary by virtue of
the 'Causer of causes' Cmusabbib al-asbab)i and thus it
has a two-fold existences possible and necessary and is
the spring of multiplicity for it has three kinds of
knowledge - of the First Principle; of its own essence
in so far as it is necessary; and of its being possible.
%aqa...p.218; cf .Fara.ix.p.58; and also -Phifa' .p.4-06.
2i1aqa...p.218.
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Because the first intelligence is possible, it generates
multiplicity within itself. By intellection of the
First Principle, it gives rise to the oecond intelligence;
and by intellection of its own essence to two beings which
are the soul of the first heaven and its body. One may
say that the first intelligence has three forms of knowledges
(i) Knowledge of the Pssence of the First Principle.
(ii) Knowledge of its own essence as a being necessary
by virtue of another being Cwa.jib bi fthayrilL).
1
(iii) Knowledge of its own essence as a possible being.
So from its existence there derive three things,
an intelligence, the soul, and the body of the farthest
sphere, that is the ninth heaven (falak al-aflak).
ihen from the second intelligence there derive a third
intelligence and the soul and the body of the sphere of
the fixed stars Cfalak al-buru.i): then from the third
intelligence there derive a fourth intelligence and the
soul and the body of the sphere of Saturn; then from the
fourth intelligence there derive a fifth intelligence and
the soul and the body of the sphere of Jupiter; and so
"Viaqa...p.219s cf. Shifa1 .pp.405-406.
p
ftaqa...p»22Q; cf. also Saliba, ha ftetaphysique d'Avicenna. pp.128-
32; cf. Ka.1.256-57*
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on till one arrives at the intelligence fro® which there
derive the intelligence; the soul and the body of the sphere
of the moon; and this last intelligence is that which is
called the active intelligence (alcaql al-fa^^al).
This scheme of the emanation of the ten intelligences and
the nine celestial or planetary spheres corresponds in the
following manner:
ho, of Heaven Name of Heaven ho. of Generating Intelligent
9 The highest heaven 1
(falak al-aflak)
8 Heaven of the fixed stars 2
(falak al~buru,j)
7 Saturn (zuhal) 3
6 Jupiter(muster!) 4
5 Mars (mirrikh) 5
4 Sun (shma) 6
3 Venus (zuhara) 7
2 Mercury(Cutarid) 8
1 Moon (qamar) 9
i'hen there follows that which fills the sphere of
the moon, namely, the matter which receives generation and
A —. «• «•» c
hiaa.dar iiaqi...p.15t awwala ma khalaqa-<L-lahu -1 ao&a
w C
see also Hisa. Arab.Tr.p.36: and cf. also Goldzier art.
'Platonic & Gnostic element in Traditions', (tr. A. Badawi,
al-Turath al-Yunanl. Cairo,19^0. p.221).
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corruption from the active intellect and. from the natures
Of the spheres. Then through the action of the movements
of the spheres and the stars the matters are mixed in
different mixtures from which the minerals, vegetables,
and animals arise. It is not necessary that from each
intelligence another intelligence should derive endlessly,
for these intelligences are of a different kind, and what
is valid for the one is not valid for the other, that is
these intellects are of gradually diminishing unification
and dignity. It follows from this that the intelligences
after the tfirat irinciple are ten in number and that there
are nine splo es, and the sum of these noble principles
after the Jfirst Principle is therefore nineteen; and that
under each of the primary intelligences there are three
things, another intelligence and a soul and body of a
sphere. Therefore there must be in each intellect a
triple character, and in the first effect a plurality can
only be imagined in this way:
(1) It is conscious of its principle;
(2) it is conscious of itself;
(3) it is itself possible, since the necessity of its
existence derives from another.
These three conditions, and the most noble of these three
effects must be related to the most noble of these conditions.
uaqa...p.220; cf«foa.i...p»2/5«
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therefore the intelligence proceeds from the first effect
in so far as the first effect is conscious of its principle;
the soul of the sphere proceeds from the first effect, in
so far as the first effect is conscious of itself; and
the body of the sphere proceeds from the first effect,
in so far as by itself the first effect belongs to possible
existence. One must still explain why this triple
character is found in the first effect, although its
principle is only one, The philosophers say that from
the First Principle only one thing proceeds, namely, the
essence of this intelligence through which it is conscious
of itself. The effect, however, must by itself become
conscious of its principle, and this kind of consciousness
cannot derive from its cause. Also the effect by itself
belongs to possible existence, and cannot receive this
possibility from the First Principle, but possesses it in
its own essence. They do indeed regard it as possible
that one effect should proceed from the one, although this
effect possesses by itself and not through its principle
certain necessary qualities, either relative or non-rela-
stive, in this way multiplicity arises, and so it becomes
the principle of the existence of multiplicity.
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Starting from the First Principle, according to
the philosophers, the emanation proceeds till the last or
the tenth intelligence appears which bridges the gulf
between the heavens and the earth. It produces the first
matter (hayula) which is passive and formless but which is
basis of the elements from which all creatures arise.
She composition and decomposition of the elements is the
cause of generation and corruption of all bodies. All
these transformations take place under the influence of
the movement of the spheres. As the actice intelligence
is the producer of the first matter, it is also the
bestower of forma (wahib as-»suwar). It gives to each
matter its proper form and to each body a soul when tnat
1
body is ready to receive it.
Existence of Lower Thin&a
In the opinion of the philosophers, al-uhazali
further states:
And after that there starts the existence of the lower
things which are the four elements (°anasir)» There
is no doubt that there are differences in them because
the places they occupy by nature are different, some
of them intermediary and some cii'cular. How do their
1I1a-ta...p.221; cf. 3hifaf .p.4-10
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natures become one if the/ have the capacity for corru-
iption and generation? A common material becomes
necessary for them since it cannot be conceived that
a body is coming into being from another body, so it
is not possible (permitted) that the cause of the
existences is only the heavenly bodies. Since the
matter of the four is common, it is not possible that
the cause of the existence of their matter is more than
one thing. And since their forms are different, it
is not possible that the causes of the forms are diff¬
erent and more than one thing, They are limited to
four things or to four species because they ere four
forms.
The philosophers believe that the elements are
four in number and they are by nature different with
respect to their places. The motions of the heavenly
bodies are circular and those of the corrupt things pertain
to a place, that is why their proximate origin implies
change and motion.
Production of other Bodies
Al-Ghaaall further states:
The other bodies are produced by the mixture of the
elements. First of all, are the production of ether
from vapour, smoke, flame, and the like, secondly,
minerals; thirdly, plants; fourthly, animals; and then
1Haqa«,,p,221.
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the grade of man follows. All of them are produced
by the mixture of the elements, Moreover, from the
mixture of the form of water and air, vapour is produced\
and from the mixture of the form of fire and earth
a
smoke is produced,
Al-Ghazali says, as the Muslim philosophers asserts
And then the forms emanate from the giver of the forms,
so whenever there comes about a mixture stronger and
more complete than that and there is added to it certain
conditions, there comes about capability for the form
of mineral substances and these forms also emanate from
the giver of forms. Then if the mixture becomes more
complete than that, plants result. If it is still
more complete, animals results, and the most complete
mixture consists in the seed of the human being which
has the capacity for accepting the form of humanity.
The cause of these capabilities is the interweaving of
2
the heavenly and earthly movements.
Thus, according to the Muslim philosophers' belief
the universe is hierarchical. At the summit of their
system is the most perfect being, the first Principle, from
this being proceeds less perfect beings. The first thing
having being that emanated from Him was the noblest} there¬





lowliest of all was reached. First was Intelligence}
then Soul; then the Body of Heaven; then the materials of
the four Elements with their forms - their materials are
common to all, only their forms differ. Matter in so far
as it is matter, does not become; for if it did, it would
need other matter and infinite regress would follow.
Matter only becomes in so far it is combined with form.
Everything that comes into being, comes into being from
something else, and this must either give rise to an infinite
regress and lead directly to infinite matter which is imposs¬
ible, even if one assumes an eternal mover, for there is
no actual infinite; or the forms must be interchangeable
in the substratum, eternally and in rotation. There must,
therefore, according to the philosophers, be an eternal
movement which produces this interchange in the eternally
transitory things. >*hen one form is removed, another is
assumed. -i-t is transition from potentiality to actuality.
Ahe materia uriaa is itself eternal.
The ^elation between the First Principle and the world
It has been observed that the Muslim Neoplatonists,
in their ontology separate the Necessary Being from all
possible beings; while in their cosmology they consider
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the world as an emanation of the Necessary Being. They
try to maintain the absolute transcendence of the First
Principle, by keeping it aloof from all other emanations.
Further, emanation itself is intellection by the First
Principle of its own essence. It is this intellection
and the knowledge of its own essence that brings all things
into being. The act of intellection is eternal, and
the nu hifestation of the world is the First Principle's
etern; 1 knowledge of itself. Since this emanation is
grounded finally in the intellectual nature of the First
Principle, it has the character of unalterable rational
necessity. The world exists eternally with the Principle.
For the philosophers the world is an eternal existent,
but since it is in itself contingent, in its entirety it
needs the Necessary Being and is dependent upon it
eternally. The meaning of procession, according to the
philosophers, is necessity through another, that is the
First Principle. Bo the world is eternal and so are
the movements of the spheres. In their opinion,
priority resides in the causal, so the final cause precedes
the effect in the mind and thought of the Necessary Being,
not in existence, for example the rays of the ^un with the
1
Sun itself. The derivative (austafad) being coines by
^[1aqa...p.149.
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necessity through another. So in this perspective the
world derives ultimately its existence from the First
Principle or the Necessary Being. It is an eternal
effect of its Principle*
Conclusion
ihe origin of the world thus came to be regarded
as a Procession or emanation from the First Principle,
the primordial Unity, rather than as a creation by the fiat
of absolute will. It existed eternally with its First
Cause. once the First Cause had initiated the world-
process, he left it to continue by itself. Leaving the
dynamic idea of Cod, the Huslim philosophers supported the
concept of the transcendental unity of God.
CHAPTER III




Al-Ghazall's Criticism of the Philosophers
in the Tahafut
Introduction
The Muslim Keoplatonists upheld the position, as
shown in the preceding chapter, that the world as a whole
is eternal. They believed that the world co-existed with
God in the same way as the light with the Sun and that God's
priority to the world is priority in essence, not in time.
Matter has always existed, though continually talcing
different forms. But as Muslims, they did affirm that
God is the Creator and Agent of the world. According to
them the procession of a temporal being from an eternal
being is absolutely impossible. This is in conformity
with the Aristotelian notion of change as a process by
which what is merely "potential being" passes over through
"form" into "actual being".
According to al-Ghazall eternal emanation and
creation are two contradictory notions. In the Tahafut
he has undertaken a refutation of the philosophers'




Al-Ghazali's main philosophic object in Tahafut
al-falasifa is to point out the insufficiency of reason as
a guide to the truth. This he endeavours to achieve by
invalidating the conclusions of reason in the field of
metaphysics. In the introduction to the Tahafut he
remarks that there are some thinkers, whom he lists as
theists, who, in their pride, have rejected religious
authority merely on the basis of the authority of certain
grandiose names such as Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato,
1
Aristotle, and others. Bewildered by the vast knowledge
attributed to those geniuses, they only desired to elevate
themselves above the mass of the people by disdaining
evil
religious admonitions. It is to eradicate this/lag ilk
that he wants to demolish their entire philosophical
superstructure. Al-Ghazall goes on to explain in detail
four basic principles upon which his criticism is based:
1. It is not in his power to discuss the doctrines of
all ancient philosophers - for each of them contradicted
his predecessors, including Aristotle, who criticized
his teacher Plato most bitterly, saying: "Plato is dear
^Taha...p.38 (Bouyges ed. Beirut,1962).
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to us; and truth is dear, too. Nay, truth is dearer
1
than Plato"; he would confine his attention to the incon¬
sistencies which are found in the theories of the Muslim
philosophers - al-Farabl and Avicenna. Aristotle is
regarded as the greatest philosopher who refuted a number
of the doctrines of the philosophers and established the
best of his own. This proves that metaphysics, far from
being founded on certain irrefutable axioms, such as
mathematics and logic, is built on guess work and unproved
hypotheses. Thus, there is nothing fixed and constant
in the philosophers* position. Even the interpreters
and commentators of Aristotle differed among themselves.
Al-Ghazall, therefore, concentrates only on the refutation
of the philosophical thought of his day, as it emerges from
the writings of the two most faithful Muslim Aristotelians
2
al-Earabi and Avicenna, particularly those of Avicenna.
2. Philosophers and sects differ:
(a) Firstly, in the use of certain terms, such as
"substance", which lead to controversies. But al-Ghazalx
does not intend to undertake the refutation of this termi-
snology and its use, for this belongs rather to philology
A
Ibid.p.hO; cf. Aristotle's Ethics Nichomachea. sec.vi, 1096a15«
^Taha...p.40.
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and. casuistry than to his enquiry,
(b)Secondly, they differ on mathematical, astronomical,
and geometrical sciences, which are wrongly rejected by
some thinkers on religious grounds, which do not really
contradict the fundamentals of religion. He who imagines
that it is his religious duty, te refute such sciences -
as mathematics - will in fact do more harm to religion,
(c) Thirdly, they differ on metaphysical doctrines,
such as the doctrine of the world's beginning in time,
creation ex-nihilo, the attributes of God etc., in all of
which the philosophers negate the fundamentals of religion.




Since his purpose is to disillusion
those who think too highly of the philosophers, and
consider them to be infallible, and since he has under¬
taken to expose the incoherence and inconsistencies
involved in their philosophical thought, he will try
to refute what they believed and not to defend something
of his own,^
4. The philosophers in order to confuse people, claim
that metaphysics is a difficult and complicated science
whose understanding requires a good knowledge of mathematics
- _ v^o^e.





necessary to metaphysics than to medicine or grammar.
Logic, on the other hand, is undoubtedly needed; and it
is by no means confined to the philosophers. The
be
Mutakallimun consider it to/a fundamental element in their
preparation. The philosophers, however, give it a
different name and use other" terminology. In order to
destroy their false presumptions, al-Ghazall meets the
philosophers on their own ground by using their terminology.
What he saw to his dismay was that the philosophers -
al-T'arabl and Avicenna - at points did violence, without
any philosophical justification, to the principles of
religion. Al—Ghazali1s empirical and theological spirit
revolted very strongly against this. He says that the
positive facts of religion cannot be sacrificed for sheer
metaphysical speculation, nor can they be interpreted
externally from the point of view of a preconceived system
of philosophy. These are to be interpreted intrinsically
and reckoned on their own grounds. The Muslim philo¬
sophers failed to take the empirical standpoint. They
had also been slow in realizing that notwithstanding the
great breadth of outlook that the study of Greek philosophy
brought to the Muslims, there was in the ultimate analysis
1Ibid. pp.44-45.
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a gulf between the inspiration of the Qur'anic teachings
and the spirit of Hellenism, Carried away by the
enthusiasm to bring a reconciliation between philosophy
and religion, al-Parabl and Avicenna, according to
al-Ghazall, had so compressed the dogma of Islamic
religion within the moulds of Aristotelian and Platonic,
or rather Neoplatonic, systems as to fall into a morass
of inconsistencies or get implicated in heretical positions.
His general position is that the truths of the positive
facts of religion can neither be proved nor disproved,
and to do otherwise leads the philosophers to take more
often to nonsensical positions.
All this al-Ghazall brought out in his Tahafut
with the most accomplished understanding and admirable
skill, and with a "transcendental" dialectic. He selects
twenty problems for investigation and exposes contradictions
involved in the philosophers' theories. ^-'he problem
which al-Cfrazalx considers the most important, is that
of the eternity of the world, to which he allots the
*Vc
greast space, almost a quarter of his book. Phis is
A
one of the most challenging and uncompromising problems
in the conflict between religion and philosophy.
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The advocates of Sunnism consider the eternity of the
universe to be the most pernicious thesis of the philoso¬
phers and vehemently combat it,
Al-Ashcarl (d,224-/935) wrote a refutation of the
eternity of the world, in his kitab al-Fusul. which is'
•
probably the earliest treatise dealing with this question;
and Ibn-Hazm (d,4-57/1064) made the doctrine a dividing
line between the Sunnite and the heretic, Sunnites
cannot possibly concede the philosophers' belief in the
eternity of the world, for with them there is nothing
eternal except God. All else is originated (hadith).
To make anything co-eternal with God is to violate the
strict principle of monotheism, for that infringes the
absoluteness and infinity of God and reduces Him to the
position of an artificer. Virtually, the doctrine
11 'u1' J one to the materialist's position that the world
is an independent universe, a self-subsistent system,
which develops by itself, and can be understood by itself.
All this was hard to swallow for a theologian like
al-Ghazall.
''ibn cAsakir, labyln Kadhib al-muftari. Damascus, 134-7/1928.
p.128.
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Discussion on the Eternity of the IVorld
The arguments of the philosophers for the eternity
of the world start with certain statements:
(a) The proofs from cause and will;
(t>) the proof from time;
(c) the proof from the possibility of the world as a whole; and
(d) the eternity of matter.
The First Argument and its Discussion
The first argument of the philosophers is based
on the presumption of the notion of cause. (i) That
every effect has a cause to determine its occurrence; (ii)
cause must be the action of some external force other than
the effect; and (iii) cause when executed must immediately
lead to the effect. For the world's coming from non¬
existence to existence there certainly should have been
some cause; this cause could not be a physical one for
ex hypothesi none existed yet. If this cause arose from
an act of will of God at some specific time, then the
divine will itself should have been determined by some
other cause. This cause which led God to change His mind
should certainly be outwside His mind; and this is not
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possible, for nothing outside Him existed yet. Thus, the
philosophers are forced to conclude that either nothing ever
arose from the being of God - which is not true, for the
world does exist - or that the world must have been in
existence from all eternity, as an immediate effect of His
eternal existence, for the procession of a temporal (being)
1
from an eternal (being) is absolutely impossible.
Al-Ghazall declines to subscribe to any one of the
assumptions stated above and shows that the belief in the
origination of the world from the eternal will of God at a
specific moment of time as selected by Him involves no
violation of the fundamental principles of logic. The
assumptions of the philosophers that every effect has a
cause and that a cause is a force external to its effect,
do not have a logical coerciveness about it. It is
legitimate to believe that God's will does not have any
cause or at least that this cause does not lie outside His
will but in itself. Similarly, it is not logically
necessary that the effect should follow a cause immediately,
for it is not logically contradictory to hold the notion




eternity that the world should appear at a certain time.
According to the Qur'an, God has but to say to a thing:
•i
"Be, and it is". So He said to the world "Be" but not
yet. Then the world came into existence at the appointed
time. Al-Ghazali says that it is possible to think that
God's will is eternal and yet an object of that will has
occured at some period in time. Here a distinction is
made between the eternity of God's will and the eternity
of the object of His will. God, for example, can eternally
will that al-Farabl and Avicenna should be born at such
and such a time and that the one should be born before the
other. Hence it is not logically illicit to affirm the
Bunnites* belief that God eternally willed that the world
should come into being at such and such a definite moment
in time.
But the philosophers point out a difficulty here,
r'hey say that an act of will is a complete cause of an event,
and when once the will acts, the event must follow imme-
sdiately unless there is an obstacle. In the case of
God's willing the world there is no obstacle, so any
delay would be inexplicable. Again, it is impossible to
^Cf. Qur. 2:117; 16:40; and also Ch.I,pp.18-20
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to find out a specific determinant (mukhassis) for God's
eternal choice of a particular moment for the creation of
the world. All moments of time are completely similar;
how is it possible to choose between two completely similar
things? Why was not the world created earlier or later
than when it was created?
One of the answers to these questions is that
there arises no question of the world being created earlier
or later, for time as yet had no existence. It was
created along with the creation of the world, that is,
both the world and time are finite in duration.
Al-Ghazall adds further that should one assume with the
philosophers that time is infinite, then at any present
moment that infinite time has been brought to an end, and
a time that has an end is not infinite but finite.
Al-Ghazali's standpoint, however, is that God just arbitra¬
rily chose one particular moment rather than another for
the world's coming into being. One need not ask any
more about this choice, for God's will is completely
undetermined. His will does not depend upon distinctions
<1i'aha...p.52
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in the outside world, for it is itself the producer of all
the distinctions therein. The creation of distinctions is
in fact the true significance of God's will. God chooses
a particular moment for the creation of the world as he
chooses a particular direction for the movement of the
spheres of the heavens, in some cases from East to West, in
other from West to East, as described in the Aristotelian
astronomy, even when the reversal of directions would have
1
made no difference. There is no way to explain God's
choice either in one case or the other. The difficulty
posed by the philosophers arises because of their misguided
attempt to understand the nature of the divine will entirely
in terms of man's will. Al-Ghazall says that certainly
God's will is not like that of man's, as God's knowledge
is not like that of man. So far as God's knowledge is
concerned, the philosophers admit that it differs from man's
knowledge in so many respects that in their final position
it becomes indeed an inexplicable mystery. According to
them, God possesses the knowledge of all universale without




additional to His essence, and without its multiplicity in
proportion to the multiplicity of the object known. Some
of them assert after Aristotle that God is the icnower, the
knowledge, mid the known, and that the three are one.
If one judges all this by what applies to man's knowledge,
1
it will be found to be an utter impossibility. while the
philosophers admit that God's knowledge cannot be compered
with man's knowledge, they insist upon drawing a coraparison
between God's will and man's will. ihis is exactly the
incoherence of the philosophers, and their thought taken
as a whole reveals a number of such inconsistencies.
Indeed, the philosophers' very notion of eternal creation
is self-contradictory and meaningless. Is it sense to
speak of the creation of that which exists eternally?
If God and the prime matter are both eternal existents,
does it make sense to say that the one is the cause of the
other? Can the relation between two existents qua exist-
senta be regarded as a causal one? ihe philosophers
believe that the world is eternal and still they ascribe it






Al-Ghazali further points out that the doctrine of
the eternity of the world is impossible, because it leads
to the affirmation of the view that the celestial spheres
have an indefinite number of rotations whose units are
impossible to count, although they have among them definite
proportions and a well-calculated number. He describes in
detail these proportions. He says:
The fact is that these revolutions can be divided into
one-sixth, or one-fourth, or a half. For instance,
the sphere of the Sun completes one revolution in one
year, while that of Saturn makes one in thirty years.
Therefore, the revolutions of Saturn are one-thirtieth
of those of the Sun. And the revolutions of Jupiter
are one-twelfth of those of the Sun, for Jupiter completes
1
one revolution in twelve years.
The development of this argument has an interest
only in so far as it shows the astronomical and mathematical
knowledge at the time of al-Ghazall and the way in which
the infinite was conceived. The philosophers maintain
that, in spite of the fact that the revolutions of Saturn
are one-thirtieth of the Sun, they are equally infinite.
If the philosophers point out that the error in the argument
of al-Ghazall consists in his considering those circular
'ibid, pp.53-54; cf. Iqti...pp.17-18
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movements as an aggregate of units, "but those movements have
no real existence, for the past is no more and the future
not yetj Al-Ghazall answers that:
This number must be either odd or even, or both, or
neither the one nor the other. If they say that it
is odd and even at the same time, or that it is neither
one nor the other, the error of such a claim is evident.
If they say it is even, the even becomes odd by adding
one unit to it. How is it possible to add one unit
to that which is infinite? If they say it is odd,
the odd becomes even also by adding one unit. Again,
how could this infinite number lack one unit which
would make it odd? Thus, the philosophers are obliged
to conclude that it is neither odd nor even.
The philosophers object that odd and even cannot
describe adequately the infinite since such an explanation
would necessarily imply that it is composed of present
existing units, Al-Ghazall replies that in the case of
the world, one is actually facing a "whole" made of
component units which constitute the rotations of the
celestial spheres. Their number must necessarily be
either odd or even,
Al-Ghazali summarizes the argument: "Our aim is to
prove that the philosophers cannot refute their opponents
^Taha..,p,54-; cf. £qti.,,p.18.
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on the relationship between the eternal will and creation."
their theory of change in time, arising from an eternal
changeless Cause without any act of His own in time, is
unsatisfactory. there is no reason why He should not
have created the world as a whole by a direct act of will
in time, and not from eternity.
the Second Argument from time
the second argument of the philosophers for the
eternity of the world revolves around time. they put
different constructions upon their notions of space and
time. they assume time to be infinite and space finite,
and yet consider time to be the measure of movement.
One may ask how the existence of time is relevant to the
existence of the world. It is so because of the philo¬
sophers' assumption that the existence of time depends
on the existence of movement, and thus of a moving body.
If it is proved that time is eternal, it would mean that
2
a moving being - the world- is eternal. Al-Ghazali in
his response to the proof neither challenges the definition
of time as the measure of movement, nor does he question
^Taha...p.64.
p
cf. Ross,W.D., Aristotle. p.89f
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the legitimacy of the inference of the eternity of movement
from the eternity of time. He only argues that the time
and the world were created together. God precedes the
world in a non-temporal sense of "before". (The argument
from time is introduced by the philosophers in conjunction
with the problem of God's priority to the world. It is
only on the assumption of this argument, that is, the eter-
2
:nity of God, that they argue for the eternity of time.
Al-Ghasall say3:
Jhe philosophers assert that he who affirms that the
woi\Ld is posterior to God and God prior to the world
w uinot/mean anything but that He is prior not temporally
but essentially, like the natural priority of one to two,
although they can exist together in temporal existence,
or like the priority of cause to effect, for instance
the priority of the movement of a man to the movement
of his shadow which follows him, or the movement of the
hand to the movement of the ring, or the movement of the hand
in the water to the movement of the water, for all these
things are simultaneous, but one is the cause, the other
effect, for it is said that the shadow moves through
the movement of the man and the water through the hand
in the water, and the reverse is not said although they
are simultaneous. If this is what you mean by saying
that God is prior to the world, then it follows that




absurd that the one should be eternal and the other
temporal. If it is meant that God is prior to the
world and to time, not essentially, but temporally,
then there was before the existence of the world and
of time, a time in which the world was non-existent,
since non-existence preceded the world and God preceded
it during a long duration which had a final term but no
initial one, and then there was before time an infinite
time, which is self-contradictory. Therefore the
assertion that time had a beginning is absurd. And
if time - which is the expression of the measure of
movement - is eternal, movement must be eternal. And
the necessity of the eternity of movement implies the
necessity of the eternity of the thing in motion,
through the duration of which time endures.
This argument for the eternity of time, as formu¬
lated by the philosophers, is not a deduction from the
nature of time and motion. It is not deduced from the
argument that time must always have a "before" and an
"after". It is deduced from the premise that God is
eternal and the supposition of His temporal priority to
the world. The discourse constitutes a hypothetical
disjunctive syllogisms
If God is eternal, the world is eternal, and if God is




therefore, the world is eternal.
But to prove that the world is eternal, all that
is necessary, for the philosophers, is to .rove that God's
priority to the world is essential, and not temporal.
Shis proof is not from the nature of time, but rather from
the nature of God's priority and causality. Al-Ghasall,
therefore, has simply to show that the meaning of God's
priority to the world and time is:
He existed without the world and without time, then He
existed and with Him there was the world and there was
time. And the meaning that He existed without the
world is the existence of the essence of the Creator
and the non-existence of the essence of the world.
And the meaning of priority is the uniqueness of
His existence.
Xho argument from time comes only in the discussion
as a consequence of the supposition that God's priority is
temporal. If one supposes God's priority temporal, it
means that He precedes the world by infinite time.
Infinite time in turn implies the world's eternity since
time is the measure of motion and it does not exist without
motion. Al-GhasalX says that there is no reason why time
1ibid
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should not be finite, for the existence of time is taken to
be only co-extensive with the existence of the moving world,
and there is no evidence that this moving world is not
finite. Any extension of time beyond this world thus has
no more basis than imagination. Moreover, if time is
nothing but an attribute of movement, then the only valid
way to find out the extent of time is from the evidence of
the extent of movement. But the philosophers say that
whenever the world began, one can always conceive a time
before it, and this time must be eternal. They then go
on to deduce from this eternal time an eternal movement.
According to al-Ghazall, they have reversed the correct
order of reasoning, and instead of inferxdng the extent of
time from the extent of movement, they have inferred the
extent of movement from the extent of time - an illicit
process.
Again, the philosophers have another1 way of forcing
their opponents to admit the eternity of time. They say;
You do not doubt God was able to create the world one
year, a hundred years, a thousand years, and so ad
infinitum, before He created it and that those possi¬
bilities are different in magnitude and number.
Therefore, it is necessary to admit something - before
the existence of the world - which had a quantitative
or measurable nature, and some parts of which would be
greater m quantity or size than others.
1Ibid. p.70.
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Al-Ghazall says that all this is the work of imagi¬
nation, This plea will be invalid for three reasons:
Firstly, it is repugnant to reason. For reason shows
that the supposition of the world's being larger or
smaller by a cubit than it is is not like the supposition
of black and white, or existence and non-existence,
coming together. It is only the affirmation and
denial of the same thing at the same time which is
impossible, and to which all impossible things can be
reduced. The assertion of the impossibility of a
larger or smaller size is an arbitrary, unconvincing
and false assertion.
This is indeed a silly and faulty assertion,
iil-Ghazali points out the important distinction between
logical impossibility or necessity and factual or hypo-
sthetical impossibility or necessity. For God everything
is possible but the logically impossible.
Then al-^hazali mentions the second reason:
Secondly, if the world is in the state it is, without
the possibility of being larger or smaller than it is,
then its existence, as it is, is necessary, not possible.
But the necessary needs no cause. So then, either
the philosophers deny the Creator as the materialists do,




But this is not their doctrine. Al-Ghazall
further says that the false argument of the philosophers
authorizes their opponent (the AshCarites) to oppose it by
a similar one. He puts it:
Thirdly, the existence of the world was not possible before
its existence, for indeed possibility - according to
your theory - is coextensive with existence, neither
more nor less. If you say: 'But then the eternal
has passed from impotence to power', we answer: 'No,
for the existence was not possible and therefore could
not be brought about and the impossibility of a thing's
happening that could not happen does not indicate impotence.'
If you say: 'How can a thing which is impossible become
possible?' We answer: 'But why should it be impossible
that a thing should be impossible at one moment and
possible at another?' If you say: 'The times are
similar,' the answer is: 'But so are the measures, and
why should one measure be possible and another, bigger
or smaller by the width of a nail, impossible? And if
the latter assumption is not impossible, the former is
not impossible either.' And this is the way to oppose
them.
But the true answer is that their supposition of possi¬
bilities makes no sense whatever. We concede only
that God is eternal and powerful, and that His action
never fails, And there is nothing in this power that
demands the assumption of a temporal extension, unless
imagination confuses God's power with other things, and
connects it with time.
1Taha...pp.72-73; (Eng. Tr.pp.4-4—45)
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The argument is carried by al-Ghazali to a new
point, that is, the analogy between space and time. He
insists that one who believes in the finitude of space must
consistently assume the existence of finite time, parti¬
cularly when one holds the position that space, time, and
movement in space are all related to one another. If
the philosophers insist that it is impossible to think of
an empty space, they should equally realize that it is
impossible to conceive of an empty time. Al-Ghazall goes
on to say that the philosophers admit that space is finite,
because it is an attribute of body which is finite. Why
do they not admit likewise that time is finite, because it
is an attribute of finite movement2 He then shows the
weakness of the philosophers' position that they are unable
to prove the infinity of movement, though this according
to their supposition should come first, that is, before the
infinity of time.
Thus, the eternity of the world cannot be proved
from the eternity of time.
The Third and -Fourth Argument from Possibility and Matter
The philosophers maintain that the world existed
as a possibility long before it actually came into existence.
^Taha...pp.67-70
87
They say that prior to its origination, the world must have
either been possible (mumkin); or impossible (mumtani ).
1
or necessary (wa.iib). It is impossible that it should
have been impossible; for that which is impossible in itself
is never brought into existence. Again, it is impossible
for it to have been necessary in itself; for that which is
necessary in itself is never deprived of existence. It
follows then that the existence of the world must have
always been possible in itself, otherwise it would have
never come into existence. The philosophers further say
that this possibility cannot inhere in possibility itself,
nor in the agent, nor in a non-substratum, for the possible
is that which is in the process of becoming actual. Hence
the subject of possibility is some substratum which is
susceptible of possibility, and this is matter. Now, this
matter cannot be considered to have originated. If it
had originated, the possibility of its existence would have
preceded its existence. In that case possibility would
have existed in itself, but possibility existing in itself
is unintelligible. Hence matter is eternal, and it is




2Ibid. pp.74-80; cf. Ch.II,p.61
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Al-Ghazall points out that possibility, like
impossibility, is purely a subjective notion to which
nothing need correspond in reality. If possibility
requires an existence to correspond to it, so would impossi¬
bility require something to correspond to it, but there is
no existing thing in concrete reality to which impossibility
may be referred. Hence possibility like impossibility is
merely a concept. The assumption of an existing substratum
to which this concept may be related is to make a meta¬
physical leap from mere thought to actual existence and
so to commit an ontological fallacy. Al-Ghazall opposes
the view that the creation of the world is always possible
and that there is no time in which the world could not have
been created. Its creation has been decreed from all
eternity but achieved in time. Thus, creation is not
concomitant with possibility as such. The possibility
for creation and the principle of existence cannot be
determined by "sooner" or "later". That which can be
ascertained is the principle that the world was created,
and this is the only possibility.
Discussion of the Creator and Creation
According to al-Ghazali, the arguments of the
philosophers are either full of contradictions or unproved
89
assumptions. And the most manifest inconsistencies and
sheer baselessness of their assumptions become conspicoua
when they try to explain the origination of the world from
the Being o£ God, in terms of the Heoplatonic theory of
emanation. He demonstrates the dishonesty of the philoso¬
phers who say that God is the Agent and the Maker of the
world} whereas in fact these words have only a metapho-
;rical and not a real significance to them. He say3 that
all the philosopher®, except the materialists, agree that
the world has a maker, and that God is the maker and agent
of the world and the world is Iiis act and His work. But
this is a dishonest distortion of their principles.
There are three reasons why, according to them, the world
as an act of God is inconceivable: (a) One of these reason®
is to be found in the nature of the agent; (b) another, in
the nature of the action; and (c) the third on©, is in the
relationship between the action and the agent.
(a) As concerns the first point, the agent must be willing,
choosing, and knowing what he wills to be the agent of what
he wills. But, according to the philosopher^ God does not
will, He has no attribute whatever, and what proceeds fro®
Him proceeds by tho compulsion of necessity. Al-Ghazall
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says:
Agent means someone from whom there i>roceeds an act
with the will to act according to choice and with the
knowledge of the object willed. hut, according to
the philosophers, the world stands in relation to God
as the effect to the cause. So it follows from Him
by way of necessary causation. And, therefore, it
cannot he imagined that God should have been able to
avoid His action, even as the shadow is unavoidable to
a person, or light to the Sun. Now, this has nothing
A
to do with an action.
Al-Ghazall answers that they have employed the
expression of act only metaphorically, and as compared to
a 'natural act'; only a voluntary act is a proper act.
The proof of that is: if one assumes an event which is
based on two facts, the one voluntary, and the other invo-
:luntary, the mind relates the act to the voluntary fact.
The word 'agent' is used of one whose act proceeds from his
regard
will, and behold, the philosophers do not/God as endowed with
2
will and choiceJ
(b) The second point is that according to the principle
i i
of the philosophers the world is eternal, but an act implies
temporal production. Al-Ghazali says that the meaning of
'act' i3 'to convert from not-being into being by producing
it', and this cannot be imagined in the eternal, as what




•act' iaplieB a temporal product or origination, but
according to the philosophers* opinion the world is eternal}
1
bow then could it be God's act? Then al-Ghazall says,
on behalf of the philosophers: "The philosophers may
perhaps say: The meaning of 'product* is that 'which exists
2
after its non-existence'." Al-Ghasall answers that it
is impossible to say that previous non-existence was connec-
*ted with Hita, since the agent cannot exert influence upon
non-existence; and it is equally impossible to say 'both
together*, for it is clear that non-existence is in no way
connected with the agent, for non-existence qua non-exis-
:tence needs no agent at all. it follows, therefore,
that what is connected with hia is connected with Him in
so far as it is an existent, and what proceeds from Eim is
pure existence, and that there is no other relation to Hi®
than that of existence. Temporal production implies,
thex^efore, the contradictory statements that it must be
connected with an agent, that it calinot be produced, if it
is not preceded by non-existence, and that non-existence




non-existence a condition for the act's becoming an act is
to impose a condition although the agent cannot exert any
influence under any condition. Al-Ghazall retorts that
the relation, as the philosophers conceive, between God and
the world is that of the power which holds the world together.
He says:
Our answer is that our aim in this question is to show
that you philosophers use those venerable names without
justification, and that God according to you is not a
true agent, nor the world truly His act, and that you ^
apply this word metaphorically - not in its real sense.
(c) The third reason why it is impossible for the philo-
:phers to admit according to their principle that the world
is the act of God is because of a condition which is common
to the agent and the act, namely, their assertion that out
p
of one only one can proceed. Now the First J rinciple
is one in every respect, and the world is composed out of
different constituents. Therefore, according to their
principle, it cannot be imagined that the world is the act
of God. Al-Ghazali says that the Muslim philosophers'
adherence to this view is the clearest evidence that their




and duplicity. The problem of emanation with the philo¬
sophers, however, arises because of their over-emphasis on
the abstract unity of God, They never understood the
transcendental immanence of God, Again, creation through
an act of volition implies both will and knowledge, and these,
according to the philosophers, cannot be predicated of God
as attributes apart from His essence without doing violence
to His absolute unity. In their opinion, both will and
knowledge have limitations; will, in particular, implies a
deficiency in a being who wills, for it means that he desires
or wants to have that which he lacks; for they thought of
the divine will in terms of human will. Hence the philo-
:sophers elaborated an ingenious theory of emanation which
contrives to erect a cosmological staircase between God's
stable unity and the changing and varied multiplicity of the
world. This staircase consists of a finely graded series
of intelligences and souls of the celestial spheres, each
emanating from the other in an hierarchical fashion.
Determinism implicit in this emanational world-view is so
opposed to the theistic voluntarian of Sunnites' world-view
that al-Ghazall launches the most vehement attack against it.
His strictures against this grand cosmological construction,
made out of various imported ideas, are the strongest and
94-
the bitterest of all the arguments that may be found in the
entire Tahafut. All this, he inveighs:
Is idle speculation; arbitrary reasoning; wild guess
work; and darkness piled upon darkness. If someone
says that he saw things of this kind in a dream, it
would be inferred that he was suffering from some
disease. Even an insane person could not rest
satisfied with such a supposition.
The philosophers circumscribed God's knowledge to
that of His self only. It is a strange theory, says
al-Ghazali, which makes the effect know of its cause but
lets the cause remain ignorant of its effect. Again,
al-Ghazali differs with the philosophers with regard to the
range and mode of God's knowledge. His criticism of the
emanation theory consists in showing:
(i) Firstly, that it fails to account for the multipli¬
city and the composition of the world; and
(ii) Secondly, that it does not succeed in safeguarding
the absolute unity of God,
(i) If the formula that from one only one proceeds be
observed logically, then all the beings in the world would
be units, each of which would be the effect of some other
unit above it, as it would be the cause of some other unit
1Ibid. pp,100-101
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"below it in a linear fashion. But in fact this is not
the case. Every object, according to the philosophers
themselves, is composed at least of form and matter.
How does a composite thing such as a body then came into
existence? Does it have only one cause? If the answer
is in the affirmative, then the assertion that only one
proceeds from one becomes null and void. If, on the other
hand, a composite has a composite cause, then the same
question will be repeated in the case of this cause so on
and so forth, till one arrives at a point where the
compound necessarily meets the simple. This contact
between the compound effect and the unitary cause wherever
it occurs would falsify the principle - that only one
proceeds from one. Strictly speaking, all the existents
in the universe are characterized by composition; and only
the First Principle, that is God alone can be said to possess
true unity, for in Him alone there is a complete identity
of essence and existence. This would necessarily lead
to the conclusion that either the principle - only one
from one - fails to account for the composition and multi-




not possess a genuine unity. But the philosophers cloak
the issue with their artificial subtleties and the grandiose
constructions they put upon their emanational foundations.
What earthly or unearthly relation is there, al-Ghazalx
questions, between the first intelligence having a
possible existence and the body of the sphere of the
second intelligence which is supposed to proceed from it?
Neither logic nor experience can substantiate this wild
supposition and as such it is no more than pure nonsense.
Further, how is it possible that from two kinds of knowledge
of the first intelligence, that is, knowledge of the First
Principle and that of itself, should arise two kinds of
existence, firstly, that of the second intelligence, and
secondly, that of the soul of the highest sphere? How can
they say that the knowledge of a thing leads to the exis¬
tence of a thing without committing an obvious ontological
fallacy? How can the knower emanate from the knowing?
Al-Ghazall is amazed and deplores, that of all people
1
philosophers should believe in such mythical nonsense,
iiven if the triplicity with which the philosophers charac¬
terize the first intelligence should be taken for granted,
(which indeed cannot be done) it fails to account for all
1Ibid.pp.99-100
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that they want to deduce from it. The body of the highest
sphere, which according to them proceeds only from one
aspect of the essence of the first intelligence, is surely
not single in nature but composite and that in three ways:
(a) Firstly, as stated before, it is composed of form
and matter, as indeed all bodies are according to philoso¬
phers' own admission. Though form and matter always
exist conjointly in all bodies, yet they are so different
from each other that one cannot be the cause of the other.
Hence, the form and matter of the body of the highest
sphere require two principles for their existence and not
one. A single aspect of the three-fold character of the
a
first intelligence fails to account for it.
(b) Secondly, the body of this sphere has a definite
size. Its having a definite size is something additional
to the bare fact of its existence. Certainly, it could
have come into existence with a different size, bigger or
smaller than it is. Hence, over and above that which
necessitated the existence of the body of the sphere, there






(c) Thirdly, in the highest heaven, there are marked
out two points as its poles, which are fixed. This was
admitted by the philosophers in accordance with the Aristo-
:telian astronomy. Now, either all the parts of the high-
sphere
:est/are similar, in which case it is impossible to explain
why two points should be chosen in preference to all the
others as its poles; or they are different, some of them
possessing properties which are not possessed by the others.
Hence, it is required that there should be another aspect
in the first intelligence, which should be the cause for
the differences in the various parts of the highest sphere,
which differences alone would justify the choice of two
-i
points therein to be the poles.
In view of what has been stated above, it is sheer
"ignorance" on the part of the philosophers to hold that
the body of the highest sphere has emanated only from one
aspect of the essence of the first intelligence. Either
the principle that only one proceeds from one is true, in
which case the first intelligence which is not a mere
triplicity but a whole multiplicity remains unexplained;
i 2




In the latter case infinite variety and plurality of the
world can directly be derived from the unity of God and
there is no need to erect the emanational staircase between
Him and the world.
The above principle certainly collapses when one
comes to the second intelligence, for it is supposed to be,
in one of its aspects, the cause of the sphere of the fixed
1
stars. These are twelve hundred or so and are different
in magnitude, shape, position, colour, and in respect of
their special functions in nature, etc. Each one of
these factors in every single star needs a separate cause
as its determinant. All this necessitates a bewildering
multiplicity in the second intelligence and also indirectly
presupposes the same in the first intelligence in so far
2
as the latter is the emanative cause of the former.
A
According to the then Greek or Arab astronomer's reckoning
in itolemy's Almagest the number of the stars mentioned is
1,025» This number was generally accepted by the Arab
astronomers. cAbd-ar-Rahman ibn-cUmar as-Sufi (291/905 -
# # #
376/986), one of the Muslim astronomers, in his kitab al
kawakib al-Thabita al-Musawwar (Illustrated Book of the
Fixed Stars) adds that there are many more stars than




If the above argument fails to convince the
philosophers, there is another way to show them that the
first intelligence is more than a mere triplicity. Is
the self-knowledge of the first intelligence identical with
its essence or other than it? It is not possible that it
should be identical, for knowledge is not the same thing as
that which is known. Hence, the first intelligence is
not a triplicity but a quadruplicity, namely, its essence,
its knowledge of itself, its knowledge of the First Principle,
1
and its being a possible existent by itself. To all
these four aspects there can be added yet another, namely,
its being a necessary being whose necessity is derived
from an external cause. All this proves that the fir3t
intelligence has five aspects and not three, as arbitrarily
assumed by the philosophers. Whether the first intelli¬
gence has five aspects or three, it certainly is not of
purely unitary character according to the philosophers*
own admission. This shows that there is something in
the effect which is not present in the cause, that is,
the First Principle, and this is scandalous.
(ii) Not only does the formula that only one
proceeds from one become shame-facedly invalid; but
1Ibid. p.104
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further according to al-Ghazall, the entire emanational
line of argument does great violence to the concept of
God*s unity, and thus, nullifies the very purpose for
which it is adopted* There is no reason, according to
him, that the very arguments which the philosophers advance
to establish the triple character of the first intelligence
should not be applied to God Himself. One of the aspects
of plurality in the first intelligence, according to the
philosophers, is its being a possible existence by itself.
It may be asked: Is its being possible identical with its
existence or other than it? If it is identical, no
plurality would arise from it. If it is other than its
existence, then why should it not be possible to say that
there is as much plurality in the .First Principle, that is,
God Himself, for He not only has existence but is necess-
:arily existent? The necessity of existence as such is
other than existence itself. In fact, existence may be
considered to be a generic concept divided into necessary
and possible. If one specific difference is an addition
to existence per se in one case, it should be considered so
in the other also. If the philosophers insist that the
possibility of existence is other than existence in case of
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the first intelligence, through the same argument they
should admit that necessity of existence is different from
existence in the case of the First Principle. Similarly,
al-Ghazall asks:
Is the first intelligence's knowledge of its Principle
identical with its existence and with its knowledge of
itself or other than the two? If it is identical,
then there will be no plurality in its nature. But
if it is other than the two, then such a plurality
exists also in the First Principle, for He too knows
A
Himself and also what is other than Himself.
Thus, al-Ghazall contends that either there can be
no plurality in the first intelligence or if it is there,
then it is for the same reason in the First Principle too,
and therefore, the beings characterized by diversity and
plurality would directly proceed from Him. Al-Ghazali
forces this conclusion upon the philosophers through their
own logic.
For himself al-Ghazali believes that:
The First Principle is an omnipotent and willing agent;
He does what He wills, and ordains as He likes, and He
creates the similar and dissimilar things alike, whenever
and in whatever manner He wills. The impossibility of






He, in support of his agnosticism with regard to
the modus operandi of God's creativity, alludes to the
Tradition: "Ponder the product of God's creative activity;
1
do not dwell on His essence," Al-Ghazali confesses that
the problem of God's creativity remains ever beyond the
comprehension of human understanding. The enquiry into
the manner in which the world proceeded from God's will,
2
he urges, is "an idle and aimless venture,"
'To repeat again, the vieiv of God as reflective
thought, reflective in the literal sense of turning back
upon itself, has been subjected to severe criticism by
al»GhazalI. According to him, self-knowledge of a
literal and direct sort is an impossibility. He argues
with Avicenna that self-knowledge even in the case of God
implies an epistemological subject-object dualism, and
therefore would impede the philosophers' thesis of the
absolute unity of the First Principle, In fact, the
philosophers make the first intelligence superior to and
"nobler" than the First Principle in so far as from the




the first intelligence three things proceed. Further,
the First Principle does not know what proceeds from it;
hut its effect knows its cause and its three effects.
Al-Ghazall feels so bitter at this conception that he goes
to the length of saying that the philosophers by limiting
God's knowledge to the sphere of self-knowledge virtually
1
reduce Him to the status of the dead. He is very
emphatic with regard to the all-circumscribing knowledge
of Gods " He says: "God knows the creeping of the black
ant upon the rugged rock in the dark night, and He perceives
2
the movement of the mote in the midst of the air."
Al-Ghazall thus differs with the philosophers with regard
to the range and mode of God's knowledge, power, and will.
He strongly affirms the Sunnites' belief in God's attributes
and His having created the world out of sheer nothingness
at a specific momemt of time, yet he insists that it is
not for us humans to have even the shadow of comprehension
of God's creative activity. All philosophical expla-
:nations have their ultimate termini, and the doctrine of
7.
creation ex-nihilo is one of them.
^Ibid. p.103.
^Cf. Muslim Theology, p.302; cf. also Our. 10:61
*0f. Tennant,F.R., Philosophical Theology. ii,p,125f; & also
Laird,J., Theism and Cosmology. Gh.iv-v.
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Conclusion
Al-Ghazali concludes that the philosophical specu¬
lation cannot form the basis of truth. He exposed the
philosophers' position by pointing out their logical
inconsistencies, and tried to show that on rational grounds
the philosophers in their doctrine of creation could achieve
nothing. The designing of the world, which implies a
designer, further implies that the Designer is also the
world's Creator, Moreover, God's attributes must immea¬
surably transcend man's attributes of similar kind,
Al-Ghazall accuses the philosophers of<Mt attempting to prove
no more than a world-architect, working upon a pre-existing
matter. Cut of the negabive arguments, however, the foll-
:owing are the positive implications:
1. Cod is a free agent, not a cause constantly conjoined
with its effect,
2, He acted without a determinant, other than His will
for He is i?acil-Mukhtar.
5, Time did not exist before the creation of the world;
time before the world is merely a figment of the imagination,
A, The world is by nature contingent, and there must be
some determinant of its specificity. Al-Ghazali's position
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here is based on the belief that God's will needs no external
determinant since it is of its nature to choose in accordance
with His eternal knowledge.
But al-Ghazalx's attitude in the fahafut is mainly
negative. He refutes the arguments of the philosophers
on jrtkie rational grounds and thus has shown that with their
premises and methods they could not achieve any certainity.
The Muslim Neoplatonists professed to prove everything by
reason, but reason cannot demonstrate the metaphysical
subtleties and al-Ghazall has shown a destruction of
rationalism by reason itself.
CHAPTER IV
Al-Ghasall'a Viava on the Doctrine of Creation
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CHAPTER IV
Al-Ghazali1s Views on the Doctrine of Creation
Introduction
Al-Ghazall's deep love of the Faith made him defend
his religious standpoint with all his power of belief and
arguments. The task which he undertook was a dual one:
Firstly, he had to refute the philosophers' belief in
%
the eternity of the world, and for that, as mentioned
earlier, he devoted one book - Haqasid al-falasifa - to
expounding their views, "so that he might not be suspected
of neglecting the essential basis of their proof"; and
another - Tahafut al-falasifa - to criticizing and refuting
their arguments.
And finally, the exposition of his own belief.
Al-Ghazalx builds the doctrine of the creation of the world
on the Burmites' foundations and supports it with arguments
acceptable to the minds of the community as well as to the
religious institutions of his time. He strongly adheres
to the belief that God existed alone, and there was nothing
with Him. The world is by nature contingent and there
must be a cause for its origination. By cause, al-Ghazall,
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means nothing hut the 'determinant', which is God, The
existence of the world, before its origination, was equally
possible and not-possible, God brought it into existence
out of absolute non-existence, by an action of His own,
which is the result of His will and power, and which is not
subject to the laws of nature, God is a free agent, not
a cause which is conjoined with its effect, Al-Ghazali
also believes that time, too, began with the world,
Al-Ghazall analysed and criticized the views of the
philosophers' belief in the eternity of the world in order
to affirm and prove the doctrine of the temporal origin of
the world, though he does not explicitly argue in the
Tahafut for any positive views of his own. His reflection
on the doctrine of creation involves two main trends:
1, The first embodies a negative critical attitude
which takes two forms:
(a) One of these forms is his attitude towards the
philosophers, as discussed before where he impeached their
arguments, as he says, "in the manner which a denying
defendant would adopt, and not in the manner which a
1
proving asserter would adopt,"
1laha»,.pp, 62,66,
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(b) The other form concerns al-Ghazali's attitude to
the theologians. He outlines this in his book al-Munqicbh
and on various other occasions in his other works like
Ihya* cUlum ad-Din and al-Iqtisad fi'l-Ictiqad, Al-Ghazali
criticizes the methods of the theologians and rejects the
suitability of their scholastic discourses. He condemns
them for limiting their pursuit of knowledge to the extent
to which rational proofs and logical arguments can take
them. He asserts that the purpose of theology is the
preservation of the tenets of faith from confusion by
sceptics. The proofs offered by the theologians appear*
to him to be weak and insufficient for the purpose of
fulfilling this object. Although he concedes that the
theologians had done good work in defending the tenets of
faith, he nevertheless says that:
They based their arguments on premisses which they took
from their opponents and which they were compelled to
admit by naive belief (taqlid), or the consensus of the
community, or bare acceptance of the Qur'an and the
Traditions, For the most part their efforts were
devoted to making explicit the contradictions of their
opponents and criticizing them in respect of the logical
consequences of what they admitted. This was of
little use in the case of one who admitted nothing at
q
all save logically necessary truths.
^The Faith and Practice, p.28; cf. also Muslim Theology...p.219,
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2. The other trend comprises the formulation and presen¬
tation of al-Ghazali's views and doctrine concerning the
origination of the world. Al-Ghazali promised in the
Tahafut to write another hook to be entitled as . ,awacid
al-caqa*id. in which he would endeavour to substantiate the
special theological views and the doctrine which might
prove the temporal origin of the world, on the lines he
1
adhered to in the Tahafut. The most important of his
works for the purpose of stucying his theological views and
the doctrine of creation is al-Iqtisad. while his popular
book on this subject is Iljjra'.
The sound methodology in the study of al-Ghazali's
^
views is to concentrate on the main works of undoubted
authenticity, while to depend on others in so far as they
2
are not incompatible with the former.
Al-Ghazall's Attitude towards Revelation and Reason
According to al-Ghazall, the doctrine of the origi¬
nation and the creation of the world is a matter of faith,
though it can be supported by reasoning. His fundamental
'i
Taha. . .p. 109; cf. also I.qti.. .p.96«
^Cf. W.M.Watt: 'The ^tudy of al-GhazalT', Oriens. 1961.pp.121-24;
& 'The Authenticity of the Works attributed to al-Ghazali',
JAA3, 1952. pp.24-45; cf. also Bouyges: Essai de ChronolOKie.
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notion is that the ultimate source of knowledge of faith is
1
crevelation. Aql (reason) itself is no rival of reve-
:lation: it is no more than common sense and regulated
thinking, which may be employed by men about religion; a"fe
best it acts as a preservative against errors in deduction
and arguments. The primary source, so far as the articles of fait:
are concerned, can be furnished only by revelation.
Al-Ghazall holds the view that the articles of faith should
be based upon the Qur'an, and the Sunna. But the right
course is to follow them with moderation - and by moderation
he means following the Traditions with the methods of
speculation. in the introduction to al-lqtisad, al-Ghazall
wages a very severe campaign against the Hashwiyya for their
acceptance of a naive belief in the matter of the doctrine
of faith, and for their adherence to the literal meaning of
the religious texts (an-nusus ash~sharciy:/a). He also
directs an attack against the philosophers and the extremists *
amongst the Mu'tasilites for their having exaggerated the
power and authority of the mind and its freedom, so that
thereby they put reason in opposition to scriptural proofs
(qawatic ash-sharlca). Al-Ghazali sayss
The tendency of these is toward remissness (tafrlt) while
the tendency of the others is towards extravagance
1Iqti...p.13; cf. also Ihya'...i.p.93.
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(ifrat); and both of them are far from wisdom and
caution. But the essential purpose in the dogma of
faith is adherence to moderation and the following of
the rightful path; since both the extremes are
abhorrent. And how can enlightenment prevail amongst
those who are content with following the Traditions
while denying the methods of speculation and ignoring
the fact that the truth of the prophet is proved by
1
reason.
Al-Ghazalx further states that the traditional
proofs may be conclusive and positive in their transmission
(sanad) and text (matn) and show that what is proved by
them must be believed. Where doubt and suspicion about
the text or transmission of these occur, then what is
proved by them must not be believed. Secondly, the words k
of the traditional proofs must be interpreted because it is
not reasonable to assume that a traditional proof embodies
propositions that are opposed to the verdict of reason.
Thirdly, when propositions can be known by both the evidence
of reason and revelation, it is imperative to believe in
2
them. Thus, al-Ghazall in matters of faith and the
doctrine of the origination of the world relied mainly on
text of the Qur'an and the Traditions; but he made full





Al-Ghazali's Methodology to prove the Origination of the World
Al-Ghazall confines himself to three methods to
prove the origination of the world, which he probably-
regarded as the most important bases of his proofs. They arei
1. The first is the method of Enumeration and Division
(as sabr wa-t taqslm).^ According to this method, al-Ghazali
classifies a proposition as being of only two alternatives,
and he then proceeds to invalidate one of these alternatives,
thereby proving the other alternative. An example of such
a proposition in syllogistic form is that:
"The world is either a thing originated or a thing eternal.
It is impossible for it to be eternal.
Therefore the world is a thing originated."
2. The second method is also in the form of syllogism:
"All that is not free from the originated-changes (al-
hawadith) is originated.
The world is not free from the originated-changes.
2
Therefore the world is originated."
3. The third method is to assert the impossibility of
the opponent's claim. Al-Ghazali says:
The eternity of the world is impossible as it leads to
the affirmation that the spherical revolutions are
infinite in number, and consist of innumerable units.
But we know that this is impossible. The fact is that
these revolutions can be divided into one-sixth, or
G •••
Ibid.p.9: cf. also Mi yar. pp.88-89. This method was already
used by al-Juwayni but in a different form, cf. -£rststd.p.11 J
cf. also Muslim Intellectual.pp.121-22.
2Iati...p.9.
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one-fourth, or a half.
In other words, they have among them a definite proportion*
and a well calculated number. To put it in a syllogistic
form would be:
"The revolutions of the celestial sphere have no end;
Whatever has no end, has no beginning;
Therefore, the world has no beginning."
HUts al~Ghazali says: "it is evident that this claim of the
op onent is impossible, for the revolutions of the sphere
1
have a definite number."
Al-Ghazalx further proceeds to support and strengthen
these methods by elucidating the differences and variations
that may exist between some of them, from the point of view
of the benefit derived therefrom by speculative analogy and
also from the point of view of the cogent force that they
may hold in inducing conviction. He demonstrates how we
inevitably arrive at the final conclusion if the opponent
concedes the assumed premises. What would happen,
however, if the opponent were to refuse to concede all
these premises of the proof or some of them? To meet such
an eventuality, al-Ghazali analyses and classifies the
propositions used for demonstrating evidence into self-
evident and non-controversial propositions conceded by
^Ibid.p.10
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everyone. These, he maintains, should form the basis of
the proof, and the introductory premises should thus rest
upon them, either directly or by means of another line of
reasoning. These premises, which are in their nature
axiomatic, fall into six categories. They are:
1. Premises based upon the .judgment of the senses
Cal-hissiyyat)
By this al-Ghazall means things perceived and
trusted by the outward and inward vision and realization.
If we say:
"Every originated-thing has a cause (sabab).
The world is an originated-thing.
•i
Therefore the world has a cause."
The truth of the major premise can be ascertained by our
senses; because we perceive and ascertain by our senses
the existence and origination of human beings, animals,
vegetation, clouds and rain; and also the movement of
these things. We also perceive and ascertain by 1HM(
inward realization the origination of the spiritual
phenomena like joy and pain. In these circumstances
the opponent cannot fail to concede this a priori major





Every body is not-without-originated-things.
Therefore every body is originated."
2. Premises based upon Reason (caql)
If we say that "the world is either eternal or
originated"; then every reasonable person must concede the
fact that the world is an originated-thing. We arrive at
such a conclusion in the following manner:
"What does not precede originated-things is originated.
Eubstances do not precede any originated-thing.
Therefore the World (the totality of substances and
accidents) is originated."
The first proposition is an intellectual one, and no reaso¬
nable (rational) person can fail to concede it; because
everything which does not precede originated-things can
either come into existence at the same time as these
originated-things, or at a later time. There can be no
other alternative; and if the opponent allege such an
alternative, he would be in direct opposition to the thing
that reason makes self-evident.
1Ibid. pp.11-12
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5» Premises supported by widely-transmitted Traditions
(at-tawatur)
An example of this kind would be to say:
(a) She prophet Muhammad is truthful because the divine
miracle is an evidence of his truthfulness; and
(b) She person who has a divine miracle as an evidence
of his truthfulness is indeed truthful.
The opponent cannot deny the existence of the divine
miracle, because this fact is substantiated by the traditions
reported to us by successive witnesses, and because know-
:ledge of it is derived and ascertained in the same manner
as knowledge of the existence of Moses, Jesus, and all other
1
prophets of old.
A. Premises verified by other Means
These premises are based upon either "sensual",
"mental", or "traditional" evidence. Al-Ghazali says
that after we substantiate, by the use of any of these
methods of proof, the fact that the world is an originated-
thing, the origination of the world (huduth al-calam) would
become a given premise which can then be drawn upon for the
purpose of proof and be regarded as having the strength
2




5. Premises based upon the Samci.yyat - the Qur'an.
and Sunna
An example of this would be to say that: "Sin occurs
by the will of God, for we say that all that happens in the v
1
world is by the will of God." If we want to substan-
itiate the proposition that sin occurs in the world, it
would be substantiated, for the 'Traditions support that
everything happens by the will of God. The opponent
cannot deny the statement if he admits the validity of
revelation.
6. Premises derived from the Beliefs held by the
Opponent and the admission made by him
Such premises, although not amenable to direct
substantiation by cogent proofs and also not verified by
either sensual or intellectual evidence, may nevertheless
be made use of if admitted by an opponent. They can then
be used as premises in our proof, and the opponent cannot
deny them except at the risk of vitiating the whole of his
argument or doctrine.
These various kinds of axiomatic premises vary in
their power to induce conviction, and also in the scope in
1Ibid; cf. Qur. 3:26,29.
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which they can be made use of, for the purpose of proof.
The first and second categories are general and carry
conviction in the eyes of all people, excepting of course
those who have no intellect or trustworthy senses, The
third is considered to be acceptable only to those who have
accepted the truth of the report of the Traditions, The
fourth category is considered convincing only to those who
are familiar with the method of analogy and who appreciate
the essential pre-requisites for the operation of this
method in a way that will make it possible to draw upon it
for the purpose of providing a consistent argument leading
to a valid conclusion. The fifth category can convince
only those who accept the validity of the SamacI and its
authenticity. The sixth category of premises does not
convince the investigator himself, but is helpful to
convince the opponent, by the use of arguments in which
he believes.
Meanings of Al-Huduth, Al-Calam, and other Cognate Words
Before giving al-Ghazall's proofs of the origination
of the world, the meanings of the words al-huduth. al-calam.
khalaqa, and other cognate words should be understood, to
ascertain his attitude with regard to their meanings.
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Al-Huduth
The general meaning of the verb hadatha is "happened"
•
or "was found". It means also that which "came into
existence; began to be; had a beginning; began or origi¬
nated; existed newly for the first time, not having been
1
before." Al-hadith is an event, an accident, which is
H » »
likely to happen from nothingness. The opposite of the
verb hadatha is qaduma. The opposite of al-huduth is
al-qidam. and of al-hadith is al-qadim.
• ——
According to the philosophers, the specialised
meaning of huduth is only the determination of the exis-
:ten^t from pure potentiality to actuality. They believe
that the world is eternal. The existen#* do not spring
from nobhing; matter and time preceded them. They say
that there is an eternal matter. It has no form, and bears
within itself the potentiality of being. The prime mover
2
moves the potential matter to actual form.
But in the opinion of the "ancient" (as-salaf) as
well as the "later" (al-khalaf) Muslim scholars, huauth
means that which originated from non-existence. The
Mutakallimun believed that origination is one of the acts
1 —Lane's nexi. ..I.ii.p.527; & also Lisan. art. ' ahdatha* ,ii,pp.436-
2Cf. Oh.II,p.6J; & also Ishra..,ii.pp.97-104-; iii,pp.4-99-507.
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of God. It means the origination of the world out of
1
absolute non-existence. Al-Ghazali is in agreement
with the ancient as well as the later Muslim scholars1
viewpoint that existence did not spring from a pre-existing
matter, but was brought out of nothingness. He says that
huduth means the origination of things which have no existence
before, and that existent or originated thing in itself had
not that existence in itself for all times as different
2
from this or that time. Al-Ghazali outrightly rejects
the idea of the existence of any matter in whatever form it
may be. According to him, matter had neither the poten¬
tiality nor the power and the possibility of any existence
whatsoever before its origination by God. He says that
eternal is that which never ceases to exist, and whose
c
existence has no origin. It has no ilia (cause) and
3
that alone is God.
Ai-Cgiam
The word al-calam in the ordinary sense denotes






means "what the cavity of the celestial sphere comprises."
According to the ancient scholars it means "everything that
exists other than God." The later scholars define "the
world as consisting of substances (al-.iawahir) and accidents
2
(al-a rad)." Al-Ghazali uses both the definitions given
by the ancients as well as by the later scholars. He says
"al-calam means the collection of all the simple physical
3
bodies and all the homogeneous existences"; or "by the
'worlds (or spheres)' we simply mean 'classes of existents'.
mm M ^ Qmm
In al-Iqtisad al-Ghazali says: "by al- alam we mean every
existent thing other than God", and he further says that




These two definitions of al- alam are not contrary.
Everything that exists other than God is what implies a
prior non-existence. It has a beginning. It is
originated. Al-Ghazall mentions two existents:
(i) God, who has no beginning; in Him alone is the
_ «. 6
coincidence of existence (wu.jud) and essence (dhat).
^Lane's hexi...I.v.214-1.
2 —
Irsh...p.10; cf. also Usui.p.33.
^MiCyar. p.172.





God is the one whose essence and attributes are inde¬
pendent of all existing things, whereas everything
in existence is dependent upon (in need of) Him.
A
Everything derives its existence from Him.
tr
(ii) The other existenaw, which he says:
ts
In all other existen« there is a separation between
A
the existence and essence. These existents have
a beginning, and an end. They are originated and





Khalaqa in the ordinary sense means 'to cut accord-
:ing to some measure'. It also means to create something
in accordance with some plan. It has been discussed in
the first chapter and here it is more fitting to confine
this term to what al-Ghazall means by it. He says:
Khalaqa is a common term, which may be used in the
meaning of bringing or creation of existence, however
it may be; or one may bay the creation of existence
which proceeds from matter and form, however it may
be; one may say khalaqa in the second meaning but
different in the sense that the creation is in the




meaning Qf invention (ikhtira0) without there previously
having been matter, in which is the power and possibi-
1
:lity of existence.
Al-Ghazali uses the term khalaqa in this last
sense, that is to say the creation of the world is an act
of origination, by God, of matter as well as form, out of
absolute non-existence. In the technical sense, al-Ghazali
uses khalaqa to mean the same as ahdatha, in accordance with
2
the divine decree and plan.
Ibdag or Badac
Another word which al-Ghazall uses in connection
with the creation is ibdac. He says it is used in two
meanings:
Firstly, it means establishing something not from
pre-existing matter and not by means of anything;
and secondly, it means that a thing has existence
without a cause and without any intermediary though
it is possible for it in its essence not to exist,
and in this case it has lost completely what it has
x
xn its essence.
Ibda° means to bring something into existence








It means that which originated for the first time, not after
the example of anything preceding. Al-Ghazalx interpreting
the word badlc says that it means the one who originates
something for the first time when such an action has no
precedent in terras of an act similar to it. He says,
"Al-Badxc% as the name of God, means the originator of all
1
existents, with no pre-existing model." It further
signifies that every existent (which has come into existence)
after Him, results from His producing it and so is in no way
analogous to its producer. Al-Ghazalx further illustrates
the various aspects of creation - as its emergence, organi¬
zation and composition of forms - according to the best
ordinances, while discussing the most beautiful names of
God.
Different Aspects of Creation
Al-Ghazall says that everything which emerges from
non-existence to existence, or the act of creation and ori¬
gination, requires planning. In order to simlify al-Ghazalx
A
Haasad. pp.71 * 65; cf.also ur. 2:117; 6:101.
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distinguishes the different aspects of creation. His
analysis refers to the three aspects that connote the pass¬
age from non-being to being:
(i) The first is in accordance with the divine plan Cat-
taqdlr);
(ii) secondly, the production and bringing of things into
existence (al-Itjad cala wafq at-taqdir); and
(iii) finally, the formation and development of it after
production (taswlr bacd al-i.1ad).
He says:
God Most High is the Creator (Al-khaliq) in as much as
He is the One who plans and pre-determines, in accor¬
dance with the Divine decree (qadar); He is the
Originator (Al-Bari') who produces and brings into
existence all; and He is the One who Forms (Al-Musawwir)
the exi^tents, and arranges them in the best possible
manner.
Al-Ghazali illustrates this by saying that these
aspects of creation remind one of a building which requires
a planner to estimate accurately what is needed in terms of
timber, bricks, and land area ( not to mention of the number
of buildings plus their length and width). To sketch and
fashion is the work of an architect; following this a
builder is required who will assume the responsibility for
^Maqsad. pp.35-56.
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the work by which the building should actually come into
existence, The next step requires a decorator to improve
upon its appearance. This is the usual procedure in
respect of planning, production, and formation of anything.
However, this is not the case with Almighty God. He
Himself is the Planner and Creator, the Producer, and the
Decorator. Al-Ghazall further explains this by giving an
example of God's work in man, one of His creatures.
Various things are required in respect of his existence and
formation. First of all, the substance from which his
existence is to be derived, must be obtained. This is,
of course, a body endowed with special characteristics.
Further man's physical constitution cannot be sound without
the combination of water and earth. But earth alone is
rigid and cannot be moulded in such a way as to make movement
possible. Water, too, is absolute liquid; it does not
hold together, nor can it have a firm shape. So the dry
and the wet are to be blended in such a way that they keep
the balance. The result is the clay. At this point
heat must be applied so that the mixture might solidify.
Again, man requires an accurate estimate of the particular
amount of both water and earth to be used. If the amount
is too little, man's physical constitution would not emerge, ,
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rwe-re.
and if it is too much, that would he a mass. /hat is
A
required is the exact amount, neither too much nor too 3
little, and that exact amount is known only to God.
'This fact, of course, is important to the planning. Thus,
in respect of the planning and the creation of all things,
in accordance with pre-determination, says al-Ghazali, God
is the Creator. In respect of the production and bringing
forth of all existence, He is the Producer. He is the
.Fashioner, since He arranges the shapes of things in the
best possible order and gives them the best possible form.
Its real nature is known only to the one who knows and under-
:stands the construction and the form of the world in general
as well as in details.
The most important point which al-Ghazali wants to
stress is that God is not only the 'Giver of forms', but
also is the Originator and the Creator of every existent.
He creates things out of absolute nothingness, and further
develops and sustains them. Here al-Ghazall wants to rule
out the possibility of any potential matter in which lies
the power and possibility of existence whatsoever. To
prove that the world is created and originated by God,
al-Ghazali says that human nature itself seems to testify
it. He quotes from the Qur'an: "Is there any doubt
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regarding God, the Originator of the heavens and the earth?"
The Qur'an further affirms that this conception is innate
in the minds of human beings as the Qur'an says: "If you
ask them, who created the heavens and the earth?, they
2
will say, God," There is then, according to al-Ghazali,
enough evidence in the nature of man and in the testimony
of the Qur'an to prove that God is the Originator and the
Creator of every existent thing,
Al-Ghazall's Froofs for the Existence of God and the
Orip;ination of the world
1. The Proofs of Origination
Al-Ghazali starts with the fundamental belief that
God exists alone and that there was nothing with Him, He
then proceeds to argue that everything that exists other
than God requires to be originated in order to acquire
existence. He supports his claim on the premises based
upon both the judgment of the senses and reason. He says
that it is self-evident to the senses and reason that there
must be a cause for the origination of everything originated.




cause for its origination. The most succint statement of
this argument is in al-Iqtisad. The syllogism runs as:
"Every originated thing has a cause.
The world is an originated thing.
Therefore the world has a cause."
Al-Ghazali says:
"Of everything there is a cause, and the world is an
originated thing, so it necessarily has a cause.
And we mean by the world every existent thing other
than God, and by every existent thing other than God
we mean all bodies and their accidents. Its detailed
explanation is that we have no doubt in the origin of
the existence, since we know that every existent either
occupies space or not (mutahayyiz wa ghayr mutahayyiz).
And if every existent which occupies space is not
united (i'tilafj with its body we call it an indivisible
substance (al-.jawhar al-fard), and if it is united with
another we call it a body; and that which does not
occupy a place will either necessitate for its existence
a body in which it subsists, and we call it an accident
(al-°arad), or that which does not require anything for
its existence, that is God. As for the bodies and
their accidents, they are known by observation and no
attention should be paid to the opponent who disputes
about the accidents, as they are self-evident. If
his arguments and disputations were not existent how
could we busy ourself in answering and listening to his
arguments? If they were existent, it is inevitable
that they are something other than his (arguer's) body,
^Iqti...pp. 13-14-
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since his body was existent before and his arguments
were not# Thus, you have known that bodies and
accidents are perceived by observation. But the
existent which is neither a body, nor a located
substance, and which has no accident in it, cannot be
so perceived (known by sensations), and we claim that
that existent is prior to everything, and that the
world exists because of his power (that is God). And
y\
we understand this by proof and not by sensation.
Al-Ghazall goes on to verify the argument of his
claim. He says if the opponent disputes that everything
originated has a cause and questions, how did he know that?
The answer will be that this question can be asked concer-
:ning that existence which is originated, and not concerning
that existence which never ceases to exist. He who does
not understand what is meant by the term 'originated-thing'
and 'cause' is either ignorant, and there is no need to
answer his questions; or %£ he understands them, then his
reason would necessarily accept that there is a cause for
everything originated. "By originated-thing, we mean,
2
what was non-existent and came into existence."
With the origination of the world as a premise,
al-Ghazali proceeds to prove that the world being originated
^Ibids cf. Irsh.pp.10,12-13; and also Tamhid.p.43. Here
al-Ghazall followed the same line as undertook by al-Juwayni
to prove the origination of the world.
^Iqti_. . .p„l4.
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must necessarily have a cause, by recourse to the so-called
•principle of determination'. In its barest form, this
principle meant that since prior to the existence of the
world it was equally possible for it to be or not to be,
a 'determinant', whereby the possibility of existence could
prevail over possibility of non-existence, was required;
and this 'determinant', he argued, was God.
2. Proof from Contingency
Al-Ghazali says that existence before its origination
must have been either 'possible'; or •impossible'; or
A
•necessary'. Necessity and possibility in existence is
a philosophical idea as already mentioned by al-Farabl and
Avicenna. Al-Parabi says that there are two kinds of
existents: the possible and the necessary. If the possible
is supposed to be non-existent, this is not logically absurd.
If it happens, it happens as a result of something. It
needs a cause and there cannot be an infinite series of
causes. It should always need a necessary existent, which
is the Pirst existent. As to the necessary existent, it
is absolutely absurd to suppose its non-existence. It has
^Ibid; cf. Irsh...pp.16-17.
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no cause. It never happens as a result of something other
than itself. It is the first cause of all things. Its
existence should be previous to all other existents. It
is the most perfect of all existents, and beyond causes.
Avicenna also defines the necessary and the possible.
He says that the necessary does not need a cause; whereas
2
the possible needs a cause.
Al-Grhazall uses these concepts of the opponents to
prove the origination of the world in his own way. He states
that it is wrong to say that existent was impossible; for
that v/hich is impossible in itself, never exists at all.
Again, it is not necessary in itself, for that which necess-
:ary in itself is never deprived of existence. It follows
that it must have been possible in itself. To prove his
argument, al-Ghazall, points out that the world is composed
of bodies, with vai'ious forms, having accidents which have
distinguishing characteristics as colour, shape, and other
qualities. He then tries to ascertain their variability,
and from this deduces the meaning of the possibility of things,
One finds that things have an unstable nature (this is
perceptible by the senses as well as by the mind). One can
^'Uyum al-iviasa'il.p.57.
^Ha.j.. .p. 566; cf.also Shifa' .p.299
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perceive the sequence of the accidents and can assert that
things might always be of another shape than they are.
Thus, all existents are unstable. This leads to the
conclusion that they are possible. And its possible
existence originates - against its continued non-existence,
which is equally possible - then the mind posits intuitively
and without recourse to rational proof that there must be a
cause to bring it into existence from non-existence.
Al-Ghazali says:
The existence of the world is possible and we mean by
this statement is that it may exist or not. It was
not in existence befox*e, because its existence was not
necessary; but, rather, its existence needs a 'deter¬
minant' so that its non-existence may be changed into
existence. And by cause, we mean, nothing but the
A
'determinant'•
What al-Ghazall means by the determinant and its
relation to creation will be stated later on. Having
proved the contingent nature of the world, he further goes
on to prove its origination on the basis of movement and
rest.
3* Proofs from Changes (hawadith) and Movement and Hest
Again, al-Ghazall tries to prove the origination of
^Iqti.. .p. 14.
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the world in a syllogistic way by shifting the argument that
by the world he means nothing but all bodies and substances.
He says:
"All that is not-free from originated-changes (hawadith)
is originated.
All bodies are not-free from originated-changes.
A
'therefore all bodies are originated."
Al-Ghazali asks the opponent which of the two
premises he disputes? If the opponent asks why it is said
that every located body is not-free from changes, the reply
would be that it is not-free from movement and rest, and
both are originated. If he questions again why their
existence is claimed first and then their origination,
al-Ghazall says that the answer to thi3 question has been
elaborated in kalam and needs no further explanation.
For no rational man can ever doubt the existence of accidents
in himself such as pain, hunger, thirst, and other conditions
nor in their origination, as these characteristics are
perceptible. Similarly, if one observes the bodies of
the world, one cannot doubt the change of their conditions,
and that these changes are originated.
Al-Ghazall further proves that movement and rest
are originated by their alternate occurence, as is observable
1Ibid.
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in all material objects, those that can be seen as well as
those that are invisible. For there can be nothing at
rest which reason does not decide to be capable of coming
to a stand-still. Of the two states of rest and movement
that which happens to occur at a time (tari') is originated,
because it did occur. The previous state, of an object
whether at rest or in motion, is also originated, for were
1
its eternity proved, its non-existence would be impossible.
Again, if it is said: how did you know that it is origi-
:nated, for it might be hidden and then appeared? Its
reply would be rather to say that substance has either
hidden movement in it or apparent and they are originated,
for it has been proved that it is not free from changes.
The proof involved in this statement of al-Ghazali is that
by the world he means the bodies and the substances, and
they are either at rest or in movement, and whatever is at
rest or in movement is originated. This statement is
self-evident, for he who conceives a body which is neither
at rest nor in movement is both obstinately ignorant and
unwilling to follow the path of reason. Al-Ghazali
further states that those who dispute the origination of





They declared that the bodies of the world are divided
into heavens and the four elements. The heavens are
in continuous movement. And the individuals of their
movements are originated, but they are continuously
successive, eternally and everlastingly. And the
four elements, which the cavity of the heaven of the
moon encompasses, are common to a matter containing its
forms and accidents. And that matter is eternal, but
the forms and the accidents are originated and follow
each other successively from eternity. .ater by heat
changes into vapour and vapour changes by heat into
fire and so with the rest of the elements; and these
elements mingle with each other and originate new
mixtures, and from these mixtures the minerals, plants,
and animals come into existence. These elements are
not separate from these originated forms, and the
heavens are never separated from the originated movements.
The philosophers believe that no one of the bodies
in the world originates, nor does it perish. It is only
the forms and accidents which originate. The bodies -
that is, the heavens - are eternal; and the four elements,
which are the stuff of the sphere of the moon, and their
bodies and matter are eternal. On these pass in succession
the forms resulting from combination and transformation.
Further, the minerals, plants, and the animal soul originate
in time. And the series of the causes of all those which
^Iqti...pp.14-15; cf.Maqa...220-23; cf.also Fara fx.pp.38-60;
ha.j. . .p.299: Iaha. ..pp. 277,661.
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which originate come to an end at the circular motion.
And the circular motion is eternal, its source being the
eternal soul of the sphere. All this shows that the
world has no origination. Al-Ghazali says that if these
bodies are supposed to be necessary, it will be absurd.
If they are supposed to be possible, all that is possible
needs a cause and is originated. Since all the philosoph-
:ers have agreed that the bodies of the world are not free
from originated-things (as they admit the origination of
the forms and accidents), nevertheless, they have denied
the origination of the world. If it is said, as the
philosophers state that everything is not free from
originated-things, then it should be originated. I'he
proof is that were it not so, it would be necessary to
assume the existence before everything originated of
another so originated, and so on ad infinitum, so that
unless all these originated-things did come and pass, the
turn of the one in question would never come. But this
1
is impossible because there is no end to infinity.
A _
Iqti...pp.16-17; cf.also Ih.ya1 .i.p.94-.
139
4. Proof from the Revolutions
Al-Ghazali's other proof is from the revolutions of
the celestial spheres. Were these revolutions infinite,
their number would either be odd or even, or both odd and
even, or neither odd nor even. -But it is impossible that
the number could be both odd and even, or neither odd nor
even, for this would combine the positive with the negative,
so that affirmation of the one would involve the negation
of the other, and vice versa. iiirther, it is impossible
for the number of the revolution to be even only, since even
becomes odd by the addition of one to it - and look how
the infinite stands in need of one! It is impossible to
be odd only since odd becomes even by the addition of one
- and here again the infinite is proved to be in need of
one! .Finally, it is impossible for the number to be
1
neither odd nor even, for this would mean that it is finite.
here al-Ghazali, again, derives the premise from
the belief held by the opponent and the admission made by
him. By involving the opponent in the choice between
two equally unfavourable alternatives, he gets his
conclusion. He further proves that the celestial
1lqti...pp.16-17
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revolutions have a well calculated and a definite number.
For instance, he says:
The sphere of the Sun completes one revolution in one
year, while that of oaturn makes one in thirty years.
Therefore, the revolutions of '-'aturn are one-thirtieth
of those of the Sun. And the revolutions of the
Jupiter are one-twelfth of those of the Sun, for ^
Jupiter completes one revolution in twelve years.
This argument leads to the affirmation that the
revolutions of the sphere are finite and consist of a
definite number, and so they are originated.
Proofs of the Existence of God
Having established that the world is possible and
originated, al-Ghazali proceeds to argue that the possible
cannot exist by itself. He now sets forth the more
popular proof from origination, which is known as dalxl
2
al-.jawaz. lie repeats that if the world is possible, it
must need a cause to bring it into existence. Hence the
next claim is that the cause of all possible existents or
the bodies of the world is eternal, that there is no
1Ibid.pp.17-18.
21 -
Gf. Xrsh. p.16, where al-Juwaynx develops the similar argu¬
ment from temporality.
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beginning of its existence. It should be the originator
Of everything, and that it has existed before everything,
and He is God. Here is the proof: Were He Himself
originated and not eternal, His own coming into existence
would have required an originator, and his originator
another and so on ad infinitum, without ultimately leading
to one pre-existent, first originator who is the object
and whom we call the Originator of the world. So
al-Ghazall says that we should stop at the eternal cause
and this is what we are aiming at and call it the Origi-
:nator of the world. It is evidently necessary to
declare it Lternal, and by 'eternal' he means nothing
but that which is not preceded by non-existence, that is
the statement of existence and denial of preceding non-
existence.
The next claim is that the Creator of the world
is eternal without a beginning and everlasting without an
end. For according to revelation 'He is the First and
2
the Last'. Here is a point which one should know, that
/
that which is first is first in relation to something and
that which is last is last in relation to something.
^iqti...p.18; cf.Ih.ya'.i.p.94.
2 —
Ihya'.i.p.94; & also Maqsad.p.65; cf. Qur.57:3.
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Those terms are relative and. moreover they are opposite.
It is inconceivable that one thing can both be first and
last in the same respect and related to the same thing.
Rather when one observes the order of existence as such,
and also observes the chain of the ordered existents, then
one must know that God Most High is the First in relation
to them, since each and every existent acquires its exis¬
tence from Him. As for God Himself, He exists by means
of His own essence, and He has not derived His existence
from another. At the same time, no matter how much one
considers the order or progression and the gradation of
those which are moving, one must conclude that He is the
Last. He is the Last in relation to the progression and
1
the First in relation to existence. According to reason
it is impossible to imagine the non-existence of that which
has been shown to be eternal. Here is the proof: if the
possibility of its non-existence is assumed, then this
could be self-imposed or through the action of an opponent.
But were it possible for a thing (whose existence is
conceivable) to be annihilated by itself, it would be
possible for a thing (whose non-existence is inconceivable)
2
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of existence, like the occurence of annihilation, requires
a cause. But it is absurd and unimaginable to assume
Hi3 annihilation through an opponent, for that would require
the assumption of the letter's being pre-existent or
co-existent with Him. How, then, is it possible to
conceive of an opponent with Him in pre-existence, when
God's existence and eternity has been proved. It is also
impossible for the opponent to be himself originated, since
l-ess.
it is iujlii^r likely for the originated to succeed in its
opposition to the eternal with a view to its destruction
than it is for the eternal in its opposition to the origi-
:nated with a view to preventing its coining into existence.
For prevention is indeed easier than destruction, and eternal
1
is stronger than and superior to the originated.
Al-Ghazali further builds up his proofs of the
existence of God on the basis that He is neither a substance,
nor a body, nor an accident, and that He is One. He
starts with substance, body and accident, and the movement
and immobility resulting from the transference of a substance
from one place to another, and to its stabilization therein,
and goes step by step to prove the need for an originator
1Ibid.pp.19-20; cf.Ihya'.i.p.94
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both existent and eternal, and in doing so he argues for
1
the proposition that "what has no beginning can have no end,"
Al-Ghazali argues in much the same way as the
Ashcarites, but he differs from them in the fact that often
in the course of his argumentation he formulates possible
objections to his contentions. It seems that he was
strongly affected by his drawn-out controversy with the
philosophers on the subject of their belief in the eternity
of the world.
The fourth claim which al-Ghazali brings forth is:
that God is not a substance which occupies space and that
He is too exalted to have any relation to space, ^ere is
the proof: Every substance which occupies a space is con¬
ditioned by this space, and is either at rest in that
space or in movement away from it, that is, it is subject
to movement and rest which are originated. But if it
were possible to imagine the existence of an eternal
substance which is limited by space, then the eternity of
all substances in the world would be conceivable, which is
impossible, for what is subject to changes is proved to be
originated. If someone uses the term 'substance' with
1Iqti...pp.19-20
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reference to God, without intending to mean substance which
is limited by space, he would be verbally wrong but not in
1
the meaning.
The next claim is:
God is not a body. Its proof is this: A body is
composed of substance. Alt since it has been
disproved that He was a substance limited by space, He
cannot be a body, since every body is limited by space
and is composed of substances, and since it is also
impossible to dissociate substance from composition
(i,jtimac) and decomposition (iftiraq), movement (haraka)
and rest (sukun), form (hay1 a) and quantity (miqdar),
all of which are the characteristics of originated
things, so it is impossible for the originated to be
2
its own originator, or the created to be its creator.
Again, al-Ghazali says:
God is not an accident inherent in a body nor settled in
a location. For body is subject to accident and is
necessarily originated, and its originator would exist
before it. It is not possible then that ue could be
incOrjpflriated (hallan) in a body when He existed from
all eternity alone, with none beside Him, and then
7.
created all substances and accidents afterwards. ^
Al-Ghazali further asserts that He is all-knowing
(callm), all-powerful (qadir), all-willing (rnurld), and
^Ibid.p.20; cf.Ihya1.i.pp.94-95.
2Iqti...pp.20-21; cf.Ihya'.i,p.95«
^.Iqti...pp.22-25; cf .Ihya' .i,pp.95-96.
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creator (khaliq), and these attributes are impossible for
accidents to possess. Nay, they are inconceivable except
1
for a being (mau.jud) who is self-existent and self-dependent.
further Proof
Al-Ghazall goes on further to prove the creation of
the world with the Oneness of God as a premise. He ascri-
:bes to it two meanings:
(i) That God is indivisible, for He has no quantity and
what has no quantity cannot be divided.
(ii) That God has no equal in degree and no opposite, as
already mentioned.
That God has no opposite is evident since the
opposite of a thing is that which alternates with it in the
occupation of a place, and never shares it; whereas God is
not limited by space, and therefore, can have no opposite.
2
What is meant by the peerlessness (la nidda lahu fi rutbatihi)
of God is that no being created by God can equal Him. In
proving this proposition al-Ghazall makes use of burhan at-
tamanu0. Hut he draws his argument from the degrees of
3





If God has an associate, then this associate must he one of
these: (a) either equal to God in degree; or (b) of higher
degree than Him; or (c) of lower degree. Each of these
alternatives can be shown to be absurd. In the first case,
duality implies variation; this variation may be in the
nature (movement and colour, for example, are two different
natures, although they may exist in the same place and at the
same time), or it may be a variation in place or time, the
nature being the same (an illustration of this would be two
blacknesses which cannot reside in one substance at one time).
Now if God's associate is His equal in every way, his exis*
:tence becomes impossible, for they cannot differ in nature
since they are both pre-supposed to be eternal, and they
cannot differ in time or place since they are not bounded by
time or place. Therefore, there can be no variation and
no duality either, and the unity of God is established.
The second and third alternatives are equally absurd, for
God is ex hypothesi the highest Being in existence; in
either of the two cases therefore the higher form is God
1
and the other is not God. Al-Ghazall then attacks the




the creation of the world, the dividing line being between
the heavens and the earth, or animate and inanimate, or
good and evil. He reduces this theory to two alternatives:
either (a) the dividing line cuts through both substances
and accidents, each of the gods creating some of the sub¬
stances and some of the accidents; or (b) one of them
creates all the substances and the other all the accidents.
He then disproves both the alternatives by taking another
hypothesis that one god may create solely good and the other
solely evil. "This amounts to folly", he writes of the
hypothesis, "for evil is not evil in its essence; indeed
in its essence it is equal and similar to good, and he who
has the power to create one thing has the power to create
1
its similitude." Al-Ghazall concludes his argument with
the assertion that the multiplicity of gods in any form
would result in confusion, and he quotes from the Qur'an:
"If there were in them other gods than Allah, their order
2
would have been disrupted."
CO rvchIA.S >~0 ru.
Al-Ghazall' s Iluwh I. i galltlft, so far, is that God
exists and is self-existent. He is neither a substance
nor a body and an accident, while the whole world is made




and created by Him. Hence it is impossible for the
created to resemble its creator. Ihe world is not of
the nature of the effect which always co-existed with God.
It is originated out of non-existence. The world in its
totality is possible, and God is the cause of its existence.
How a number of questions arise: If the world is originated
it must then inevitably be at a specific moment of time,
and for what reason is that moment particularized to the
exclusion of all others? What is the nature of the cause
and its relation to the originated? Al-Ghazali is obliged
to answer all such questions.
Meaning of Determinant and its Relation to Creation
Al-Ghazali says that the existence and the non¬
existence of this originated world are possible. If its
possible existence animates, there must be a cause to
ft
bring it into existence. By the cause, he means, the
'determinant'. The question is if the 'determinant' was
and the world was not; when later on the world emerged,
who is the originator of the determinant itself? Why does
it originate now, and not before? In analysing the
'determinant', al-Ghazall considers two alternatives:
(a) Either it is a natural determinant or agent; or
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(b)it is a free agent (facil mukhtar).
Al-Ghazall disproves that m is a natural agent,
A
and concludes that the determinant is 'all-powerful* (qadir)
and 'all-willing' (murld), or in other words He is a free
agent. He says:
The Originator of the world is all-powerful and all-
willing as regards His actions (muridun li 'af°alihi).
He brings about the world according to His power and
will. If the determinant or God could not excercise
his power and will, he would not have been able to
create the world in this particular place, and at a
particular time. As to the world, all spaces and all
instants of time are similar. The Originator origi¬
nated it in a space and time that best suited His
power and will. He chooses the time and space as He
wills.
Thus, according to al-Ghazali, the determinant is
a free one who creates and originates through His will and
power. Affirming the attribute of power, he says, that
it is the attribute by which action becomes possible.
Among its special characteristics is that it is related
as
to all things possible, and/these are infinite there is no
limit to the power of God. To prove the prevalence of
God's power, al-Ghazali relies on two propositions already
<1Iqti...pp.38,47} cf .Ihya' >ifp.96
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proved: That God exists; and that the Creator of the world
is one, J?rom these premises only two possible alterna-
:tives can follow: either God has as many powers as there
are objects of power (these are infinite), and this alter¬
native is absurd since it has been established that the
revolutions of the sphere cannot be infinite; or else He
has a unified power over all substances and accidents, which
differ among themselves but have one thing common, that is
possibility. Therefore, everything that is possible is
1
subject to God's power and is actualized by His power.
To establish the prevalence of God's power gives
rise to a number of questions, like the creation of man's
acts and its relation to the power of God; these will be
reviewed later on. At this point the relevant reference
is only to answer the question: Can things unknown be the
object of God's power? Before answering this question,
al-Ghazalx affirms that anything possible is an object of
power and anything impossible is not. He then explains
the meaning of "impossible" and "possible" in order to
determine whether a thing unknown is possible and therefore
an object of power, or impossible and therefore not so.
Thus he makes out that, viewed from different aspects, the
1Iqti.,,p,59
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world may rightly be said to be "necessary", "impossible",
or "possible".
(i) If the will exists, and wills it to exist, then it
is necessary;
(ii) if there is no will willing it to exist, then it
is impossible; and
(iii) if the will for its existence or non-existence
is left out of consideration, then it is possible, that is
possible in itself.
It is therefore imaginable that the same thing may
be possible and impossible at the same time, but only in the
sense that it may be possible in itself and impossible in
respect of something else. It cannot be at the same time
possible in itself and impossible in itself, for the two
terms are contradictory. What is meant by impossible in
itself is what is precluded by the essence, such as the
co-existence of the two opposites - like blackness and non-
blackness - in the same substance.
Wow, if it is foreknown to God, for example, that
Zayd is to die on Saturday morning, then the creation of life
for him at the same time is possible in itself, but impossible
if it is considered that something outside it, that is know¬
ledge, is connected with his death. Thus, life has become
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impossible because of something outside itself, which is
knowledge, otherwise knowledge will have become ignorance.
So when we say, "Zayd's life at such a time is an object of
power", what is meant is that life in itself, inasmuch as
it is life, is not impossible, and that God's power inasmuch
as it is power is not incapable (in itself or because of
some reason within it) of creating it. Therefore the
negation of impotence in the essence of power, and the
affirmation of possibility in the essence of life are two
matters which no rational being can gainsay. So when an
opponent sajs that whet is unknown is not subject to power,
meaning that its existence would lead to an impossibility,
then he is true, and al-Ghazall says his quarrel with him
is not over this point but over whether it is correct to
use the texmi in an absolute sense. This is a matter of
linguistic research, and in such a case as the one above,
there can be no doubt that it is correct to apply the term
1
"potent" to God.
Al-Ghazali further explains that the 'determinant'
is the one who has the will for the action, who has a free
choice, and who knows what he wills. Real action depends
on will. Suppose an event which in order to happen,
1.Iqti, . .pp.4-0-4-1.
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depends on two things - one volitional and the other non-
volitional - here reason would attribute the action to the
volitional factor# This is the will that determines that
a possible thing shall be existent or non-existent. It
cannot be dispensed with even where there is knowledge,
because knowledge is dependent upon the thing known, related
to it in its actual form, and it is no part of its function
to alter or influence it# The will is involved in every
act of origination because every originated thing is
created by the power of God, and everything created by the
power pre-supposes a will to direct power to the object of
power. Thus every object of power is willed, and every
originated thing is an object of power; therefore every
1
originated thing is willed. So the •determinant* is he
from whose will an action proceeds. What al-Ghazali
means by God being the determinant is that He is the cause
of the existence of everything. The opponent points out
that a will implies a need and act of will stands in need
of another, and so on ad infinitum. Al-Ghazall retorts
that such a will which implies a need is by no means to be
attributed to God. Eternal will does not resemble temporal
intentions. As to the other objection, raised earlier,
^Ibid.pp.46-47.
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al-Ghazall says that the will of God is unconditional and
unconstrained by any external will, except by the self-
imposed law of contradiction. His will is free and
self-initiated. It need not have a cause to act or not
to act; if it needs must have a cause it is impossible to
think that this cause is not external to it. Al-Ghazalf
further states that it is also not necessary that God's
will should produce its effect immediately; it is possible
to think that His will may have a 'delayed Effect', that is,
the effect might appear after some period of time. Here
he maintains the possibility of the eternity of God's will
and the temporality and the origination of the world as
the object of that will. But one thing is to be borne
in mind>that the will of God is not separate from Him.
Again, it is also possible to think that God eternally
willed that the world should come into existence at some
specific period of time. Hence, there is no violation
of any logic in affirming the Sunnites* belief that the
world had its origination in time.
Al-Ghazall illustrates this point further. He
says that the world is an action of God. It is the nature
of an action that it must have a beginning in time. This
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is inconceivable in the case of an eternal thing, for that
which eternally exists cannot be produced and hence is not
a product. (Thus, the temporal origin is an indispensable
condition for an action. Al-Ghazali again repudiates the
view that non-existence could bear a relation to God. He
says that non-existence can never be related to Him, and
moreover non-existence qua non-existence does not stand in
need of an agent at all. The action is related to the
agent by virtue of its being an originated event, not by
virtue of its non-existence, which is a mental supposition
only. On the contrary, it is related to the agent in the
state of its temporal origination. And it is so related,
because it is a temporal and originated phenomena*. if the
opponent denies its temporal character, its being an action
will be unintelligible, and it will bear no relation to the
agent. Whereas the world is an action of God's origina¬
tion, determined by His will, thus it has a beginning, and
what begins, begins in time. Time originated with the
origination of the world.
The Relation between the Agent and Action
Al-Ghazall states that the principle (God) is one
in all respects, while the world is composed of different
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things - substances, bodies, and accidents. The world is
an act of origination through His will and power. So in
this way there is a relation of total dependence of the
action upon its agent. What prevents one from believing
that God is the omnipotent and willing agent who does what
He wills and ordains as He likes, and who creates similar
and dissimilar things alike, whenever and in whatever
manner He likes and wills? The impossibility of such a
belief is neither a self-evident truth, nor a matter of
inferential knowledge. On the contrary, the prophets,
whose strength lay in their miracles, have lent their
authority to it. Hence it is obligatory on us to believe
in them. As regards the inquiry into the manner in which
- wordd proceeded from dod-e a* ddde erd aimleSS
venture. Here the opponent might point out that instead
of giving a reply on sound rational grounds, al-Ghazall had
recourse to authority. Al-Ghazali himself was aware of
the weakness in his argument. He admitted that his answer
did not completely silence his opponents, for he deemed it
impossible finally to answer their objections or to do
more than explain and expose their mainspring, because the
subject of the investigation was the eternal attributes of
God, the reality of which transcends our understanding.
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He writes:
Since one must necessarily believe, and there is no
possibility of belief other than in those three
interpretations: 'extravagence'; 'remissness*; and
•moderation'; and since the third (that is the middle
course) affirming the attributes is the likliest,
therefore, one must believe in it. If the objection
leaves some traces of doubt in the heart, then these
are unavoidable - and there are doubts about other
points which are even greater. To explain the
objections, in whole or in part, is possible, whereas
the object of investigation - being the eternal attributes
transcending the understanding of created beings - is
beyond our grasp.
Thus, al-Ghazali in the final analysis takes refuge
in the articles of faith. But still he tries to explain
whatever he can. Al-Ghazall's primary conception here
is volo igggo sum. He suggests two ways of knowing God
and His attributes:
(i) One is by the consideration of one's self. He quotes
a well-known saying of the prophet that "he who knows
2
himself, knows his God"; and that is by contemplation of
his own being and attributes, man can have some knowledge of
God and His actions. When a man considers himself he
Iqti.. •pp.62-63.
^Kimiya-yi Gacadat.p.41; Ihya',iii,p.526; iv,p»571.
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knows that there was a time when he was non-existent, as it
is said in the Qur'an: "Does it not occur to man that there
1
was a time when he was nothing?" Further, he knows that
he was made out of a drop of mingled sperm in which there
was neither intellect, nor hearing, sight, head, hands, feet,
etc. From this it is obvious that, whatever degree of
perfection he may have arrived at, he did not make himself,
nor can he now make a single hair. How much more helpless,
2
was his condition when he was a mere drop of water (semen)?
Thus, man finds in his own being reflected in miniature the
power, will, and wisdom of the Creator, Here al-Ghazall
tries to prove that from his own creation man comes to know
God's existence, from the wonders of his bodily constitution
God's power and will. In this way the knowledge of one's
self becomes a key to the knowledge of God and His attributes,
(ii) Secondly, al-Ghazali speaks of an affinity and
resemblace between God and man, on the basis that 'He breathed
into man His spirit', and of man's duty to imitate God and
\vVic
to be characterized by the characters of God (takhalluq bi-
- - 5 -, A
akhlaq Allah), Al-Ghazall further quotes in this connec-






in His gura." Man may be regarded as a microcosm, a
uaivei'se in little, just as God is living, knowing, willing,
and has power, so man is living, knowing, willing, and has
power. there is some affinity since a3 God rules tho
world, so the spirit of man rules tho body. Gut al-Ghazall
holds the position that when attributes are said to belong
to God and also to son, the correspondence is only verbal.
he maintains that the statement implies the assertion of a
resemblance between man and God, because if man is character-
:isea by the characters of God then he resembles aim, yet
it is ioiown by both revelation and reason that nothing is
like God, that "he does not resemble anything and nothing
2
resembles Mia." Al-Ghazall says that he would reply
that when one knows the meaning of the resemblance which is
denied of God and knows that nothing resembles him, then it
should not be necessary for one to suppose that sharing
necessitates resemblance in respect of every characteristic.
Resemblance is an expression for sharing in the species and
the Quidaity( (aahiyya ,■. tor example, even if the horse
'Klmiya.p.45i of. X^ya* .iv,pp. 205,251 ; cf. also v.. ;. ,att,
•Created in His Image1, 'transactions of the ^laspow University
oriental -ociety. Xviii,(1959-60). pp.3<>-^-9.
*niaqsad»p.18; cf. .,ur.42i11.
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attains the ultimate degree of cleverness, it still does
not resemble man because it is different from him in respect
of species. It is similar to him only in respect of
cleverness which is something accidental and external to
the quiddity which constitutes the essence of humanity.
The special property of God is that He is the Existent
whose existence is necessary by virtue of His essence.
No sharing in respect of this property is conceivable at
all; a resemblance would depend on sharing in it. Thus
the correspociance here is only of verbal nature. And
reference to such a resemblance is to make human beings
understand the attributes of God, though it is clear that
neither man nor the world, with all its spheres, was God,
nor was God the world. Everything originated in the
world is His work, creation, and invention. None other
than Him is the Originator and the Creator. He created
man and created their actions, and iniiitiated their
capacity (qudra) and their movement (haraka). Thus all i
the actions of man are created by Him and dependent upon
2
His power, as "God is the Creator of everything"; "and
3
God created you and what you make."
Maqsad.p.18.
^Ih.va' .i.p.98: cf. ,_ur. 4(9j62; 6:101-102.
5 cf. vur. 37:96.
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The Relation of Creation to Han's Acts
The doctrine of the universality of the omnipotence
of God has given rise to the following retort: If the
power of God is universal, that is if it comprehends all
possible things, what would be al-Ghazall's view on the
objects of the power of man? Do such objects of power
belong to God, or do they not so belong? If his answer
be "no", he will thereby be contradicting his contention
that God's power is universal. If he says that these
objects of power belong to God, then he would be establish¬
ing that an object of power is the object of two separate
powers which is an impossible proposition. Moreover, to
deny that human beings are capable of originating actions
would be contrary to the dicates of reason and of revelation.
It is impossible for the human being to be made to account
for something that does not lie within his power; and it
is impossible to hold that God could say to a person: 'You
must do that which is capable of being originated by Me and
which lies exclusively within My power, without being anyA
power possessed by you over that thing'.
This leads to the problem of free-will andpredesti¬
nation, which is not the subject of this discourse.
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Here it will only be shown how al-Ghazali reconciles the power
of God with the creation of man's action.
Al-Ghazali says that the determinists (Mujbira)
had denied the power of human beings. They were thus
bound to deny the intrinsic difference between the movement
of man's hand shaking with fright and its movement of shaking
voluntarily. They were also bound to hold by logical
implication that obligations imposed by religion on the
individual have no real basis. The Mu'tazilites had
denied the correlation of the power of God to the actions of
His servants. They have contended that all the actions
of created beings are originated by them and that God has
no power over these actios by way of making them either
A
existent or non-existent. Two corollaries follow from
this proposition:
(a) The rejection of what they (the Mu'tazilites) have
agreed upon to the effect that there is no creator other
than God; and
(b) the attribution of the faculties of invention and
creation to the power of entities that do not have any
knowledge of the movements which they have created.
1Iqti...p.41; cf. Watt, Free Will and Predestination, pp.96-99;
104; 167.
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As regards the Sunnites*belief, al-Ghazali holds "WH
that they have considered that the two powers are correlated
to the action of human beings. In this respect al-Gfcazall
says:
Look now at the Sunnites and see how they succeeded in
choosing the right view and in attaining 'the right
measure in belief', I'hey said, the contention in
favour of determinism (jabr) is impossible and false
and the contention in favour of free-will (ikhtiyar)
is a presumption. The right course or view is to
correlate the two powers to the same action and to hold
the view in favour of an originated thing being related
to tivo powers of origination. What remains then would
be the improbability of the joint operation of the two
powers upon the same action; but this becomes improbable
only if the correlation of the two powers is in the same
mode. But if the two powers differ and the mode of
their correlation also differs, then the operation of the
two powers upon the same thing would not be impossible,
Al-Ghazall considers that committal to the view
in favour of the possibility of the occurence of an object
of power by the operation of two powers was implied by
irrefutable proofs that denote the following:
(a) That the movement of voluntary shaking is different
from the movement of the shaking with fright, in that the
1Iqti...p.4-2
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human being has to undertake the former but not the latter; and
(b) that the power of God attaches to every possible
thing; that every originated thing is a possible thing;
that the action of a human being is an originated thing;
and therefore it is impossible that the power of God should
not attach to that thing.
Al-Ghazall endeavours to clarify the correlation of
a.
the two powers to the action of human being, thereby defin¬
ing the meaning of what he calls "acquisition". In this
view, it is reasonable to hold that God creates movement in
a.
the hands of human being without that movement itself being
A
under the personal control of the individual. Thus God
creates the power of the individual and likewise creates the
object to be governed by the power of the individual; and
God in this manner reserves to Himself the exclusive power
<k
of creating the power of human being and the object which is
A
governed by that power. He says in this respect:
The cz-eation by God of the movement in the hand of the
servant is reasonable, without the movement necessarily
being within the power of the servant. The conclusion
is that the Potent whose power is wide, is able to
furnish the power as well as the object of the power.
And whereas the designation of •creator* and 'furnisher*
is applied to everyone who has created the thing with
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his power; and because the power and the object of the
power are all within the power of God the Almighty, He
has been designated as 'the Creator*• The object of
the power is never invented by the power of human being,
although it accompanies it; for this reason he was
never designated as a 'creator'. It was imperative
that a different name should be given for this kind of




Al-Ghazall supported the doctrine of creation, as
held by Ahl as-Gunna. He believed that God exists; He is
eternal; He is neither a substance nor a body nor an
accident; He is not limited by direction nor settled in a
location; He is One,
The world, which is nothing but the bodies and
substances with their accidents, is originated by God
through an act of His will and power. The world in its
totality is possible, and God is the only cause of its
existence. God was and nothing was with Him, and then
the world was originated at a particular moment of time
which is not determined other than by the will of God.
1Ibid.pp.cf. Ihya',i,pp.98-99
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God is a free agent; He acts and does not act as
He pleases. He is not a natural cause bringing about the
effect according to mechanistic rules, without thought and
choice. Creation was not an obligation upon Him. He is
the Creator of everything, and also the sole Creator of
human actions, but these are also within the capacity of
human beings. And God created both the capacity and what
it can accomplish.
The nature of the world is distinct from that of
God. He did not create it out of His essence, but brought
it into existence out of absolute non-existence, by an
action of His own. It was neither originated out of the
nature of God, nor was it created out of any primeval matter.
CHAPTER V
Averroea* Views on the Doctrine of Creation
A
CHAPTER V
Averroes1 Views on the Doctrine Qf Creation
Introduction
It has been shown in the preceding chapters that
the Muslim Neoplatonists assume that the world is an
emanation from the One. It was perhaps to resolve the
problem of the One and many, or of the Divine immanence and
transcendence, that they put forth the claims which conceived
God as a transcendent thought pondering its own essence.
On the other hand, a world scheme, in which the notion of
1
transcendent and immanent God, the Originator and Creator
of the world, is paramount is bound to view the admission
of the eternity of the world with suspicion. Al-Ghazali
supports the Sunnites' belief that the world and time have
been created together out of nothing and that it is false
to maintain that these were co-eternal with God. The
thesis of the philosophers' belief in the eternity of the
world was repudiated.
With Averroes the doctrine of creation takes the
turn of a conscious reaction against the theological view,
^Cf. Stade,k.C, Edinburgh University Library (Unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, Oct. 1967. Ch.I).
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on purely rational grounds. Having no theological pre¬
occupation, in his interpretation of the Aristotelian
doctrine, Averroes develops in the commentaries the
Aristotelian teaching. As a Muslim he was aware of the
difficulties which the doctrine of the eternity of the
world would involve; but he reserves the right of inter¬
pretation and declares that the Qur'an provides a way to
truth suitable to everyone through demonstrative, dialec-
stical, or rhetorical methods. He believes that the
doctrine of creation ex-nihilo% as upheld by the Ash arites,
is irrational and untenable, and maintains that such a
doctrine derogates the power of God by limiting His activity
to one mode of creation and reducing Him to a state of
idleness and inactivity throughout the infinite lapse of
time preceding the actual creation of the world,
Averroes explains that according to the ancient
philosophers (as he supports their view) the world is not
said to be eternal per se (qadlm bi-dh-dhat). since this
would entail that it is uncreated; but it is rather said
to be eternal in the sense of being an eternal effect
co-existent with its eternal cause. He says that huduth
means 'happening', 'becoming*, or 'production', but neither
in time nor out of nothing. Revelation speaks from the
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analogy of sensible production, as though the universe were
created out of something already existing. •Production',
however can be proved on the stronger grounds of rational
demonstration which contains the notion of eternal creation.
Absolute origination there is none, but rather it has always
been. Matter and form are both eternal. Averroes
agrees with the ideas of the Muslim Keoplatonists, to the
extent in which their views are in conformity with the
Aristotelian concept of creation.
The investigation in this chapter would involve
Averroes' attitude towards reason (philosophy) and reve-
ilation (religion) and his methodology to determine the
doctrine of creation; the meaning of huduth al-^alam.
khalaqa and other words of similar significance; his
proofs for the existence of God, and views on the eternity
and causality of the world; and the points where he differs
from the Muslim Neoplatonists.
Averroes1 Attitude towards Reason and Revelation
Averroes expounds his views on the subject substan¬
tially in his two works: Kitab ffasl al-Maqal and Kitab
al-kashf can Manahi.i al-adilla. His main position is that
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revelation is based on three principles: belief in God,
, c- s 1
prophecy, and future blessedness (sa ada). These
constitute the subject-matter of revelation. As prophecy
depends on revelation, reason remains distinct from reve-
:lation, unless it is shown that reason and revelation are
in accord with each other. But he believes that reason
contains nothing opposed to revelation. Reason is investi¬
gation into the nature of the existent. And the existent
is the created, and the created leads at once to the creator;
as reflection on existing things are indications of the
creator. It follows that from the point of view of reve-
slation, reason is necessary and leads to proper under¬
standing of its principles. The Qur'an exhorts man to
speculate on the being and knowledge of the Creator in many
2
vex'ses. And knowledge of the existent can only be obtained
through intellect and reflection which consists in deducing
the unknown from the known by inference and reasoning.
And in this way he says that revelation recommends reason.
He further declares that revelation is true, as it is from
God; reason, too, is true, as the results reached by human
mind. These two truths cannot contradict each other.
^Fasl.p.44.
j—
2lbid.pp.27-28: cf.Our. 59:2; 7:184-85; 3:190-91; 88:17-18.
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Averroes, assuming that the statements of both sources are
true, and therefore no real contradiction can arise,
proceeds to strike the key-note on which depends his entire
attitude to reason and revelation. He says if one finds
anything in revelation which seems outwardly to contradict
the results of reason, one must look for some plausible
interpretation of the text and that is to be interpreted in
such a way as to be in harmony with the rational. Allego-
:rical interpretation is based on the fact that there are
certain Qur'anic verses which have an apparent (zahir) and
1
an inner (batin) meaning.
But the methods of comprehending God and creation
are not the same for all people, though each man has the
right and duty to understand and interpret such passages in
the most perfect way of which he is capable. Some believe
because of demonstrative proofs; others base their opinion
on dialectical propositions; and still others are satisfied
with rhetorical statements. The one who can understand
the philosophical meaning of the text should interpret it
thus, for its lofty meaning is the true meaning of reve-
slation; and each time there appears any conflict between
1Fasl.pp.35-36
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the text of revelation and demonstrative conclusion, it is
by interpreting the revelational text rationally that
1
harmony should be established. Averroes sounds a warning
that literal acceptance is the duty of the masses and inter¬
pretation is the duty of the 'man of demonstration'.
Thus, having admitted reason as demonstrative, Averroes set
up philosophers as judges of the inner meaning of revelation.
Theologians are incompetent because they can only attain
dialectical reasoning which starts from popular accepted
premises. They are incapable of sound interpretation
because they do not possess the qualifications of deraonstr-
:ative science. He gives two more concessions to philosophy:
(a) firstly, he says that objections to innovation (bidca)
cannot be raised, for one can reply that the same applies
to the jurist who is continually innovating, yet no one
considers it a violation of the principles of the Qur'an.
However, the majority of theologians (Mutakallimun) recog-
2
:nize inference and reason.
(b) Secondly, error in philosophical speculation ought
not to deter any one from the study of philosophy, since
error exists per accidens - either because of the insuffi¬
ciency of talents, or misunderstanding in one's studies -
3





If this principle or method of interpretation is
accepted, the question may arise: In what instances is
interpretation permitted? Averroes replies that the
texts of revelation fall into three kinds with respect to
the excusability of errors
(i) Texts which must be taken in their apparent meaning
by everyone. Since the meaning can be understood plainly
by demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical methods alike,
no one is excused for the error of interpreting these texts
allegorically. Examples of such texts are concerning:
belief in God, prophecy, and blessedness. Whoever denies
these principles is an unbeliever.
(ii) Texts which must be taken in their apparent meaning
by the masses and interpreted allegorically by the demonstr-
:ative class. It is inexcusable for the multitude to
interpret them allegorically or for the demonstrative class
to take them in their apparent meaning. Eor example, the
verse about God's directing Himself and the Tradition about
His descent.
(iii) Texts whose classification under the previous
headings is uncertain. Error in this matter by the
1
demonstrative class is excused. Eor example, the texts
about the creation of the heavens and the earth, since
1Ibid. pp.42-4-7
175
demonstrative scholars do not agree whether to take them in
their apparent meaning or to interpret them allegorically.
Either is permissible. He says that the Mutakallimun too
in their statements about the world do not conform to the
apparent meaning of the text of the Qur'an but interpret
it allegorically.
Averroes returns again to the principles and methods
of revelation and compares them with the logical method of
reason. The principles of revelation depend on four
sources: the Qur'an; Traditions; Qiyas; and I,1mac.
Since revelation is truth, its principles must contain what
will satisfy and convince all minds, and it should be based
on rational interpretation. So far it is compatible with
reason. 1.1ma comes from the unanimous accord of the
opinion of all the qualified scholars at a certain time.
Since there was no consensus at any time about doctrinal
matters, the Mutakallimun had no right to condemn the philo¬
sophers as kafirs because of their belief in the eternity
of the world. Everyone can believe what he likes by means
of the demonstrative, dialectical, or rhetorical way.
Philosophers must be given the liberty to interpret the text
as they choose. In Averroes' opinion the Mutakallimun
sometimes interpreted the text metaphorically when they
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should have kept to the letter, and sometimes took passages
literally in which they should have found imagery. He
does not accuse them of heresy for this, and they should
grant him the same liberty.
Preliminary Discussion on the Doctrine of Creation
Averroes says that on the question of the world,
the ancient philosophers agree with the Ashcarites that it
is originated and co-existed with time. The Aristotelians
only disagree with the Ashcarites and the Platonists in
holding that past time is infinite. This difference is
A
insufficient to justify a charge of heresy. Averroes thinks:
The entire problem of the eternity or origination of the
world resolves itself into a mere difference of words -
and essentially, the philosophers agree with the Ashcarites.
There are three categories of existence - two extremes
and one intermediate: (i) One extreme is a thing caused
by an agent, composed of matter and form, and generated
in time, for example the various bodies, water, air, etc.
All alike, ancients and Ashcarites, agree in naming this
class of existents 'originated'. (ii) The other
extreme is an existent, uncaused, made out of nothing,
and is not subject to time; it is God. Here too all
agree in naming it 'eternal'. (iii) The intermediate,
an existent made out of nothing and not preceded by time
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yet created by an agent, that is the world in its
tdhlity, is the existenjM* that has occasioned much
p A
strife and discussion. The Mutakallimun admit that
time does not precede it, or rather this is a necessary
consequence for them since time according to them is
something which accompanies motion and bodies. They
agree with the 'ancients' in the view that future time
is infinite, but there is a division of opinion with
respect to past time. The Mutakallimun and Plato
hold that past time is finite, while Aristotle and his
followers maintain that it is infinite. Be this as
it may, this intermediate, or the world in its totality,
bears a resemblance both to the things which are really
generated and to the eternal Being. The Mutakkallimun
view it from the former extreme and call it originated,
while the Aristotelians see it from the side of the
Infinite and therefore designate it as eternal. Punda
smentally it is a question of homonymy (ishtirak al-ism)
Averroes adds here that in truth it is neither
really originated nor really eternal, since the really
originated is necessarily perishable and the really eternal
2
has no cause.
Meanings of Hudutht Khalaqa, and other cognate words
In determining the meanings of such terms Avorroes
relies mainly on the Qur'an, but he reserves the right of
^Ibid.pp.41-42; cf. also Manahi.j. pp.193-206; & also at-Iaha
2Pasl.p.42; cf. at-Taha...pp.121-24.
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interpretation. According; to him, the verb ahdatha means
•to produce', 'to cause to happen or to become', as occurs
1
in the Qur'an: "that God will bring something new to pass",
does not necessarily imply time factor. Absolute origi-
snation there is none, it is becoming. Averroes distin¬
guishes two existents: One which is eternal per se: and
the other which is eternal because of the first one. The
First exists in the past eternally and thus His acts have
no beginning. Through this First Existent acts can exist
which had no beginning and will never cease, and if this
were impossible for the act, it would be impossible, too,
for the existent, for every act is connected with its
existent in existence. The world cannot have had an
origin, because there could be no new decision in the mind
of God. One does not the of what never
A ' A
ceases to exist, for this would mean that its existence had
a beginning; the same applies to that which is simultaneous
2 Let
with the eternal. consider* an entity whose
existence is perfect - if it is eternal, it follows necess-
:arily that its acts be eternal, for the eternal existent
would not be eternally inactive, otherwise what is eternally
^Qur. 65?1.
2Rasa'il.pp.51.52.95: Manahi.j.pp. 193-96; cf.also at-Taha...pp.124,
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inactive is necessarily impossible. The acts of that entity
whose existence is not limited by time should also be eternal
because the priority of that entity over its effect is not
in time, but in essence or in importance. If the movements
of the celestial bodies and what follows from them are acts
of an eternal entity whose existence does not enter the
past, then its acts also do not enter past time either.
It is, therefore, untrue that what ie co-existent with the
eternal existent has entered existence. Averroes says;
To apply the expression 'production' for the world's
creation as the Divine Law does is more appropriate than
to use it of temporal production or origination, as the
Ashcarites did, for the act, in so far as it is an act,
is a product, and eternity is only represented in this
act because this production and the act produced have
neither beginning nor end.
Khalaqa
Khalaqa. Averroes says, has two meanings;
(a) To form something out of something else, for example;
God is He that created the heavens and the earth,
and what between them is, in six days,
then seated Himself upon the Throne...




2i?asl.p.4-2: Hanahi.j.p.205; cf. Qur. 32:7; et passim.
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(b) Secondly, to create in a general sense as:
And of water We fashioned every living thing; or
What do you disbelieve in Him who
created the earth in two days.,.
Then He lifted Himself to heaven when it was
smoke.
Averroes says in both of these passages the word
khalaqa means creation out of something already existing.
The verses: "He created all things", (khalaqa kulla shay*):
2
or "The Creator of everything", (khaliqu kulli shay'), could
be interpreted in the sense 'to form'or 'to order'. Thus,
Averroes says that khalaqa means to form out of something,
from clay, water, or smoke. The etymological meaning of
khalaqa also indicates creating out of something.
Similarly, according to him, other words like bada a.
or fatara also suggest to create out of something as the
heavens were created out of smoke. He also mentions
tjacala and sanaca. as: "We made your sleep for rest, and
IL
made the night as a covering." He says that if the
apparent meaning of the text is searched, it will be evident
from the verses which give us information about the bringing
of the world into existence that its form is originated but
its existence in itself is without interruption. Averroes
1
ffasl.p.4-2: cf.Qur. 21:30 & 41:9-12.
2Qur. 6:101-102.
^ffasl.p.45; Hanahi ,i .pp . 203-6 .
^lianahi ,i . pp. 197-98.
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further says that what is clear from the Qur'an is that God
is the agent of creation, knowing its details and regulating
it. He is the ordering principle of the world. Creation,
according to him, is the ordering of the world which was
1
eternal in matter and form.
Proofs for the Existence of God
Again, the proofs, which Averroes give^ for the
existence of God are based entirely on the Qur'an, and the
conclusion is deduced from the verses contained in it.
But before he proceeds to the exposition of his own views,
he discusses the opinions of the various schools. He




(4) The Batiniyya (he does not mention the views of
mm0
the Batinites).
Averroes says that each has different theories
concerning God, and each believes that its views have been
handed down from early Islam. In truth, this is not so,




Here Averroes differs from the Muslim Neoplatonists, for
according to them it is only the matter which is eternal.
2Manahi,1.p.155.
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1. The Hashwites' Views
•
,
The existence of God, and the other principles
according to the Hashwiyya, must not be subjected to
rational investigation; it is known only through trans-
1
:mission (of revelation). They are commended by
authority and they believe that this is sufficient to
(Ensure truth. They think that faith in God is received
from the prophet and that reason has nothing to do with it.
In other words, they deny thattthe existence of God can be
demonstrated by human intellect. This view can easily
be refuted, since the Qur'an itself enjoins the speculative
consideration of His existence, "In the creation of the
heavens and the earth, and the alteration of night and day,
_ p
there are signs for men of understanding", says the Qur'an,
If so, one may ask, why did not the prophet give a philo¬
sophical demonstration of the existence of the Creator,
before he called men to the service of God? Averroes
says that the answer is evident: All Arabs believed in
God instinctively, and it was not necessary for the
prophet to establish this truth for them.^
^Ibid. p.134; cf, Iqti,..p,2»
2Hanahi:i, p.134; cf, Our. 3:190; 2:164,
^Manahid,p•134,
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2. The A3h°arites' Views
The Ashcariyya, on the other hand, maintain that
the existence of God lies within the proper field of reason;
but in their proofs they make use of non-Qur'anic methods.
They start with certain dialectical premises such as: that
the world is originated, which is based upon the premise
that bodies are composed of originated atoms. This
theory in itself, Averroes says, is very difficult to
understand, but even granting it, does the Creator follow
from the originated? Is He eternal, or originated? If
the latter, there is no end to it. If He is eternal, His
action likewise must be eternal. The only solution
possible is to hold that an originated action, in the form
of becoming, can come from an eternal agent. But the
Ashcarites will not admit this, for they believe that
everything which is connected with an originated-thing is
itself originated. And, again, if things are originated,
the agent at one time acts and at other time does not act;
there must be a cause, then, which changes the state of the
agent. This cause also must have a cause which sets it in
action after non-action, and so on ad infinitum. The
Ash arites attempted to answer these questions by saying
that an originated action may originate from an eternal will.
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This,however, does not remove the difficulty, in Averroes'
view, for an origination cannot come from an eternal will
without the medium of action. He explains that there
are three distinct elements: the thing; the will, which
is the cause of the action} and the action, which is the
cause of the origination; were this not so, we would have
origination without an agent. 'The Ashcarites have mad©
the action a middle, but the problem remains the same.
Further, this eternal will co-existed with the non-existence
of the origination for an infinite time, because the origi¬
nation was non-existent for an infinite time. The will
enters existence actually together with its origination,
after the cessation of an infinite time. As the infinite
cannot end, this is, of course, absurd. And again, if
the eternal will is to cause a certain action, a new element
must enter which was not previously present. If one does
not assume this, in what way will the existence of the
action be distinguished from its non-existence?
In addition to these difficulties, there are many
other doubts: The Cur*an does not command investigation
according to these methods. Averroes says that we must rule
out the arguments of the Ashcarites for two important reasons:
Firstly, the masses cannot comprehend them; and
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Secondly, they are not demonstrative,
Averroes further criticizes the views of the
Ash arites to build up his own proofs. He says that one
of the proofs for the existence of God, generally employed
by the Ashcarites, is based upon three premises:
(i) Substances are inseparable from accidents;
(ii) accidents are originated;
(iii) anything connected with origination is itself
originated,
Averroes discusses these individually. He says:
The first premise that substances are inseparable from
accidents, when applied to ordinary bodies is evident,
but when used with reference to atoms, various questions
arise. In the first place, the existence of the atom
is not known per se, and philosophers are not agreed as
to its nature. The Ashcarites maintain that the
existence of the atom is almost axiomatic. When we
say that the elephant is bigger than the ant, we mean
that it has more parts or atoms. The elephant is
not one simple existence, but a composite of atoms,
which separate with the destruction of the body.
The Ash?®111*®8 erred in their conception of the atom
because of a confusion between contiguous (muttasila)
and discrete (munfasila) quantity. The former is
applicable only to numbers; the latter to bodies.
If discrete quantity were equivalent to contiguous_quantity,
the science of Geometry would coincide witi^the science




If, the Ashcarites further questioned, AM** the
atom has originated, what happens to the origination?
Origination is an accident, and when something has originated
and exists, the accident is removed, which can never happen
according to the Ashcarites, for accidents cannot be separ-
4
:ated from their substances. Again, if the existent
comes from the non-existent, with what is the action of the
agent connected? In prder to obviate this difficulty,
the Muctazila were compelled to assume some being in non¬
existence. Both of these schools must necessarily,
Averroes says, admit the existence of the vacuum. He says:
These doubts, as you see, dialectics cannot dispel.
This then should not be made the starting point for the
knowledge of God, at least for the masses. The true
methods of attaining to a comprehension of God are
2
clearer than these.
The second premise of the Ashcarites, all accidents
are originated, is as perplexing as their first premise,
which states that bodies are originated. One must assume
the
that what one perceives by one's senses to be true in/case
of certain bodies and accidents, is also true in cases




ail accident, but it is impossible to form a conception of
its being originated. Every originated thing must be
preceded in time by its non-existence, and the priority
of anything can only be understood in terms of time.
If time were originated, would there be time before time?
The same is true of space. If space exists as a vacuum,
the origination of this vacuum must be preceded by another
vacuum and so on ad infinitum, The only fact that the
Ashcarites succeed in proving is that the accidents, which
the senses perceive as originated, are originated. All
the rest, Averroes says, is mere rhetorical quibbling.
The third premise of the Ashcarites that everything
which is connected with an originated thing is itself
originated - rests on a homonymy. The expression "that
which is not independent of an originated thing" may be
understood in two ways:
(a) That which is not independent of the category of
originated things; or
(b) that which is not independent of this particular
originated thing.
When interpreted according to the second sense,
the proposition is true. If taken in the first sense, it
is untrue, because an infinite number of successive accidents
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may enter into one eternal substance.
The second method of the Ash arites rests upon two
premises. The first premise is that it is possible for
anything to be different from what it actually is - it
might even be its opposite; in other words nothing is true
per se. The world might be larger or smaller, it might
have a different form, any motion might be changed. The
other premise states that the possible is originated and
has an originator» who is the cause of its being one of two
possible things rather than the other. Averr6e3 points
out that the first premise is merely rhetorical. The
second premise stated is that "the possible is originated."
This proposition is not at all clear, and the opinion of
scholars are not in agreement. Plato admits the possi¬
bility of the eternity of a contingent thing; Aristotle
denies it. "This is a difficult question the truth of
which is only known to the masters of the art of demon-
1
stration."
Another method of the Ashcarites is that of
Abu 'l-liacall. He attempts, as Averroes states, to
clarify these premises by adducing others:
(a) The possible must have a determinant, that is an




(b) this determinant must necessarily be endowed with
will j
(c) anything that exists in consequence of will is
originated. The possible must originate from the
will, for there are but two alternatives - either it
is from nature or from the will; and nature cannot
produce one of two similar possibles but must produce
both. Since the world might occupy a position in the
vacuum different from the position it now occupies,
Abu*1-Macali deduces that it was originated through the
will.
This conclusion of Abu'1-Macall, Averroes says, is
true, but the premise regarding the world in a vacuum is
incorrect or at least not clear, for he is compelled to
assume the eternity of this vacuum, which, if originated,
1
would require another antecedent vacuum. Averroes further
comments that the meaning of the third explanatory premise
C-* «p
of Abu'l-rla all - anything that exists in consequence of the
will is originated - is not at all evident. The will
belongs to the category of the correlative and is insep-
:arable from the realization of the thing willed - if one
exists, actually the other does also; for example, father
and son. If the will which is actual is eternal, the
1Ibid.pp.147-48.
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willed which is actual must also be eternal. The Qur'an
makes no mention either of an eternal will or an originated
will. It merely remarks that the will is the cause of
1
c
originated things. Thus, these methods of the Ash arites
are neither evident as rational proofs, nor are these the
methods of revelation.
The methods of revelation have two characteristics;
firstly, they are evident, and secondly, they are
simple, not composite, that the premises are few in
number and the conclusions are not far removed from
the premises.^
The methods of the Sufis are not based on syllo-
igistic proof. They follow the mystic way and maintain
that in order to comprehend truth, one must emancipate
oneself from the restraints of passions and earthly desires.
He says that he does not deny the value of suppressing the
passions as an aid to speculation - but he will not admit
that this suppression brings about knowledge. Moreover,
the methods of the Sufis are not accessible to all mankind,
and they abolish speculation to which people are exhorted





As regards the Muctazila, Averroes says, "we have
not received their hooks in Spain, but it seems that their
methods are essentially the same as the methods of the
c 1Ash ariyya."
If then all the methods of the various schools are
unsatisfactory according to Averroes, the question arises
what is the correct method to be pursued in this investi-
jgation?
Averroes declares that the correct and proper
method is the one contained in the Qur'an. He says that
if one examines the Qur'an carefully, one will find that it
suggests two methods:
(i) 'The proof from Providence (dalll al-cinayya), that
is, the provision made for the comfort and happiness of
man in that all existent things were created for his sake,
(ii) The proof from the wonderful creation (dalil al-
ikhtira0), that is, the production of organic life, sense-
2
perception, and intellectual cognizance.
The first proof is based on two principles:
(a) Pirstly, that all existents were created for man; and
(b) secondly, the harmony in the world must necessarily




result of chance. The first principle is self-evident -
all things serve man, for example the regulation of day and
night, the Shin and moon, animals, plants, inorganic bodies,
even the construction of the parts of the human organism.
The second proof also rests upon two premises:
(a) Firstly, that the existents were wonderfully created,
which requires no elucidation. The Qur'an speaks in
detail as:
Hast thou not seen how that God has subjected to you
all that is in the earth
and the ships to run upon the sea at His commandment,
and He holds back heaven
lest it should fall upon the earth, save by His leave?
Surely God is All-gentle to men, All-compassionate.
(b) Secondly, that every created thing has a creator,
which is also self-explanatory. In order to attain to a
true conception of the wonderful creation, one must study
the essence of things, as the Qur'an says:
Or have they not considered
the dominion of the heaven and
of the earth, and what things
2
God has created...?




of the Qur'an, which consider the existence of God, are of
the
three kinds: some contain/proof from Providence, some the
1
proof from the creation, and some include both. These
two proofs - Providence and Creation - are suited to the
requirements of both the scholars who have deep insight,
and the masses who consider matters superficially. The
difference between them is merely one of degree - the
difference between the craftsman and the unskilled person.
Common people are content with sensuous knowledge, the
elite are convinced only by demonstration.
Averroes further says that the significance of
God's unity is expressed in the Qur'an: "there is no god
2
but He." Negation of other deities is considered to be
an additional proof to the affirmation of God's unity and
existence. Had there been more than one God, the world
3
would be subject to destruction.
1 _
Manahi.i.pp. 152-33: cf. Qur. Among the first category these
verses may be enumerated: 25:59-62; 78s6-16; 80:24-30.
As illustration of the second category, we may cite: 6:73;
22:63-65; 86:5-7; 88:17-20. The third category is exem¬
plified: 2:21-22; 3:6$ 189-91; 7:185; 17:44; 36:32-34.
2ivIanahi,i.p.155: cf .Qur. 64:13; 59:23.
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>rlanahig.p. 155; cf. al-Ghazali's proofs. Ch.IV, pp.146-48
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Averroes' conclusion as to the proof for the exis¬
tence of God is: that the methods of the Ashcarites, the
Muctazilites, and the Hashwites are neither demonstrative
nor they are suitable for the masses. The proofs for the
existence of God as contained in the Qur'an are two in number:
The proof from Providence; and proof from the Creation.
But the question arises:
What relation or accord has
Averroes brought between the views of reason and revelation
on the subject of the existence of God? The answer is
evident: none; for he considers that the popular proofs
for the existence of God as given in the Qur'an are
regarded to be the most satisfactory, since they are
intelligible to all. But still one question lurks in
the mind: Will it ever be possible to bring within the
scope of finite understanding that which transcends human
experience?
Averroes' Views on Creation and Eternity
Averroes says that the acts of God can be stated
to be:
"Production (huduth); sending the prophets;
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predestination; Justice; and resurrection (al-macad).
These constitute the relationship between God, the world,
1
and man,"
Production is an act of God. He produces the
world providentially, and not by chance. Averroes brings
in the same proof, as mentioned earlier, to prove the
world's production - dalil al-ikhtira°. But he supports
it with cosmological arguments. The world is well-ordered
and in a state of the most perfect regularity, which, he
says, proves that the existence of the world depends on a
wise Creator. Here he presupposes causality, since for him
nothing comes to be without a cause, and that there is a
definite series of causes emanating from the Prime Cause.
According to him, he who denies or cannot understand the
caused resulting from causes would have no knowledge of art
or the artisan; similarly, he who denies the existence in
this world of the dependence of effects on causes would
deny the wise Maker.
Averroes believes that the world is produced from
all eternity. Production does not take place in time.
Averroes identifies the world with movement, and regards
2
the world as eternal becoming. The world, although it
^ilanahi,i.p.192.
2
Averroes on Aristotle's He Generation et Corruption. (Tr.Kurland)
pp.100-101.
196
is eternal, has a mover or agent. He stresses one thing,
however, that without God as a moving cause, the world
could no longer exist. He regards the world as having
its matter by itself but as matter cannot exist without
form, the existence of the world depends entirely upon the
Unmoved Mover. On this point, Averroes rectifies the
assumption of the Muslim Ueoplatonists. They recognized
the principle that "from one only one can proceed or
emanate"; consequently, they thought that the one which
proceeds from the .First Principle is the first intelligence,
and from that then evolved the multiplicity of beings.
Averroes is of the opinion that a single power comes from
the Pirst Principle and the whole world results from it,
and all its parts are so ordered and connected that the
whole, moved by this power, acts in concert. In animals,
for example the different faculties, the members, and the
actions are united in a single body; and each animal is
judged a single being, having at its disposal a single
power. It is because of this power, it can be said that
God creates, maintains, and preserves the world, as in the
_ XI
Qur'an it occurs, "God is powerful over everything."
1
Manahi,i .pp . 195-97: cf. Qur. 2:284; 3:29; 4:12-13; 85:12-16
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Averroes points out that it does not follow that because
this power penetrates into manifold beings, it is itself
manifold. There flows from the First Principle, a power
single in itself, which becomes manifold in the beings that
participate in it. Thus, he differs from the Muslim Neo-
platonists and says that the Prime Mover is that cause of
the world which produces it each instant and moves it.
Celestial bodies do not have a perfected existence except
through power and movement; and that which gives them this
movement is their agent. But the Prime Agent must not
1
in any way suffer action.
Averroes distinguishes between eternity with cause
and eternity without a cause. God alone is eternal with¬
out a cause. The world is eternal because of an eternal
creative and moving agent working upon it. The priority
of God to the world is not with reference to time. It is
2
solely in His being its cause and that from all eternity.
For Averroes there is no creation ex-nihilo. once
for all, but rather a •becoming' from moment to moment,
whereby the world is maintained and changes. According to
his views, a creative power, as mentioned above, is perpet-
sually at work in the world, moving it and maintaining it.
Of.Averroes Middle Commentary (Tr.Kurland) pp.4-9-50
2Hasi'il. pp.31-32; 93.
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He conceives the world as an eternal process of becoming.
The world as a whole is an eternally necessary unity,
without any possibility of non-existence or of different
existence.
He believes that matter and form are both eternal
and here he differs from the Muslim Keoplatonists.
According to him, matter and form can only be separated
in thought. Forms do not wander like ghosts through dull
matter, but are inherent in it after the manner of germs.
The material forms, in the form of natural forces, operate
in an eternal process of generation, never separated from
matter, but yet should be called divine. Absolute
origination there is none, for all happening is a transition
from potentiality to actuality. This is purely Aristo-
:telian concept which Averroes develops in his doctrine
of production.
As a proof to his statement about his belief in
the production out of something already existing, Averroes
says:
If the apparent meaning of the Qur'an, (on the basis of
which the Ash/81*1"8 arSue)» is searcjie(ij will be
evident from the verses which give information about
the bringing of the world into existence that its present
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form is originated, and that by an efficient cause and
from some matter.
According to Averroes' view the production of the
world as described in the Qur'an consists in its being its
present form, not its being brought into existence as matter
- it already existed as matter but in another form. He
quotes from the Qur'an: "And it is He who created the
heavens and the earth in six days, and His throne was upon
the waters", taken in their apparent meaning imply that
there was a being before this present being, namely, the
2
throne and the waters, and also sfiime before time.
He further quotes from the Qur'an: "And then He lifted
Himself to the heaven when it was smoke". This passage
taken in its apparent meaning suggests that the heavens were
created from something existing,-^
Averroes' investigations into the doctrine of
creation lead him to state that there is no absolute creation,
and that the eternal motive power is eternally moving it.
He does not admit creation ex-nihilo. He believes in a
production that is being renewed every instant in a constantly
changing world, always taking its new form from the preceding
205-6; Fasl.pp.42-43; cf,Qur,11:7
^rlanahi.j,p. 206 •
^Ibid; cf, at-Taha..,pp,221-22; cf. also ur,41:11,
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existent. He is of the opinion that the continuous and
incessant creation is more worthy of the name of creation
than that which is accomplished once for all.
Averroes' Concept of Causality in relation to Production
The concept of causality, in relation to creation,
is of vital importance in Averroes' philosophy. He says:
It is impossible for the Sunnites to deny the relation
existing in this world between causes and effects.
To deny the existence of efficient causes which are
observed in the sensible things is a sophistry, and he
who denies them either denies with his tongue what is
present in his mind or is carried away by a sophistical
■1
doubt.
The world is a continuum of things and persons
inter-related through necessary causality. Two principles
are presupposed, by Averroes here: The one is the perma¬
nence of things, and the other is the law of causation.
These two postulates are the result of metaphysical assum¬
ptions derived from Aristotle, namely, the idea of substance
2
and the idea of four causes. Averroes says that the
permanence of things permits one to discover their essence
1At—Taha...pp.515-20.
2Ave. He Gene...(tr) pp.97-106.
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to define them and to give them a name. For it is self-
evident that things have essences and attributes which
determine the special functions of each one of them and
through which the definitions and names are differentiated.
If a thing had not its specific nature, it would not have a
special name or definition, and all things would be one.
As to the second postulate concerning causality, all events
have four causes: agent, form, matter, and end. Human
mind perceives the things and conceives their causes.
Intelligence is nothing but the perception of things with
their causes and he who denies causes denies intellect.
Logic implies the existence of effects and causes, and the
knowledge of effects can only be rendered perfect through
knowledge of their causes, and thus denial of causes implies
the denial of knowledge. Averroes further says that if
someone calls the relation of cause and effect a habit;
habit is an ambiguous term. Does he mean by habit, the
habit of the agent, or the habit of the existing thing, or
one's habit to form a habit about such things? He rejects
the first two meanings and accepts the last one which is in harmony
with his conceptualism. Because it is impossible that
God should have a habit; the habit of existing thing is
really their nature, since it can only exist in the animated.
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Again, the Immovable Mover who is the cause of all
cannot be subject to the law of causation. Averroes means
that everything except the eternal existent needs a cause
for its existence, and only the Prime Immovable Mover has
the property of existing through its own essence, whereas
all becoming is due to a prime cause. Averroes follows
here the Aristotelian conception of generation and corru¬
ption. Absolute generation and alteration are one
process. The reason for this is that, according to him,
the substratum of all changes is a definite thing existing
in actuality and capable of no change. It is the cause
of all motion, though itself unmoved. All perishable
beings are composed of matter and form, each of which is
not by itself a body, although through their combination
the body exists. Prime matter has no existence in actu-
:ality, but it is only potency to receive forms. The
first simple bodies in which the prime matter is actualized
are the four elements: water, earth, fire, and air.
These elements enter in the composition of all other bodies
through mixture. The remote cause of this mixture is the
heavenly bodies. Natural heat is the proximate cause of




animate individual^ of their kind through natural heat.
c\
Soul is the proximate cause of their generation and their
remote cause is the intelligence that moves the sphere.
Averroes believes that the material form can never be
separate from matter, since physical form - which is
another expression of material form - subsists only in
matter. i?ormf»are temporal since they subsist only
because of matter.
Two distinct types of metaphysics reached the
Muslims:
(a) A metaphysics of the One; and
(b) a metaphysics of Being.
The latter is that of Aristotle, and the former that
of Plotinus. Since The Theology of Aristotle was mista-
ikenly ascribed to Aristotle, the Muslim Neoplatonists
fused the two systems in the Necessary Being. Averroes
returns to the original doctrine of Aristotle and frees
himself from Neoplatonism. He says: "our aim is to
pick up from the metaphysics of Aristotle his theoretical
1
doctrines." The subject-matter of metaphysics according
to Averroes is:
(i) The study of the sensible things and their genera,
^Talkhis ma bacd at-TabIcIyyat.p.33»
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namely, the categories;
(ii) The principles of substance, the separate entities
and how they are related to the First Principle, which is
the supreme perfection and the Prime Mover.
Averroes starts with the external existents which,
he says, are the basis of our knowledge. If an entity
exists in our mind without having any real existence outside,
it could not be a being, but simply an entity. Being and
existents are one and the same. To exist is to be real,
whether in potency or in act. Prime matter has being,
although it never exists without form. When the intellect
is attached to external existence, the being which was
outside becomes inside the mind in the form of a concept.
Existence, then, is presupposed in being. External
existents are called substances. Substance is the first
of the ten categories; the rest are the secondary subst-
:ances. Prime substance has more substantiality than the
secondary. For example, Zayd is a man, this denotes
that Zayd is more substantial than humanity or manness.
But manness is as real as Zayd. The particular has a
sensuous existence, and the universal an intellectual one.
But the starting points are the individual substances.
Physical bodies are commonly said to be composed of two
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principles, that is matter and form. But a body is neither
only matter nor only form. It is a whole composed of the
two. This whole is additional to the two principles of
being. The body is one unity which has many parts.
By substance, Averroes means the whole composed of matter
1
and form. The one is sensuous while the other is inte¬
llectual. Matter is the cause of their corparality and
form is the cause of their intelligibility.
But the question which is relevant to this discourse
is: how can the eternal entity be the principle of corrup¬
tible things? Averroes refers to two Aristotelian
principles: potentiality and actuality. The scale of
being is graded from pure potentiality to pure actuality.
Prime matter is pure potentiality; it can only exist in
being combined with form. The lowest existents are the
four elements of which sensible bodies are composed.
Potentiality can be understood as possibility or disposition.
The first substance can exist in actuality or in potenti¬
ality. Matter inherent in the substance is its poten¬
tiality. This potentiality is of different degrees
according to proximity and remoteness. Man, for example,
1lbid.]PP«57, W-41.
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exists potentially in the sperm and in the four elements;
the first potency is the near one, the latter is the remote
one. Four conditions are necessary for a thing to exist:
(i) The proximate subject;
(ii) Its disposition;
(iii) The motor causes; and
A
(iv) The absence of preventing causes.
There is always a motor cause which brings a thing to exist
in actuality. Sometimes there are more than one motor
causes. Since physical things are composed of matter and
form, potency is always subsequent to matter, and actuality
subsequent to form. Form, which is the act, is prior to
matter at every point, because form is also the efficient
and the final cause. The final cause is the cause of all
other causes, since these are there for the sake of it.
Further, potency is not prior in time to act, because potency
can never be denuded of act. Matter and form exist simul-
:taneously in a being. The motor cause of a physical
thing is apparently prior to the existence of a thing.
To the distinction between the motor and the efficient cause,
the former applies only to change in place, namely, the
1Ibid.p.9Q.
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movement of translation. All other changes, especially
generation and corruption, are caused by efficient causes.
Celestial bodies are moved by a motor, not by an efficient
cause, because their movement is translation in space and
they do not change. They are intermediate existents
between pure act and the existents which sometimes exist in
potency and sometimes in act. Their similarity to exis-
:tents in act lies in their eternity and incorruptibility.
Their similarity to the things which exist in potency and
come to actuality is in their change of place, their
circular movement in space. Averroes concludes the
discussion of this point by saying:
Consider how divine providence has managed to combine
the two kinds of existence. In between pure act
and pure potency, it has posited this kind of potency,
namely, the potency in space through which the eternal
I
and corruptible existences are connected.
Further, act is prior to potency in point of
dignity and perfection, because evil is privation of *one
of the two opposites, it is not absolute good. Pure act
2
is an absolute good. Hence, the nearer the things are




are. Celestial bodies have obtained their principles from
the First Principle. And, likewise, everything on this
earth which is good is the product of His will and design.
As to evil, it exists because of matter. The world, as
it is, is the best possible one. Either it would not
have existed at all, or it would have existed having some
evil for the sake of greater good. As the sensible
substances are composed of matter and form, are these two
principles sufficient for the existence of sensible
substances? Or, is there separate substance which is the
cause of their perpetual existence? Averroes says that
it is evident that the sensible is in need of a motor cause,
and this cause needs another, up to the First Mover, whose
movement is eternal. This brings us to the consideration
of time.
Time is an eternal continuum subordinate to an
eternal movement, which is continuous and one, because the
true one is continuous. It is clear that Averroes asserts
the eternity of the world on the assumption that both move¬
ment and time are eternal. The First Mover moves the
primum mobile by desire, not by representation. The world
1Ibid.p.124.
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is animated, that is, it has a soul. It also has an
intelligence. Celestial bodies are moved not through
sensation and representation, as is the case with animals,
but through the conception of intelligence. Intelligence
is so called with regard to celestial bodies; with regard
to man it is called intellect. Heavenly bodies have no
senses, because these are found in animals for their
conservation. Representation exists in them for the
same end. Celestial bodies are in no need of conser-
svation since they are eternal. Their movements are the
product of desire (shawq) through intellection. The first
mover of the firmament is moved by the most dignified desire
- the desire for the supreme good. The movers of the
celestial bodies, are, then, intelligences which are
themselves immobile. There are thirty eight movers and
nine spheres. The tenth intelligence, or the Intelli-
:gentia Agens. is the last of these movers. It moves the
sphere of the moon. It is the cause of the movement of
the sublunary beings. It is this intelligence which
gives forms to the elements and other existents. Kan is
the nearest being to the celestial bodies, and this is
because of his intellect. He is intermediate between
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the eternal and the corruptible. Through the agent inte¬
lligence, he acquires the forms which are its products.
Thus, communion with the agent intelligence can be realized.
And in this communion lies man's felicity and happiness.
In this scheme of gradations it can be worked out
that Averroes is a strict Aristotelian. He endorsee^
with all his admiration, Aristotle's theories to their
utmost extent, and expands them into a doctrine of his own.
He asserts again and again the eternity of the world and
declares that not only is matter eternal, but that even
form is potentially existent, Averroes differs from
the Muslim Neoplatonists on these points:
(a) That both matter and form are eternal; whereas
they believe that matter alone is eternal.
(b) Avicenna places the existence of all creatures in
the category of the possible; and that of God in the
category of the necessary existence. Averroes combats
this classification for the simple reason that when it is
said that the cause is necessary, its effect must also be
necessary in existence, since the effect cannot be separated
from its cause. Admitting the world as an effect of an
eternal cause, it must likewise be eternal.
(c) Further, the Muslim Neoplatonists believe that the
^Ibid.p.159.
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celestial bodies, like the sublunary bodies, are composed
of matter and form, but whatever is so composed is temporal
and originated; whereas the ancients believe that the
celestial bodies are eternal.
(d) Again, the Muslim Neoplatonists believe that
"from one only one can proceed"; according to Averroes,
this is their mere guessing. He says that in the books
of the ancients this is not found. According to the
philosophical teaching thinker and thought are identical.
Aristotle connects sensible existence with the intelligible,
saying that the world is one and proceeds from the One,
and that this Monad is partly the cause of unity, and
partly the cause of multiplicity. Averroes believes
that a single power comes from the First Principle and the
whole world results from it. He holds the view that
multiplicity exists, but he explains it because of matter
and their distances from the principle and in the dispo¬
sitions that they have in them. The main objective
of Averroes to point out these differences is to say that
A *
what the Muslim Neoplatonists believe and profess is not




Averroes worked out his theory of the eternity of
the world on the basis of causation. Both God and the
world are eternal; both necessarily exist, one without a
cause and the other with a cause. Though eternal, the
world has a Prime Mover who Himself is unmoved. The
world has had no beginning in time. The First Cause is
eternally moving the world and necessarily begetting all
that is, in virtue of its infinite fecundity. He
believes that revelation, too, speaks as though the world
had always been and was produced out of something existing.
Averroes' main system is Aristotelian, but under
the influence of ideas from Muslim theology, he gave it a
new form.
CHAPTER VI
Averroes1 Criticism of Al~Gh.azalI' s Tahafut
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CHAPTER VI
Averroes' Criticism of Al-Ghazali's Tahafut
Introduction
Being a philosopher, Averroes undertakes his duty
to defend the cause of the philosophers on the question of
the eternity of the world against the fierce attack by the
Mutakallimun. In Fasl al-maqal and can Fianahi.i al-adilla
Averroes refers to the charges framed by the Ashcarites
and al-Ghazall against the philosophers' beliefs. And he
sets out to refute in his Tahafut at-tahafut. what al-Ghazall
stated in the Tahafut. In his at-Tahafut Averroes
examined the arguments given by al-Ghazall against the
philosophers' beliefs "paragraph by paragraph, refuted in
detail its strictures on the philosophers, and incidently
expounded his own belief in the ability of reason to compre-
1
:hend the ultimate secrets of the universe."
Averroes believes in the eternity of the world and
offers a solution to the problem in no uncertain terms.
Both God and the world are eternal and necessarily exist,
one without a cause and the other with a cause. His
fundamental notion is that the world is not created
A History of islamic Spain, p.41.
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ex-nihilo. but it follows eternally from its First Cause
in both its existence and intelligibility. Likewise it
is untrue that it has been created in time, rather he
knows by a necessary demonstration that the First Cause is
eternally moving it. Averroes' basicis that
Aristotle had proved both the eternity of the world and
time.
Preliminary Discussion
Averroes' arguments against al-Ghazalx's incoherence
can be classified under three headings:
1. Firstly, Averroes criticizes al-Ghazalx because his
arguments are mostly dialectical and do not reach the
level of demonstrative proofs.
2. Secondly, what al-Ghazall refutes is not the view
of Aristotle. In the opinion of Averroes the most that
al-Ghazalx could do was to criticize the views of Avicenna
and not that of the philosophers. Further, Averroes
says that in that too, he doubts the competency of
al-Ghazall, for he studied philosophy from books, without
the help of an instructor.
3. Thirdly, Averroes says that al-Ghazalx was insincere
in his criticism. According to Averroes, he simply
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refuted the views of the philosophers because he wanted to
establish his influence in the Sunnites circles, whereas
later on he adopted the views of the philosophers as is clear
from his other books like Miskat al-anwar.
It is better to take up these points of disputation
individually, and see how far Averroes succeeds, for in
the beginning of his Tahafut at-tahafut he says:
The aim of this book is to show the different degrees
of assent and conviction attained by the assertions
in The Incoherence of the Philosophers« and to prove
that the greater part has not reached the degree of
evidence and of truth.
The First Disputation concerning the Eternity of the world
The discussion for the eternity of the world
involves different arguments as proofs:
(a) The proofs from cause and will;
(b) the proof from time;
(c) the proof from the possibility of the world as a whole;
(d) the proof from matter.
1At-Taha...(Eng.fr.). p.1
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Discussion of the First Proof
Averroes begins the discussion with the statement
of al-Ghazall's objection against the philosophers'
belief that it is impossible for the temporal to proceed
from the eternal; and their argument for the eternity
of the world, holding that it always existed with God,
co-existed as an effect does with the cause, for example
light with the Sun, Averroes says that this belief
depends on the demonstrative proofs of cause and will.
The world cannot have had an origin, because there could
be no new decision in the mind of God for its beginning,
1
God's movement is eternal and cannot be interrupted.
If He had not created the world from the beginning, He
would have lost His only chance of creating it ever,
Averroes says that God will be either always in action
or sometimes in potency. If He is always in action,
then His work also will be always in action; if He is
sometimes in potency, there must be some determinant of
this potency. Therefore, either there is an infinite
regress, always seeking a new cause for the actualization
of this potency, or one must admit that cause and action
always co-exist. But he knows it for a fact that the
^At-Taha..,p.4-t cf. Ave.Comm.De Gene...(Tr.) pp.100-101.
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world exists and it must be eternal, because of an eternal
cause. Averroes states that al-Ghazall*s objections in
this connection are in the highest degree dialectical and
1
do not reach the pitch of demonstrative proofs. Al-
Ghazall believes, on the other hand, that rationally this
thesis cannot claim any superiority over its anti-thesis,
which nevertheless has the weight of the Faith on its
side. He further says that one need not abandon it
unless its anti-thesis be proved conclusively; but this
is impossible. Only demonstrative proof should make one
abandon the theory of creation, but such proof does not
exist in nature.
To prove the eternity of the world, Averroes
starts the discussion with the definition of the term.
According to him, 'eternal' has two meanings:
(i) Eternal by itself, that is the First Mover, who is
unmoved and who suffers no action, and has no cause for
its existence.
(ii) Eternal through another, that is which is eternally
2
moved.
The one which has the principle of movement in itself, and




that one must distinguish between God's willing something
and God's willing it to be eternal, that is between God's
eternal will and the eternity of the object of His will.
Perhaps God willed what He had ordained to be before it
became, and He willed it to be at the time when its
becoming should be possible. Regarding al-Ghazall's
argument, that the world has been created by an eternal
will which has decreed its existence in the time in which
it exists and that its existence begins from the moment
it begins, Averroes says that this is sophistical, for an
act of will is a complete cause of an event, and when once
the will acts the event must follow immediately unless
there is an obstacle. He says, "how can the effect be
delayed after the cause when the conditions of acting are
1
fulfilled?" In the case of God's willing the world,
there is no obstacle, so any delay would be inexplicable.
The philosophers believe that everything that happens is
necessitated and has a cause, and as it is impossible
that there should be an effect without a specific deter-
:minant and a cause, so it is impossible that the effect
should be delayed when the cause exists. Before the
1Ibid.p.68
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existence of the world there existed a wilier, a *will, and
its relation to the thing willed. No new wilier arose,
nor a new will, nor a new relation to the will - for all
this is change - how then could a new object of will arise,
and what prevented it before? To the Ashcarites' reply
- that perhaps God made the origination of the world
depend on a certain condition, namely, the lapse of a
certain time - Averroes objects that there is no sound
analogy between conventional and natural causation, that
is one can in advance make a conventional fact legally
effective from a certain time, but an agent cannot cause
a natural event at a future time. But according to the
Ashcarites an agent who is free (facil-mukhtar) could
excercise his will as he pleases.
Again, to al-Ghazali's objection - do the philo¬
sophers recognize the impossibility of connecting the
eternal will with the temporal production of anything,
through the necessity of intuitive thought or through a
logical deduction? If the philosophers assert that
they know this through the necessity of thought, why do
their opponents not share this intuition with them?
for the most certain principles must also be the best
1Cf.Iqti...pp.58,47; & also Ihya'.i.p.96
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known - Averroes answers that this argument is very weak.
It amounts to saying that one who claims the impossibility
of delay in an effect, when its cause with all its
conditions is realized, must assert that he knows this
either by a syllogism or from the first principles; if
through a syllogism, he must produce it - but there is
none; if from the first principles, it must be known to
all. This argument is mistaken that everything should
be held by all. It does not imply anything more than
its being a common notion, just as the existence of a
common notion does not imply objective truth. But this
is self-contradiction for according to Aristotle the
criterion for objective truth is its universal acknow-
1
ledgement.
The objection that the unity of knowledge, the
knower, and the known is an impossibility, is that this
supposes the Creator of the world to be ignorant of His
2
own work, which is necessarily absurd. Averroes says
that the whole argument is extremely inept and weak and
al-Ghazall ought not to have filled his book with such
^At-laha. . .pp.14--'15.
"Ibid, pp. 15-16; cf. faha.. .pp.55-54-
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talk if he intended to convince the learned; for if there
is a controversy about questions like this, that is, the
plurality of knowledge and known and the delay of effect
of a cause, the final criterion rests with sound under¬
standing. Al-Ghazall's assertion on the other hand
- that there may be a proof of the opposite of a necessary
truth - can neither be proved nor refuted, since being in
opposition to the law of contradiction, it annuls the idea
of proof.
Averroes further says that al-Ghazali goes on to
states how would the philosophers refute their opponents,
when they say that the eternity of the world is impossible,
for it implies an infinite number and an infinity of
unities for the spherical revolutions, although they can
be divided by six, by four, and by two? Are the number
of these revolutions even or uneven or both even and
1
uneven or neither even nor uneven? According to
Averroes, this too is a sophistical argument. It
amounts to saying:
In the same way as you are unable to refute our argu-
sment for the creation of the world in time, that if
it were eternal, its revolutions would neither be
^At-Taha...pp.16-17.
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even nor uneven, so we cannot refute your theory that
the effect of an agent whose conditions to act are
always fulfilled cannot be delayed. This argument
aims only at creating and establishing a doubt, which
A
is one of the sophist's objectives.
Regarding the circular movement, Averroes says the
right answer to al-Ghazall's question is that when one
imagines things potentially infinite, there exists no
proportion at all. The existence of an infinite whole
is neither actual nor possible, but totally impossible.
If the movements in the past are infinite, then no move-
:ment in the actual present can take place, unless an
infinite number of preceding movements is terminated.
No philosopher allows the existence of an infinite number
of causes, for this would imply the existence of an effect
without a cause and a motion without a mover. There
cannot be an infinite series of causes: all movement
must end in a prime unmoved mover. Averroes further
says that when the existence of an eternal prime mover
had been proved, whose act cannot be posterior to his
being, it followed that there could as little be a
beginning for his act as for his being; otherwise his
1Ibid. (Eng.Tr.)• p.9; (Ara.p.17).
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act would be possible and not necessary, and he would not
be the First Principle. There is a difference in the
position of Averroes and Avicenna. The latter places
the existence in the category of possible, whereas the
former says that it is necessary. In any case the
problem is the same.
Al-Ghazall has his answer. According to him, the
theory of a first cause and a pri.ie mover is self-contra-
sdictory. Averroes based his philosophy on the Aristo-
stelisn notion that the world is eternalj time and move¬
ment both are also eternal because of an eternal unmoved
mover. The Muslim Meoplatonists, who combine the Keo-
platonic ideas with the Aristotelian elements, speak of a
creation of the world and an eternal emanation. This
does not change the position essentially, since both an
eternal cause for an eternally identical effect, and an
eternal creation, are contradictory conceptions. Cause
and creation both imply change. If, therefore, cause is
regarded an antecedent to effect, there cannot be a first
cause, since there is no first movement. But according
to Averroes there must be an unmoved principle of all
movement. If one accepts this, the world in totality
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is passive, cause and effect are simultaneous, and God is
not the first cause, but in fact the only cause.
However, even this does not solve the difficulty, for if
one regards uniform motion, the prime mover is the cause
of uniform movement, no cause is needed at all. If,
on the other hand, one regards uniform motion as spatial
change, a change in the effect presupposes a change in
the cause and in this way changes in God would be intro¬
duced, in opposition to the philosophers* doctrine,
which holds the contradictory view that an unchanging
God can be the cause of a changing world. Al-Ghazall
rejects the idea of eternal creation, and a3ks: how
1
could what always is be brought into being?
Averroes in his answer ignores the difficulty of
how in the present a past infinite can have come to an
qX
end. There is a contradiction in that whsefe. has no
beginning can have no end, and that what has no end has
no beginning. The act of an agent who has no beginning
has a beginning as little as his existence, and therefore
it follows necessarily that no preceding act of his is
the condition for the existence of a later, for neither
of them is an agent by itself and their sequence is
1Cf. Taha...pp.61-65.
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accidental. Averroes says the opinion of the theolo-
jgians that the philosophers admit their end is erroneous,
for they do not admit an end for what has no beginning.
He further states that it will be clear that neither the
arguments of the theologians for the temporal creation
of the world of which al-Ghazalx speaks, nor the arguments
of the philosophers which he includes and describes in
his book, suffice to reach absolute evidence or afford
1
stringent proof. This position of Averroes is
WU.
contrary to the views which al-Ghazalx He
criticizes the Muslim Neoplatonists because of their
contradictory views. Here Averroes rather supports the
cause of al-Ghazalx.
Again, answering al-Ghazall's statement that God's
power has no limit, for He could have created the world
one or two years before He did; Averroes wants to
eliminate the concept of time and to base the argument
merely on the concept of possibility. It can be pointed
out that the introduction of the concept of possibility
do63 not change the problem, and the difficulty remains




Averroes says that it was in God's unlimited power to
choose one of the unlimited number of time-points for His
creation of time. He then transfers the unlimited
possibility of choice in the subject, that is God, to the
object, that is the time-points, and regards the possi¬
bility as a qualification of these points. The termi-
:nation of this infinite series of possible time-points
would be a condition for the beginning of finite time,
which according to the supposition was created by God.
The condition introduces, of course, the concept of time
which is, however, already implied in the concept of
creation. Averroes further says that most people who
accept a temporal creation of the world believe time to
have been created with it. Therefore, his assertion
that the duration of His inactivity was either limited or
1
unlimited is untrue. Here again Averroes misrepresents
the view-point of al-Ghazali who uses a similar argument
against the philosophers. The philosophers' objection
to the time theory of creation is: that one time would
be as good as another for the creation of the world, so
it is impossible to find a specific determinant (mukhassis)
1Ibid. pp.31-32
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for God's choice of a finite time for the creation#
A determinant is necessary because it is impossible to
imagine a choice between two completely similar things,
without any differentiating reason for the preference.
1
The same is true of the Divine will as of human will.
Al-Ghazali's answer to this is that the will is
essentially that which differentiates one object of choice
from another. But one need not ask a reason for its
choice. Free-will is just that which can choose between
two similar alternatives. The argument is conducted on
two levels: human and Divine will. Of human will,
al-Ghazall gives the example: Suppose two similar dates
in front of a man who has a strong desire for them, but
who is unable to take them both. Burely he will take
one of them through a quality in him, the nature of which
is to differentiate between two similar things. It is
absurd to say that the man remains forever hungry and
perplexed, looking at the dates without taking one of
them, and without power to choose or to will, distinct
2
from his desire. Averroes' reply to this is that the
real choice in such a case is not merely between one date




and the other, but between taking either one or leaving
both; and there is a clear reason for taking, namely
hunger, Averroes has missed the point completely,
Gex»tainly the will is going to choose one or the other of
the dates rather than go hungry. But he has indicated
a question in the situation - what determines one to take
the one rather than the other? He says that man will
take the largest possible date as soon as possible, and
if they are of equal size, he will take the one that
presents itself at the moment when that fact is discovered.
The argument on Divine will follows a parallel course,
Al-Ghazall disagrees with Averroes. He gives some
example of the features of the cosmos which might have
been different without being either better or worse:
for example, the spheres of the Ptolemaic heaven might all
have moved in an opposite direction, from East to West
instead from West to East, and vice versa. This would
make no difference so long as all movements were reversed,
leaving all relations between the spheres as before.
Therefore, there is no reason for God's choice of one
direction rather than another. Averroes replies that
if one studies science closely enough one can always find
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that the existing condition of the world is superior to
the alternatives, in all cases, God has acted wisely
for the best. What God chose between was, in the first
place, the existence or non-existence of the world.
Here there is no choice between similars, and He chose the
better, namely the existence of the world. Why did God
choose to move the highest sphere from Hast to West?
It was because the direction that occurred first after He
saw that the direction was indifferent, and He wanted to
continue His good world. This would mean that God must
have created the world from eternity, because He saw from
eternity that the existence of a world such as ours was
better than its non-existence.
But this argument falls to the ground if one
believes that there is no analogy between a Divine will
and a human will. Many possibilities then arise, for
example, God can act for the worse if He wishes; or He
can choose arbitrarily between equals; or if He needs a
determinant, such a determinant springs up within Himself,
Again, al-Ghazalx says that the question of the eternity
of the world cannot be solved from the considerations of
the Divine will, for one does not know enough about the
1
nature of that will, though one guesses a great deal.
1Cf. Taha,..pp.58-59.
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Concerning al-Ghazali's second objection to the
philosophers' proof of the eternity of the world on grounds
of causality, Averroes protests that al-Ghazali has mis¬
interpreted the way in which the eternal Being causes the
temporal event, Bach event has its accidental cause in
an infinite series of preceding temporal beings; such a
series is apparently possible. Only the whole eternal
series is caused essentially by an eternal Being acting
upon the whole. Thus, the eternal Being is not a cause
of temporal beings qua temporal, and so the philosophers
have admitted that God can act directly in time. |M|
Averroes explains that moving essentially means moving by
a mover existing simultaneously with the thing moved, and
moving accidentally means moving by a mover preceding the
thing moved. as a matter of fact this annuls the proof,
for it cannot be seen why an infinite series of accident-
sally moving movers should not suffice. Al-Ghazali,
however, makes a more careful statement of the philosophers'
theory of creation, which does try to avoid a direct
intervention of God in temporal events. He proceeds to
show that their theory is unsatisfactory and fails to
explain change. The philosophers link the eternal Being
with the temporal through an intermediary being, the
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outermost heaven, which is in endless circular movement.
This movement is eternal essentially, in its universal
aspect, being circular and endless, but it is generable
and corruptible in respect of its particular movements
which are transient, and always changing. The theory
was produced by the philosophers to get them out of a
difficulty: how can a changeless Being be a cause of
movement? Movement can only be caused by another move-
:ment by its mover; but a changeless Being could not stir
such a movement in Himself. The intermediary being's
movement is supposed to follow more easily from an eternal
changeless Cause, because it is itself eternal and change¬
less in a certain respect. But at least it moves, so
in
that it can/turn start all the particular movements of
the world. All this, however is a subterfuge. The
difficulty, as al-Ghazall points out, remains. For
there is obscurity in the link at least on one side of
the intermediary. He puts a dilemma: Is the circular
movement the principle of temporal things because of its
permanence? But how can a temporal event proceed from
something because of its permanence? Or, is it the
principle of temporal things because of its arising anew?
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But what arises anew will need a cause for its arising anew,
and there is an infinite regress, Averroes says that
this is sophistical. The temporal proceeds from the
circular movement qua temporal; but this process does not
need a fresh cause, for it is "not a new fact, but an
1
eternal act".
But it is still not clear how an eternally same
movement (the cycle) could cause the changes of the world,
Al-Ghazali shows the unsatisfactoriness of the philosophic
theory of change in time, arising from an eternal change-
:less Being without any act of his in time. He believes
if the temporal events of the world are caused by a creator,
they must be caused by him in a more individual manner,
and he must be able to act in time directly. And in this
case there is no reason why God should not have created the




Again, arguing/the notion of causality, Averroes
says that according to al-Ghazall the connection between
what is usually believed to be a cause and what is believed
to be an effect is not a necessary connection. Each of





other, and neither the affirmation not the negation, neither
the existence nor the non-existence of the one is implied
in the affirmation, negation, existence, and non-existence
of the other. For the connection in things, according
to al-Ghazall, is based on a prior power of God to create
them in a successive order, and not because this connection
1
is necessary in itself. Averroes says, "to deny the
existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible
things is sophistry, and he who defends this doctrine either
denies with his tongue what is present in his mind or is
2
carried away by a sophistical doubt." He maintains that
everything in the world happens according to a perfect
regularity and the existence of the world can be understood
in terms of cause and effect. The world is a continuum
of things and persons interrelated through necessary
causality. Human mind perceives things and conceives
their causes and who denies causes denies the intellect.
Logic implies the existence of causes and effects, and
knowledge of the effects can only be rendered perpfect
through the knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause




implies that nothing in this world can really he known.
He further says that one need not doubt that some of the
existents cause each other and act through each other,
and that in themselves they do not suffice for their act,
but that they are in need of an external agent whose act
is a condition of their act, and not only of their act
but even of their existence. However, about the essence
of this agent or of these agents the philosophers differ
in one way, although in another they agree. They all
agree in this, that the First Agent is immaterial and
that its act is the condition of the existence and acts
of existents, and that the act of their agent reaches
these existents through the intermediation of an effect
of this agent, which is different from these existents
and which, according to some of them, is exclusively the
heavenly sphere, whereas others assume besides this sphere
another immaterial existent which they call the bestower
— -1
of forms (wahib as-suwar).
Here again Averroes has missed the argument of
al-Ghazali. According to al-Ghazali the real difficulty
O
of the philosophers was their adherence to a throu
1Ibid. pp.522-24.
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deterministic world view on account of which they sought
naturalistic explanation of all things, that is, their
explanation in terms of cause and effect. He challenges
the views of the philosophers that the relation between
cause and effect is a relation of necessity and that this
relation between them is a relation of one to one. He
declares that there is no compelling necessity in the
relatxon between cause and effect. The phenomena of
nature and nature as such, according to the philosophers'
own admission, does not belong to the realm of necessity
but to that of possibility such as may or may not exist.
Any two events in nature considered as cause and effect
are merely possible existents and per se there can be no
necessary connection between them. The causal relation
is a natural, that is, a possible relation and not a
logical necessity. Logical relations belong to the
sphere of thought and not to that of nature. One
certainly does get a semblance of necessity subsisting in
the relation of cause and effect because it gets trans¬
ferred from the order of nature to that of thought
through a repeated association of ideas of cause and
effect in the mind. So whatever necessity there is in
aha...pp.195-96.
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the causal connection is a pseudo-necessity. Cause
either co-exists with the effect or precedes it, but it
is never the producer of it, Al-Ghazali says that no
will can be attributed to causes nor to any of the natural
existents. Further, the relation between cause and effect
is not that of one to one as supposed by the philosophers.
Cause is not single but composite, with an indefinite
number of contributory factors, some of which are positive
and the other negative, Al-Ghasali's position is two¬
fold:
(i) The philosophers' concept of causation is self-
contradictory - the notion of causation is ad infinitum;
and an unmoved mover cannot be the cause of a changing
world; and
(ii) the law of causation does not leave any liberty
to God, whatever, since God must conform to the law.
One might perhaps say that God has chosen the lav/ Himself,
however, once this law is chosen He can no longer
infringe it. Further, Averroes' position is also
self-contradictory with regard to causation. He holds
that there are accidental events. It appears that he
means that under different conditions things may act
1
differently,
At-Taha...p.521; cf. Van ben Bergh, note 319,i.
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Discussion of the Second Proof
Averroes starts the discussion of the second proof
for the eternity of the world with al-Ghazali's version of
the philosophers1 proof. According to al-Ghazall, the
philosophers assert that God is prior to the world not
temporally hut essentially like the relation of one to two,
or the priority of the movement of a man to the movement
of his shadow which follows him. Since the effect
always follows the cause, it is absurd to say that God its
eternal and the world is temporal. If God is prior to
the world and time, but temporally, then it follows that
before the existence of the world and time, there was a
time in which the world was non-existent, since non-exis-
Jtence preceded the world and God preceded the world
during a period which came to an end, but which had never
begun. Accordingly, there must be infinite time before
time. But this is self-contradictory. Therefore the
assertion that time had a beginning is absurd. And if
time - which is the expression of the measure of movement -
is eternal, movement must be eternal. And the necessity
of the eternity of movement implies the necessity of the
eternity of the thing in motion, through the duration of
1
which time endures.
^At-Taha.. .p.64-: cf.Talia. . .p.65.
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Averroes makes the criticism that the way al-Ghazall
reproduces the argument of the philosophers does not prove
anything. It amounts to saying that the Creator, if He
is prior to the world, must either be prior in time or not
in time, but in causation. If He is prior not in time
but in causation, if He is eternal, then the world too is
eternal. But if He is prior in time, then He must
precede the world by a time which has no beginning, and
time will be eternal; for if there is a time before the
actual, its starting-point cannot be imagined. And if
time is eternal, movement too is eternal, for time cannot
be understood without motion. And if motion is eternal,
the thing in motion will be eternal, and its mover will
necessarily be eternal too. But this proof is unsound
according to Averroes, since it is not of the nature of
the Creator to be in time, whereas it belongs to the nature
of the world to be so. Averroes believes in two kinds
of existence:
(a) One in the nature of which there is motion and
which cannot be separated from time;
(b) the other in the nature of which there is no




The first is known by the senses and. by reason;
and the second is known by proof to everyone who acknow-
:ledges that each motion needs a mover and each effect a
cause, and that the causes which move each other do not
regress infinitely, but end in a first cause which is
absolutely unmoved. And it has also been established that
the entity in the nature of which there is no movement is
the cause of the entity in the nature of which there is
movement. And it has been proved also that the entity
in the nature of which there is motion cannot be separated
from time, and that the entity in the nature of which there
is no movement is entirely free from time. Therefore
the priority of the one over the other is based neither on
a priority in time, nor on the priority of that kind of
cause and effect, which belongs to the nature of things
in motion. For this reason anyone who compares the
priority of the unmoved being to the thing in motion to
the priority existing between two things in motion is
1
xn error.
But al-Ghazali in his response to the proof
neither challenges the Aristotelian definition of time as
1Ibid. pp.66-67.
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the measure of motion nor does he question the legitimacy
of the inference of the eternity of motion from the eter-
:nity of time. He only argues that time and the world
were created together, God precedes the world in a
non-temporal sense of "before", Al-Ghazall did not
reproduce the Aristotelian argument pure and simple.
His source is the concept of time as represented by the
Muslim Neoplatonists, especially Avicenna, and it is in
2
that formulation that he reproduces the argument,
The Muslim Neoplatonists introduced the argument from
time in conjunction with the problem of God's priority to
the world. The eternity of God is assumed throughout
the proof and is used to argue for the eternity of time.
What this argument involves is that God's priority cannot
be temporal and the central metaphysical issue in the
proof is not the nature of time, but the nature of God's
causality,
Averroes further says in this connection that the
previous Muslim philosophers' proof is merely dialectical
because it makes an assumption about God being in time.




certain mistakes "since they enjoyed but slight compre-
:hension of the doctrine of the ancients", in no way
refutes what al-Ghazall said, Al-Ghazall's primary
objective in the Tahafut was to point out the inconsis¬
tencies involved in the philosophers* thought and not to
winnow the chaff. Al-Ghazali believes that time is
generated and created, and before it there was no time at
all. The meaning of the statement that God is prior to
the world and to time is that He existed without the world
and without time, then He existed and with Him was the
world and time. He further says that the existence of
time is taken to be co-extensive with the existence of the
moving world. But there is no evidence that this moving
world is infinite. Any extension of time beyond this
world thus has no more basis than imagination.
Averroes admits that these existences are not
simultaneous, and says that al-Ghazall's observation, that
the priority of the Creator to the world is not a temporal
priority, is true. But the posteriority of the world
to the Creator, since He does not precede the world in
time, can only be understood as the posteriority of effect
^At-Taha.•.p.67.
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to cause, for priority and posteriority are opposites
which are necessarily in one genus. Since therefore
this priority is not in time, the posteriority also
| cannot be inttime: how can the effect be delayed when
the conditions of acting are fulfilled? But here is
the contradiction in Averroes' argument, for here the
relation between God and the world is, notwithstanding
the denial immediately preceding, regarded as a causal
relation in which the cause does not precede the effect
1
but is eternally simultaneous with it.
Averroes further says that the philosophers,
however, since they do not recognize a beginning in the
totality of this existence in motion, are not touched by
this difficulty, and it is possible for them to indicate
in what way the temporal beings proceed from the eternal.
One of their proofs that the existence in motion has no
beginning, and that in its totality it does not start, is
that, when it is assumed to start, it is assumed to exist
before its existence, for to start is a movement, and
movement is of necessity in the thing in motion, equally
whether the movement is regarded as taking place in time
or at an instant. Another proof is that everything
Ibid.pp.67-68; cf.Van hen Bergh note 3 to p.39 of his trans.
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that becomes has the potentiality of becoming before it
actually becomes; potentiality is a necessary attribute
of being in motion, and it follows necessarily that, if
it were assumed to become, it would exist before its
1
existence,
Averroes*position is that time is the measure of
movement. If it can be proved that time is eternal,
it would follow that a moving being too is eternal -
that is the world. If time is nothing but an attribute
of movement, then the only valid way to find out the
extent of time is from the evidence of the extent of
movement. But Averroes shifts his argument and says
that whenever the world began, one can always conceive a
time before it, and this time must be eternal, Then
he goes on to deduce from this eternal time an eternal
movement, because time cannot exist without movement!
Instead of inferring the extent of time from the extent
of movement, Averroes has inferred the extent of movement
2
from the extent of time, an illicit process, Al-
Ghazall, therefore, accepting time as derived from actual
^At-'Jaha, p.69,
^Cf. Al-Ghazall's Criticism Ch,III,pp.82-83
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movement, has simply to point out that any extension of
time beyond, actual movement is purely imaginary.
Regarding the analogy between time and space,
al-Ghazall says that the philosophers admit that space
is finite, because it is an attribute of a body which is
finite. So why do they not admit likewise that time is
finite, because it is an attribute of finite movement?
Averroes does not see the soundness of the analogy and
he confuses space with physical points, then accuses
al-Ghazall of making physical points analogous to time,
1
a false analogy.
The Third Proof for the aternity of the world
'The third proof for the eternity of the world
2
revolves around the possibility of the v/orld as a whole.
It can be stated thus: Everyone must admit that at least
the possibility of the world's existence is eternal; for
it could never have been impossible and then became
possible. But what can possibly exist eternally must





become corruptible", that is, have a beginning or ending.
It is not clear how this conclusion follows unless one
sees that the argument rests on another supposition, that
the world as a whole is ungenerated. And everything
ungenerated is eternal, because by definition it could
never have come into existence or been corrupted.
In this case it can be argued that the world is certainly
possible. It has existed actually at some time.
But if it existed at any time it must have done so at
every time, since it is not subject to generation and
corruption (al-kawn wa-l-fasad).
The assumption made, that the world is ungener-
:ated, begs the whole question at issue. If one
substitutes "Socrates" for "the world" one can start off
with the premise:
"The possibility of Socrates' existence is eternal."
But it is obvious that one cannot prove from this that
Socrates is actually eternal. Al-Ghazall says that
eternal possibility does not imply eternal actuality,
"for reality does not conform to possibility but differs
2




world as a whole is something ungenerated. Even if he
had seen it, he v/ould not have accepted it as a proved
truth.
'ihe Fourth Proof
She fourth proof concerns the relation of possi¬
bility to matter, inside the world. The philosophers
believe that while the world as a whole is ungenerated
and incorruptible, it is continually changing. Change
means the combination of fresh form in matter, making
new things actual. how every new combination was
eternally possible. But possibility requires a sub-
:stratum, matter, in which changes of form take place.
Therefore this substratum, matter, must be eternal.
According to Averroes 'becoming' is the alteration of a
thing and its change, from what it has potentially, into
actuality. There exists, therefore, a substratum for
the contrary forms, and it is in this substratum that
1
the forms interchange.
It seems that the philosophers, including Averroes,




argument can be put in the form of syllogism:
"Avery potentiality is eternal,
flatter is implied by every potentiality.
Therefore matter is eternal."
In this syllogism, it is obvious that the supposed
middle term is ambiguous. It cannot lead to the desired
conclusion. Moreover, there is no justification for
an assertion that every potentiality is eternal, for poten¬
tialities are peculiarly temporal. Therefore, there
is no proof of the eternity of matter.
Al-Ghazalx says that even if one accepts the
philosophers' argument - that £>ossibility has some kind
of objective existence as an object of knowledge, still
this would prove nothing about the actual existence of
the world. Nothing can be proved about the actual
from the possible. This is inevitable because the
nature of the actual can only be known from evidence, arid
the possible provides no evidence. The logically
possible always offers at least two alternatives, for if
"A is B" is possible; "A is not-B" must also be possible;
but logic provides no way of choosing between them and
1Taha...pp.76-77.
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deciding which is true. Such a decision can only come
from actuality, by observation and inference. In the
issue, al-Ghazalx points out, both an eternal and a
finite world are possible; therefore no amount of
reflection about possibility will tell us which is actual•
Averroes says that for the philosophers, the
truth about the world can be deduced by demonstrative
A
arguments (syllogism) which make use of sound premises.
And the premises can be known in two ways: by obser¬
vation of the world, which gives an empirical knowledge;
and by intellectual apprehension of primary axioms, which
give intuitive knowledge. Ihese axioms are not analytic
statements, known to be true by mere analysis of language.
But they are thought of as no less ultimate truths, which
cannot be proved or disproved by further argument.
She test of their certainty is that all men of sufficient
understanding and education admit them, just as anyone
with these qualities admits mathematical truths. Conse¬
quently, if one accepts the axioms together with the
empirical knowledge and beliefs, one should be able to
work out for oneself the same conclusion about the world




But this is what al-Ghazalx has already pointed
out. He says:
The philosophers try to infer the truth of their
metaphysical theories from the clarity of the arith¬
metical and logical sciences. And this method
sometimes carries conviction with the weak-minded.
But if ther# metaphysical theories had been as cogent
A-
and definite as their arithmetical knowledge is,
they would not have differed among themselves on
metaphysical questions as they do not differ on the
arithmetical.
Again, al-Ghazalx in al-Hunqidh repeats the same
argument:
Here occur most of the errors of the philosophers.
They are unable to satisfy the conditions of proof
they lay down in logic, and consequently differ much
2
from one another here.
i o "v-
Our so far is that Al-Ghazalx
A
accepts in principle all the rational sources of know¬
ledge accepted by the philosophers: Observation;
5
Axioms; and xieasoning (Inference and Gyllogism).
^'Taha...p.40 (Preface I).
^Ihe Paith & Practice.p.37>
^Cf. Iqti.•.pp.5-13.
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The difference between him and the philosophers, in the
sphere of knowledge, is that he rejects much of their
particular reasoning as fallacious or contradictory, and
holds that some of their most important axioms are not
based on intuition. The weakness of their axioms is
more serious when they base their metaphysical theories
on the arithmetical and logical sciences. It leads
him to conclude that the philosophers* position, as for
example on the origin of the world or of its eternity,
cannot be proved by direct rational methods. Aeason is
valid as far as it goes, but it does not cover as much
ground as the philosophers think.
The philosophers including Averroes have asserted,
for example that it is impossible to see in an eternal
Will of God a cause producing the world in time, after a
delay and not from eternity. Al-Ghazall answers that
such an assertion of impossibility must either be proved
by argument or known by intuition, by a direct necessity
of thought. If it is proved, the philosophers should
bring forth their argument, as they say they are men of
demonstration. If it is known by intuition, why do
their opponents not share this intuition? Averroes
believes that the assertion in question is derived from
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the axiom: "Effect follows cause immediately", and he
answers al-Ghazali's methodological objection by saying:
"it is not a condition of objective truth that it should
1
be known to all." But this as it stands is not only
an unsatisfactory answer but also self-contradictory,
for to Aristotelians the test of the objective truth of
the first and fundamental principles is their universal
acknowledgement. Perhaps Averroes is thinking of a
well-known qualification of the principle of universal
acknowledgement: that the Judge of the philosophical
truth must have natural intelligence and an intellectual
2
education. But the answer is still unsatisfactory,
for if such a conflict arises about a supposed intuition,
it is of no use saying dogmatically: "My intuition is
sound and yours is unsound". The right course is that
one should be able to obtain agreement from every reason¬
able Judge. If one cannot, then it is well to look
at the supposed intuition more closely and ask whether
Z
it really is true. It appears that al-Ghazali's
position is stronger than that of the philosophers on




^Iqti...pp.9-12; & cf. also al-Ghazali's Views Gh.lv,pp.115-18.
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The Second Disputation
Averroes says that al-Ghazali has misunderstood.
and misinterpreted what the philosophers mean by saying
that the world has a maker and it is his product.
According to him, al-Ghazali's definition of the agent &s
willing, choosing, and knowing what he wills', is by no
means self-evident and cannot be accepted without a proof,
unless one is justified in inferring the divine from the
1
empirical. He says that one observes in the empirical
two kinds of agents:
(a) One v/ho performs exclusively one thing and this
essentially, for instance warmth which causes heat and
coldness which causes cold; and this kind is called by
the philosophers natural agents.
(b) The second kind of agents are those that perform
a certain act at one time and its opposite at another;
these, acting out of knowledge and deliberation, are
called by the philosophers voluntary and selective agents.
But the First A ent cannot be described as having either
of these two actions, in so far as these are ascribed to
transitory things by the philosophers. For he who
chooses and wills lacks the things which he wills, and
^At-Taha. • .p. 14-8.
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God cannot lack anything He wills. And he who chooses
makes a choice for himself of the better things, but God
is in no need of a better condition, Further, when
the wilier has reached his object, his will ceases and,
generally speaking, will is a passive quality and a
change, but God is exempt from passivity and change.
So the way in which God becomes an agent and a wilier
has not become clear in this place, since there is no
1
counterpart to His will in the empirical world. But
the philosophers believe in the First Agent and that He
acts. They believe that God's act does proceed from
Him through knowledge, not through any necessity which
calls for it. Averroes points out that al-Ghazali
seeks to perplex, and does not look for the truth.
Again, when al-Ghazali says that all that is said by
the philosophers, is said in a metaphorical way and that
only a voluntary act is a proper actj Averroes retorts:
This is an answer of the wicked who heap fallacy on
fallacy. Ghazall is above this, but perhaps the
people of his time obliged him to write this book
to safeguard himself against the suspicion of sharing
the philosophers' view. Certainly nobody attributes
the act to its instrument, but only to its first
mover.'"
ibid.p.149: but this position of Averroes is contrary to the
one he took in Fasl« whei*e he states that the created leads
—r~
to the Creator. Al-Ghazali can point out, does he find
a counterpart of God's creativity in the empirical.
2 A£=£aha...p.95(Hng.rfr.); Ara.pp. 159-60.
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Averroes further makes the allegation:
Al-Ghazali himself deceives by ascribing to the philo¬
sophers theories which they do not hold. If the
world were by itself eternal and existent, not in so
far as it is moved, for each movement is composed of
parts which are produced, then indeed, the world
would not have an agent at all. But if the meaning
of 'eternal' is that it is everlasting production
and that production has neither beginning nor end,
certainly the term 'production* is more truly applied
to him who procures a limited production. ihe
philosophers call the world eternal simply to safe¬
guard themselves against the word 'product' in the
sense of a 'thing in time'•
Averroes again objects to the contradiction pointed
out by al-Ghazall that the meaning of 'product', according
to the philosophers, is 'that which exists after non¬
existence'. But at the same time Averroes admits:
This is an argument put forward on this question by
Avicenna from the philosophical side. It is
sophistical, because Avicenna leaves out one of the
factors which a complete division would have to state.
For he says that the act of the agent must be connected
2
either with an existence or with a non-existence...~
Averroes says that Avicenna neglects potential
existence and his argument is faulty, because the act of
^At-'faha. ..p. 162.
"Ibid, p.165-64; cf. Na.i.p.213
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the agent is only connected with existence in a state of
non-existence, that is existence in potentiality. But
al-Ghazali is not at all concerned with this formulation
of the Aristotelian argument. His source, as before,
is Avicenna's Na.iat and Shifa'. And it is on the basis
1
of these that he formulated his arguments. So Averroes'
objection against al-Ghazall is irrelevant, for he himself
admits that Avicenna's arguments about metaphysical points
do not express the idea of the philosophers. Whether
this is true or not, this does not affect what al-Ghazall
contests. He never undertook to criticize Aristotle
but concentrated on the refutation of the philosophic
thought as it emerged from the writings of al-ii'arabi and
Avicenna. Al-Ghazall says:
In transmitting the philosophy of Aristotle, however,
none of the Islamic philosophers has accomplished
anything comparable to the achievements of these two
men named. The translations of others are marked
by disorder and confusion, which so perplex the
understanding of the student that he fails to compre-
:hend; and if a thing is not comprehended how can it
p
be either refuted or accepted?
Though al-Ghazali praised both al-Barabi and Avicenna as
^Gf. Taha. ..pp.93-97; & also Ka,j. . .p. 215.
^Ihe j?aith & Practice.p.32.
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translators, he also stated that the translations them¬
selves had been subject to interpolation and change
a.a. 1
which necessitated additional commentaries and exp»lation.
A
Again, commenting upon al-Ghazall's remarks -
that our aim in this question is to show that you
philosophers use those venerable names without
justification, and that God according to you is not
a true agent, nor the world truly His act, and that
you apply this word metaphorically -
Averroes says:
In this argument he supposes that the philosophers
concede to him that they only mean by God's agency
that He is the cause of the world, and nothing else,
and cause and effect are simultaneous. But this
would mean that the philosophers had abandoned their
original statement, for the effect follows from its
cause, in so far as it is a formal or final cause,
but this does not necessarily follow from its efficient
cause, for the efficient cause frequently exists
without the effect's existing. Ghazali acts here
like a guardian who tries to extract from his ward
the confession of having done things he did not allow
2
him to do.
Averroes says that the philosophers' theory is




converting the world eternally from non-being into being.
The priciple idea is that according to the Aristotelians
the celestial bodies subsist through their movement, and
He who bestows this movement is in reality the agent of
this movement and, since the existence of the celestial
bodies only attains its perfection through their being
in motion, the giver of this motion is in fact the agent
of the celestial bodies. Further, they prove that God
is the giver of the unity through which the world is
united, and the giver of the unity through which the
composite exists. He provides the existence of the
parts through which the composition occurs, because this
action of combining is their cause, and such is the
relation of the First Principle to the whole world.
And the statement that the act has come to be, is true,
for it is movement, and the expression 'eternity' applied
to it means only that it has neither a first nor a last
term. Thus the philosophers do not mean by the expre¬
ssion 'eternal' that the world is eternal through eternal
constituents, for the world consists of movement. And
since the Ash arites did not understand this, it was
difficult for them to attribute eternity at the same time
to God and to the world. Therefore the term 'eternal
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becoming' is more appropriate to the world than the term
1
'eternity'.
But this argument of Averroes supporting the
views of the Muslim Neoplatonists with fresh statements
of his own, does not affect what al-Ghazall criticizes.
Al-Ghazall based his refutation on the statement of
Avicenna, where he defends the theory of simultaneity of
cause and effect. According to his conception of
causation God cannot be regarded any longer as a creator,
2
nor even as a cause of change, as a prime mover. God
is merely regarded as a power which holds the world
together. Further, if Averroes says that al-Ghazall
misunderstood what the Muslim Keoplatonists meant in
their books, this is not based on facts. When al-Ghazali
wrote his Maqasid and it reached Europe through Muckle's
translation, the book was taken to be the work of a
genuine Aristotelian^
It is strange that Averroes frequently reproaches
the philosophers of Islam for misinterpreting the doctrine





misunderstanding their views, I?or example, al-Ghazalx
points out that the philosophers do not admit that the
world is the act of God, because of a condition which is
common to the agent and the act, namely, the Muslim Neo-
1
platonists' assertion that out of one only one can proceed,
Averroes admits that if one accepts this principle and
its consequences, then indeed the answer is difficult.
He further comments: "But this principle ha3 only been
2
put forward by the later philosophers of Islam," Here
Averroes does not seem to acknowledge this principle of
gradual emanation, but later on in at-l'ahafut by stating
that the immaterial principles ascend to God by a causal
series his theory becomes identical with the theory he
wants to refute,^ He denies explicitly that the theory
of the philosophers of his religion, is the theory of the
ancients. He says that Aristotle connects sensible
existence with intelligible, saying that the world is one
and proceeds from one, and that this Monad is partly the
cause of the unity, partly the cause of plurality,,,
fhis is the sense of Aristotle's theory, a sense very




different from that in which those thinkers believe who
affirm that from one only one can proceed. He says:
See for yourself in the books of the ancients whether
these philosophical theories are proved, not in the
works of Avicenna and others who changed the philo¬
sophical doctrine in its treatment of metaphysics
so much that it became mere guessing.
Again, he says: "All these are inventions
fabricated against the philosophers by Avicenna, Farabi,
and others." But when Averroes comes to the statement
of al-Ghazali that the Muslim philosophers affirm only
suppositions and added obscurities to obscurities -
he looses his temper and becomes vindictive. He says:
This is very much the way the ignorant treat the
learned and the vulgar the eminent, and in this
way, too, the common people behave towards the
2
products of craftmanship.
Concerning Averroes' other objection that what
al-Ghazali mentions as the theory of the philosophers,
is in fact, the individual opinion of Avicenna; and
that al-Ghazali exerts himself to refute him and his
followers, in order to create the impression that he has
''ibid. (Eng.fr.)p.109; Ara.p.182.
r"Ibid. (Eng.fr.)p. 116; Ara.p.194.
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refuted them all. According to Averroes, "this is acting
1
like one who is in the depths of ignorance." As pointed
out before, al-Ghazali never undertook to refute the
theories of other philosophers, but only those which emerge
from the writings of these two. Averroes himself ackno¬
wledges that all the theories of Avicenna and his followers
are not true and not built on the foundations of the
philosophers*. But he takes another turn stating that
they are not inept as this man says they are, nor does he
represent them in a true light, for he has not reached the
degree of knowledge necessary for comprehending the problem
and the reason is that he studied only the books of Avicenna,
and through this the deficiency in his knowledge arose.
This statement of Averroes, again, is a distortion of the
fact and it does not do Justice to the richness of al-
Ghazall's thought.
Further, Averroes says, if he were asked what is
his own position regarding his denial of Avicenna's theory
of the cause of plurality; he would point out that the
different schools of philosophy have different answers to
this question. Some believe that plurality comes
1lbid.p.237.
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through matter; while others hold that it comes through
instruments; and still others "believe that it comes
through mediators. And it is said of the Aristotelians
that they accept the theory which makeimediation the cause
of plurality. He says, however, that this theory which
is ascribed to Aristotle is not found in his works, nor
in any of the known Aristotelians. His opinion is that
according to the principles of the Aristotelians the cause
of plurality is a combination of three factors, the inter¬
mediates, the dispositions, and the instruments; all
these depend on the Monad and refer to it, for each of
them exists through an absolute unity which is the cause
of plurality. For it seems that the cause of the plur¬
ality of the separate intellects is the difference in
their nature, by which they receive the knowledge they
gain of the First Principle and which acquire from the
First Principle a unity which by itself is one single
act, but which becomes many through the plurality of the
recipients, just as there are many deputies under the
power of a king. He further says: "this we shall
examine in another place, and if some part of it becomes
clear it will suffice; otherwise we must take refuge in
263
1
revelation." Thus in the final analysis Averroes
submits to authority; whereas in the Harmony of Reason




Averroes accuses al-Ghazalx of inconsistency in
advocating doctrine contradictory to his professed beliefs
and subversive of Sunnism. Averroes says:
It appears from the books ascribed to him that in
metaphysics he recurs to the philosophers. And
of all his books this is most clearly shown and
most truly proved in his book called Mishkat al-
- 5
anwar.
Again, while mentioning how untrue is the proposition
that one can produce only one, if it is understood in
the way Avicenna and al-Farabl understand it, Averroes
points out "and Abu-Hamid himself in Mishkat al-anwar,
ZL







Then he comes on with his book known as Mishkat al-
anwar, and mentions therein the grades of the knowers
of Allah; and says that all of them are veiled save
those who believe that Allah is not the mover of the
First Heaven, He being the one from whom this mover
of the first Heaven emanates: which is an open
declaration on his part of the tenet of the philoso¬
phers* schools in the science of theology; though
he has said in several places that their science of
theology (but not their other sciences) is a set of
1
conjecture.
This allegation that al-Ghazali really held the
same metaphysical views as the Muslim Neoplatonists
respecting emanation is a most serious one. If it is
so, the insincerity of his criticism is obvious, for he
in his Tahafut wrote pages to demonstrate the illogicality
and falseness of the theory. But the charge of incon-
ssistency against al-Ghazall is ruled out when the authen¬
ticity of works attributed to al-Ghazali is strictly
observed. Watt says:
The Veils-section is not the work of al-Ghazall but
a forgery either completing a work dealing only with
the Light-verse or else substituted for the genuine
2
Ghazalian interpretation of the Veils-tradition.
•"1 C — mm s
An lianahi.j al-adilla ed.Muller,p.71 (quoted by Gairdner
in his art., 'Al-Ghazall's Mishkat & Ghazall-iroblem*,
Per Islacu1914. V,p.33«
*A Forgery in al-Ghazali's Mishkat?*, JAAS, 1949- P«5«
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Watt further declares after a through investigation that
nowhere in the later writings of al-Ghazall can other
1
Keoplatonic doctrine be found.
Moreover, Averroes is not justified in ascribing
to al-Gfrazall an adherence to the emanation doctrine on
the strength of this passage, for Tahafut is the book
(as al-Ghazall himself tells, in one of his last works
al-Munqidh which was completed a year or two before his
death) which represents the fruit of the special study
p
and criticism of the philosophers and their doctrines.
Thus al-Ghazall gives us clearly to understand that he
stands by every one of the vital findings of the iahafut.
He condemns outright the theory of emanation as it is
incompatible with the doctrine of God as the Creator.
It is wrong to ascribe to him that which he regarded as
the first of the three heresies. Again, the discovery
of 11;jam al-cawamm. (which was completed only a few days
3
before his death) in which al-Ghazali holds a position
1Ibid. pp.5-22.
P 2
Watt,W.M., 'Al-Ghazall1, EI. p.1039.
5Ibid.
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similar to that of the Ihya', rules out the possibility
that al-Ghazali adopted extreme philosophical forms of
Sufism in his last years.
These investigations show clearly that these
charges made against al-Ghazall are baseless. He
neither attacked the philosophers to please the religious
1
circles nor, as Kenan mentions, did he write a pamphlet
refuting all he had stated in the Tahafut,
Conclusion
From the above survey of the Tahafuts, the conclu-
:sion is that in none of the proofs for the eternity of the
wox^ld - the determination of the will and in the immediate
action of cause; the principle that time implies actual
movement; the assumption that the world as a whole is
eternal; and that possibility requires a substratum
matter, which is eternal - have the philosophers,
including Averroes, made out their case. They extend
their axioms to such an extent that they are often
involved in self-contradictions. In Tahafut at-tahafut
it has been observed that often Averroes indirectly or
1
Of, Averroes et L'Averroisme, Ch.2,parti,p.79*
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perhaps unconsciously justifies al-Ghazall's criticism
by reproaching al-Farabi and Avicenna saying that they
fabricated inventions against the philosophers.
Averroes' other supposed objective statements
that al-Ghazall misinterpreted the theories of the
philosophers* or the allegations of inconsistency, are
not based on any demonstrative proof. These allegations
are falsified on the strong evidence of the richness of
al-Ghazalx's thought and on the basis of the authenticity
l
of the works attiributed to him.
General Conclusion
268
She investigation of the doctrine of creation in
al-Ghazall and Averroes, and the comparison with which
the preceding chapter concluded, has perhaps succeeded
in clarifying the theological and the philosophical sides
of the thought of each of these thinkers, or at least
made it distinguishable from each aspect of their thought.
Al-Ghazall and Averroes followed two divergent trends,
and their theological and philosophical thought was, on
the whole, shaped by different concerns - namely,
al-Ghazali supported mainly the doctrine of the Ashcarites
or, more generally, of Ahl as-Sunna; Averroes' approach
is mainly Aristotelian, and^stands out against al-Ghazali
in having formulated a problem of eternal becoming.
The theory of the eternity of the world is an Aristotelian
one. Aristotle holds at the same time that time and
movement are infinite and that every causal series must
be finite. The contradiction in Aristotle is further
accentuated in Muslim philosophy by the fact that the
Muslim philosophers see in God, not only as Aristotle
did, the First Mover of the movement of the universe,
but they regard Him, under the influence of the Neo~
platonic theory of emanation, as the Creator of the
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universe from whom the world emanates eternally.
Al-Ghazall attacks this eraanational world-view for its*
heing in opposition to the theistic voluntarian Sunnites'
world-view. Averroes relied in the ability of reason
to comprehend the ultimate secrets of the universe.
Al-Ghazall^ though accepts in principle all the rational
sources of knowledge,firmly holds that reason does
not cover the whole truth. According to him, every
sensible statement can only be justified as true in one
of two ways: Either one knows it analytically, by simply
understanding the meaning of one's language, as in
definitions; or it must be justified by some empirical
observation. One can know nothing about the real
world by supposed axioms of reason. The conclusion
which one is to draw about the world is that the state¬
ment: "The world is eternal", is meaningful being
synthetic; and the opposite statement: "The world is
originated", is equally meaningful and synthetic. Now,
both the statements are being conceived as true. How
then is it possible to decide which really is true?
There is no empirical evidence, since pre-history, geology,
and astronomy do not take us back to a known beginning
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of things. The arguments which employ axioms of reason
are also worthless, for when one examines the axioms one
finds that they are either analytic statements giving no
new information about the empirical world; or synthetic
statements about the world which have to be supported
by empirical observation, the only kind of support that
can justify such statements. Any claim that such axioms
are known by intuition simply breaks down when someone
denies the intuition, and claims the opposite assertion
as conceivable and possibly true. Thus, one lacks any
rational way of finding out whether the world is eternal
or originated, though it must in fact be one or the other.
one
Now when/tries to understand the attitude and
approach of the Muslim philosophers and that of al-Ghazall,
one finds that the former followed the somewhat dogmatic
tradition of Aristotelian philosophy, mixed with some
Neoplatonic ideas. They have followed dogmatic tradition
at least in the sense of their acceptance of a number of
axioms of reason over and above the principles of logic.
For them, the Qur'an is of course a source of truth.
Everything in it is true, when it is correctly interpreted,
and the major truths about the world are all contained
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in the Qur'an or Traditions in one place or another.
But all these truths can also be known independently by
rational methods. In the Qur'an the literal meaning
often conceals the demonstrative truth from the masses.
This is at least the position of Averroes. For al-
Ghazalx, the Qur'an and Traditions hold a more essential
place as a source of truth. In his opinion, rational
sources leave gaps in the knowledge of the world, and
these gaps are filled by revelation - the Qur'an and
Traditions. It gives us knowledge of the world that
one could never have discovered for oneself.
Thus one can see that behind the attitude of
the Muslim philosophers and al-Ghazali, there are different
emotional attachments - the philosophers to Aristotle
and the rest of the philosophic heritage; al-Ghazali
to the Qur'an and the Traditions. These attachments
provide the background which helps us to understand
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